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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THROWN TOGETHER: CREDIT UNION AND COMMERCIAL
BANK REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE CONSUMER
FINANCE INDUSTRY, 1960-2015
This project seeks to assess whether there are meaningful differences between the
stability of the Credit Union and Consumer Banking industries before the 1980s, and how both
industries’ stability had been affected by subsequent political-economic changes. I also sought to
assess if deregulation would make credit union behave at risk levels similar to banks. I initially
observed that there was a strong inverse correlation between credit union size and failures, which
I argue could be explained by regulatory change. This claim was strengthened by the observation
that credit unions had benefitted from certain key forms of deregulation, they were still
deregulated to a lesser extent than banks and had still decreased their failure rates. After the early
1980s, credit unions suffered far lower rates of outright failure than banks during subsequent
economic downturns.
The project found that regulation works, but while credit unions can eventually come to
resemble bank’ risk patterns, it has not happened yet. Time series analysis revealed that
regulatory change had a greater effect on this than most other model variables, even if they were
aggregated into categories of industry-level or economy-level variables. The most telling finding
was that banks were able to leverage their market status and political power to deregulate in a
way that primarily benefitted them and allowed them to maintain their market position.
Conversely, they reduced the level of deregulation permitted to credit unions; credit unions did
still gain substantial freedom compared to the postwar years, but still more often faced increases
in regulation than banks did. This may have ended up benefitting credit unions the most, as a
balanced approach to deregulation allowed them stable growth.
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Chapter One: Competitors in Different Games
Since the Industrial Revolution and its attendant human suffering, environmental
degradation, and economic & market failures, it has been argued that market capitalism in its
various forms cannot reach a balanced (in terms of efficiency and equity) distribution of resources
without significant state intervention via regulation (among other things). It is no different in the
United States, where debates over whether, how, and how much the state should intervene in the
economy have always been heated, and whether those interventions should be in the interest of
economic efficiency or equity. This debate can be seen in the American economic traditions that
dominated the 20th century to the present – for decades, Keynesian economics and more equityinclined ideologies dominated policymaking in the US, until Neoliberalism moved from fringe
economic theory in the 1960s to the ideological powerhouse it is today. A key element of both of
these ideologies is an argument about whether state intervention in economics, especially via
regulation, can ever truly benefit a society, how such will affect a capitalist system’s balance
between efficient and equitable outcomes, and whether a level of regulation even exists which
can promote both equitable social outcomes and the consistent growth patterns demanded of a
market capitalist system such as exists in the US.
A contemporary stage where the stakes of this debate are clear is that of the American
financial industry, particularly in the world of consumer finance. After the industrial revolution
made the need for state intervention in economies apparent, in the United States the costs of
failing to do so cast a stark shadow in the fallout of the 1929 stock market crash, the effects of
which have become a core part of basic American history: The Great Depression. Among many
responses to that profound economic disaster was the birth of meaningful financial industry
regulation in the United States.
Along with a historical precedent for financial regulation and a slew of policies since, this
period also birthed decades of sociological and economic theory finding strong support for the
fallibility of markets, and though political debate remains hot, the single most common
1

conclusion in the sociological literature (and among Keynesian and social economists) has been
that regulation leads to more social good than economic harm (Calavita, Tillman and Pontell
1997; Carruthers 2009; Carruthers and Kim 2011; Davies 2014; Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Epstein
2005; Furner 2009; Granovetter 1985; Harvey 1988; King and Pearce 2010; Krippner 2011;
Pacewicz 2013; Prasad 2006; Schneiberg and Bartley 2001; Stiglitz 2008; Stryker 2000; Way
2005). Indeed, the massive sociological literature devoted to social welfare programs can largely
be understood as a study of capitalism’s social costs, as the nature of capitalist systems demands
the placement of workers in unlivable circumstances (Block and Somers 2014; Piven and
Cloward 1978; Piven and Cloward 1971; Robbins 2005; Somers and Block 2005). In a point
supported by numerous researchers since, the widespread suffering from unregulated capitalism
could become so great that the market system destroys itself (Block and Somers 2014; Furner
2009; Polanyi 1944; Somers and Block 2005; Stiglitz 2008).
Yet a difficulty in studying the value of economic regulation in financial industries, is
that because banking institutions have consistently and effectively fought against regulation over
the decades (especially since the late 1970s), there exist few natural experiments allowing for a
study of how different levels of regulation affect industry growth and risk to the wellbeing of the
general public. Considering this difficulty has led to a surprising discovery: that not only does the
opportunity for such a comparison exist, but that it also has not previously been considered by
sociologists. Sharing economic space with banks are credit unions: not-for-profit cooperative
financial institutions owned by account holders united by a “common bond”, such as university
affiliation or place of employment.
Despite their standing as a growing and increasingly visible force in consumer finance,
virtually no sociological attention has been paid to federal credit unions as a topic of intentional
study. This is surprising given their complex position in financial industries and communities,
their relatively unique institutional structures, and their supposed mandate to be involved in the
communities of their customer bases. Credit unions are well-suited to addressing questions of
2

market stability because their functions straddle the goals of market competition and community
development, with a legally limited customer base (Lune and Martinez 1999; Moulton 2007).
Despite wrestling with economies of scale, credit unions tend to be comparatively more stable
than banks during difficult times (Glasberg and Skidmore 1997). This may be due in part to their
unique regulatory environment, raising questions of whether we can learn from the credit union
model to develop more stable financial economic relations. In this case, we can examine how
differences in the regulation of banks and credit unions explains differences in their stability and
what those dynamics can tell us about how to produce stable, effective, and possibly more
equitable financial markets.
Research Questions
A core element of this study is to test the broad argument by sociologists that regulation
leads to a more stable economy, much theorized but seldom empirically tested. I will also
simultaneously test the claim made by Credit Union industry insiders that CUs are less likely to
fail than for-profit institutions such as banks. This work will be guided by the research question:
Was there a meaningful difference between the stability of the Credit Union and Consumer
Banking industries before the 1980s, and how have both industries’ stability been affected by the
subsequent political-economic changes? The first part of this question essentially requires a basic
comparison of failure rates and indicators of stability. Initially, I will examine whether there is a
substantive difference between not only the frequency of failure of credit unions and banks, but
also whether there is a difference between each institution type along several other variables
related to stability and failure. These can include measures such as profits, growth in numbers of
accounts and loans, loan-to-account ratios, and actual failure or takeover rates.1 Worth noting,
however, is that a finding of no difference in failure or stability measures between banks and
credit unions does not necessary derail the study. Rather, given their different regulatory

1

Specifics regarding methodology, data collection, and variable calculation can be found in Chapter 4.
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environments, a potential finding of no difference raises the important question of why regulation
seems to have no significant effect on institutional stability, a question that remains underattended in the field. Not only would this be an interesting direction to explore, but it would also
provide a novel counterpoint to sociological assumptions about the function and effectiveness of
regulation.
The second part of this research question will constitute the greatest portion of the
dissertation project, as it will require developing a more in-depth understanding of the banking
and credit union industries. Addressing the second clause of the research question will require
examining what accounts for the significance or insignificance of differences between banks and
credit unions. This would require more advanced statistical analysis, as I would have to compose
regression models testing the relative effects of regulation on stability as compared to other
commonly referenced measures of institutional strength, such as an institution’s financial size,
membership, age, or range of services offered. Also, given how the state of regulation in general
has changed over time, most notably with the rise of neoliberalism and financialization, I can
customize these models to not only examine the aggregate timeline, but also sets of decades or
significant stretches of time.
The second research question for this project asks: Will the changes in economic ideology
and market structure cause credit unions and banks to develop increasingly similar levels of
stability? In the United States there has been a mercurial understanding of the role of state
regulation in the economy, a perspective which grew notably negative with the rise of neoliberal
ideology in the 1980s. American regulation has developed cyclical patterns of strength and
weakness, and faced frequent, powerful opposition. I expect to find that over time, as
circumstances change with the spread of free-market ideologies, each industry will face pressure
to conform in some way to a changing set of values.
For example, though credit unions have a strong history of valuing the notion of
democratic control and community support over profit, they also have historically fought
4

regulation, and have recently done so with more fervor. At a 2013 Conference for Bank Managers
and Directors, Elizabeth Duke, then a Governor of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, frequently evoked imagery of exhausting and burdensome regulatory changes regarding
credit unions:
“I completely understand how tiring it is to fight a financial crisis and survive a
deep recession followed by a weak recovery only to confront what seems to be a
tsunami of new regulations. … I was a community banker [in 1991]. We had
survived the savings and loan crisis with some bruises, but we were still standing.
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA) had been followed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991. I had more new regulations stacked on my
desk than I had employees in the bank. …Frankly, I didn’t know how I was going to
tackle all that lay in front of us. …Federal Reserve research over the years has
confirmed that the burden of regulations falls disproportionately on smaller banks.
(Duke 2013, p. 1)”
This is reminiscent of the conflict between banks and credit unions that has existed at
least since the first wave of credit union growth in the US (Morman 1920), wherein banks
advocated for regulations which made CUs less competitive, and credit unions fought for more
lenient treatment. Thus, one question that this project will address via its findings is that if credit
unions are safer intuitions, will they be as stable today as in the 1970s before the wave of
neoliberal policies began?
As this research progresses, I expect to find a case study of effective financial regulation
in action, weakened over time by neoliberal ideology and financialization. I will use this to
demonstrate how different regulatory regimes can contribute to economic stability and growth.
This project will thus contribute to research which has focused on problems in the banking
industry by studying potential solutions on not only the national policy level, but also through the
credit union industry, which in the US has been largely ignored by sociologists.2 It will also

2

There is a somewhat healthy literature about credit unions and their role in communities in other countries, but
American credit unions have seldom ever been the topic of focused study, and certainly not as theoretically meaningful
contributors to the sociology of finance, regulation, or economic sociology more broadly. Heather Haveman in the
1980s and 1990s conducted some research on state-chartered credit unions, but that research has not been generalizable
and was focused on abstract organizational structures.
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provide a test and application of sociological and social-economic theoretical claims (e.g.
Fligstein, Polanyi, and Stiglitz) regarding the consequences of regulatory rollbacks, a concept that
has not received rigorous empirical analysis.
Economists have argued that markets are self-regulated because of self-interest. Firms
will avoid damaging the public good for fear of driving away business (Dobbin and Sutton 1998;
Glasberg and Skidmore 1997; Gupta and Lad 1983; Short and Toffel 2010; Stiglitz 2008). Adam
Smith argued that by pursuing their own interests, individuals and firms would be led to choices
which maximize general wellbeing through efficient distribution of resources (Dobbin and Sutton
1998; Stiglitz 2008). While this remains theoretically possible, sociologists have argued that not
only are there countless contrary examples, but “…no one believes that the conditions under
which that statement is true are satisfied, (Stiglitz 2008 p.3)” at any point in reality (Epstein 2005;
Fligstein and Dauter 2007; Granovetter 1985; Swedberg 1991; Swedberg 2007). This has led
sociologically-inclined researchers to conclude that the idea that markets lead to efficient
outcomes “has, in short, no theoretical justification (Stiglitz 2008 p.3).
Instead, researchers have argued that because of their basis in social relations and their
existence as a field for power struggles3, markets are inherently unstable and must be regulated;
Adam Smith admitted that businessmen rarely gather without conspiring to wield market power
against the public interest (Block and Somers 2014; Epstein 2005; Fligstein 2002; Fligstein and
Dauter 2007; Granovetter 1985; Harvey 2005; Somers and Block 2005; Stiglitz 2008) These
claims have been supported with case studies such as the Enron and 2007 subprime mortgage
lending crises, in which it was revealed that firms deliberately engaged in high-risk and
questionably legal investment behaviors on an industry-wide level, the scope of which
necessitated some level of collusion (Campbell 2010; Duménil and Levy 2011; Epstein 2005;

Bourdieu’s theoretical work on Fields has been influential here. Fligstein, Neil, and Doug McAdam. 2014. A Theory
of Fields. New York: Oxford University Press.
3
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Harvey 1988; Krippner 2011; Lounsbury and Hirsch 2010). A point of additional support for this
claim from the recent Great Recession is that many of the destabilizing practices engaged in by
the lending industry were technically legal, such as the trade of risky, newly-created derivatives,
assets whose value depends on the price of another underlying asset (Blinder 2013; Campbell
2010; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Stiglitz 2010).
Here lay the first of two major inspirations for this study. Between sociologists and social
economists there is substantial theoretical reason to be concerned about the stability of markets in
capitalist societies. However, there are solutions recommended to mitigate the effects of what
appears to be an innate instability, most often in the form of higher state intervention in the form
of increased regulation of industries and modifications of tax policy to support the cost of state
intervention. The social democracies of Europe even appear to provide good real-world case
studies for the effectiveness of such policies. However, in the United States there is a significant
socio-cultural and -historical resistance to both arms of this proposed solution, which brings us to
the second issue driving this study: the power of ideology.
Finding Meaning in Markets: The Power of Ideology
As we transition into some broader topics necessary to understand issues of regulation
and consumer finance markets, there are just a few mare points about the broader meaning and
purpose of this project. Much of sociology has been directed toward assessing, addressing, and
explaining inequalities; and rightly so. Much theory has focused on these issues. However,
another segment of the discipline, especially common in the study of organizations, economy, and
politics has focused more on process. In these subfields, theoretical and empirical work may
focus more or how certain processes play out or how systems function but may not at all directly
address inequalities. This project lives within that space. It does not directly tie to any issue of
equality, but as many sociological topics do, it addresses subjects that, if better understood, would
help us, to better understand observed inequalities, their causes, and their effects.
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This project operates on the premise that Federal regulation of industry and enterprise is
an effective means of curbing the excesses of capitalism. This not only would allow broader
groups to participate in markets but would allow more democratic participation in who markets
serve and how. Consume markets absolutely play a role in these concerns. It had been well
established that marginalized communities are less likely to be given access to credit, a resource
which in our economy can be required for home ownership, renting a living space, accessing
reliable transportation, and more. Often, one must have a credit history to get credit, a paradox
that has burned countless low-income individuals and groups. Likewise, discrimination in the
consumer finance industry has played a massive role in American racial inequalities, given
historical and present practices of redlining in home sales and realty. Further, the development of
certain types of derivatives, bought and sold among numerous financial institutions, are made
possible because of lax or delayed regulation, which allowed new types of predatory lending
targeting and profiting off the financial failure of the poor and racial minorities.
Legislative battles over regulation often end up serving as proxy battles for whether and
how markets may be democratized, by giving citizens who do not own the means of production a
system dedicated to ensuring that markets do not only serve the interests of those able to wield
and manipulate large sums of resources for investment in ways that endanger resources that
poorer groups rely on, such as pensions, home equity, or cheap credit. A major factor in deciding
these battles is in the prevalence of certain ideological perspectives about the purpose of an
economy, who it is meant to serve, and who can influence its behavior and functions.
More specifically, this project examines the effects of dominant economic ideologies on
industry health and stability. Take a moment to recall what ideology refers to – an ideology is a
collection of ideas, values, and norms that we (as people, groups, or an entire society) use to
make sense of the world we live in. Ideologies are often deeply personal, and through they may or
may not be swayed by evidence, they are different from theories in that they are neither beholden
to, nor dependent on evidence. Thus, an economic ideology is simply a framework of norms,
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values, and cultural notions that are used to understand the economic world in which we live.
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber, 1904) can be understood, for example,
as an exploration of the ideological foundations of capitalism – it’s a work detailing the
development of an economic ideology and how that ideology became powerful.
Marx’s view on dichotomies notwithstanding, doing so for this project is useful,
especially given the exclusionary demands of market fundamentalist values. There are different
means of dichotomizing economic ideologies; the best way to do it for this project is to divide
them by whether they aim to produce an efficient distribution of resources, or an equitable one.
Economic ideologies that seek to distribute resources efficiently argue that economies are most
effective when they reach Pareto efficiency (Pareto 1927). That is, when the distribution of scare
resources has reached a point where any change is zero-sum: no party can significantly gain
resources without another significantly losing resources (Pareto 1927). A situation where all
available financial wealth in a county has been distributed to its people, and there is no way to
give more wealth to one group without taking it from another. While this definition appeals to
notions of fairness popular in US political culture, an important point to keep in mind is that this
concept is more concerned about waste than equal distribution. At its most reductionist: if all the
money is accounted for, it does not especially matter if it all rests with 1% of the population.
They also seek to ensure that the maximum possible value is derived from any given economic
activity – an example would be a chef who gets the most out of their ingredients and throws little
away. They know that the tops of carrots and celery, or outer layers of onions can be thrown into
a stock pot to enhance the flavor and value of a beef broth, rather than trashed or even composted.
Economic ideologies that seek a more equitable distribution of resources are more
concerned with whether resources are more evenly distributed across a population or industry,
even if doing so means that less wealth is derived from an activity that could be generated
(Granovetter 1985; Kreuger 1974; Krippner and Alvarez 2007; Swedberg 1991; Swedberg 2007).
They may argue that an industry that rapidly generates wealth is not effective if that wealth
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cannot be enjoyed by a broad population. It is more concerned that the distribution of resources
be generated or used in a way that maximizes the scope of their benefits, rather than the amount
of benefit. It is this perspective that justifies the existence of welfare programs or investment in
arts programs – that there are benefits to distributing resources in a way that will not offer
equivalent material returns.
It is the differences between these two ideological positions that both unite and divide the
work of sociologists and economists, each of whom have groups which will argue to their last
breath that the other fails to consider a vital theoretical point that clearly indicates which position
is most objectively true. This veers into the realm of philosophy and is not the subject of this
study. However, it is important to define these differences because of how powerfully they figure
into the political and social application of economic concepts, policies, values, and norms. A
subject of considerable argument is whether these underlying values are diametrically opposed.
Though common reason compels a person to argue in favor of distributing wealth both efficiently
and fairly, accomplishing such a societal goal has never managed to move from theory to reality.
The reason that this must be the case serves as the basis for this study – that determining
what constitutes a fair, equitable, and even efficient distribution of resources cannot be done
without the influence of social values, which themselves are profoundly influenced by the
dominant cultural ideologies from which people derive their values. In a reality in which global
capitalism can and does exist, few social institutions and their attendant ideologies touch people’s
lives in more places than that of Economy. In the United States, the inability to reconcile the
efficient distribution or resources with the equitable distribution of resources is visible
everywhere. It is present in the argument between children about who gets to play videogames
after school first, in a couple’s decision on what portion of whose income is spent on bills in a
household, in what a city council decides to do about its resident homeless population. And a
person’s conclusion about this question powerfully determines if (and for what) a person casts a
vote, be it for an elected official, or for a policy.
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The Ideological Imperatives of Neoliberalism
In the United States, the dominant ideology guiding these large and small conflicts is that
of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is a concept whose precise definition varies depending on how it
is being applied. Empirical works primarily using statistical and policy-oriented comparativehistorical methods tend to define neoliberalism in terms of its policy outcomes; as an ideological
phenomenon characterized by rhetoric and policies demanding reduced taxation, regulation, and
government intervention (Krippner 2005; Krippner 2011; Prasad 2006). Theoretical works in the
power elite tradition of political economy tend to portray neoliberalism as a hegemonic ideology
driven by powerful interest groups seeking to reassert control over global social class struggles
(Bourdieu and Nice 1998; Davies 2014; Harvey 2007). A third line of reasoning conceptualizes
neoliberalism as a modified form of market fundamentalism, a slightly older ideology which saw
market exchange as a natural human behavior and thus regarded the free market as the idea
vehicle for self-actualization and resource distribution (Block and Somers 2014; Granovetter
1985; Polanyi 1944; Somers and Block 2005; Stiglitz 2008). While these three conceptions focus
on a separate manifestation of neoliberalism, none of these definitions are incorrect; they simply
foreground certain aspects of the ideology to emphasize its relevance to a given subtopic or
method of study (i.e., comparative-historical works tend to emphasize the theoretical and
ideological contexts which led to neoliberalism). Given the variety of interpretations displayed, a
useful working definition of neoliberalism could be simply: a politically and economically
powerful ideology through which free and competitive markets are seen as the ideal means of
resource distribution and resolution of social problems.
Born of Friedrich Hayek’s depression-era critique of Keynesian economic theory,
neoliberalism was an idea circulating largely among the fringes of economics until the 1960s
(Furner 2009; Stiglitz 2008). Neoliberal ideology emerged into the more active world of policy
with a series of initiatives posed my Milton Friedman and his “Chicago Boys” (a group of likeminded free-market economists from the University of Chicago) in a response to economic crises
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in Pinochet’s Chile (Babb 2005; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Mudge 2008). The
proposals resulted in reduced inflation and substantial GDP growth in Chile once implemented.
These results drew the attention of American economists (with Friedman’s promotion) in the
1970s as the United States developed its own economic crises and was looking for an alternative
to Keynesian economic policy (which did not appear able to keep up with the economic
fluctuations in a newly globalizing world)(Harvey 1988; Prasad 2006). Its adoption as Ronald
Reagan’s driving economic ideology in the 1980s was the final push toward neoliberalism’s
meteoric rise to an apparently hegemonic level of power and has (to varying extents) influenced
the economic policy of each subsequent president (Prasad 2006). Neoliberalism also saw
additional support through its adoption by Margaret Thatcher’s administration in the United
Kingdom, and globally through institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) (Babb 2009; Prasad 2006).
The preceding timeline is well established and described by sociologists who have gone
on to examine what consequences neoliberal ideology has had for various populations, social
groups, and countries. However, little work has examined precisely how neoliberal ideology was
able to spread so quickly during a time characterized by strong welfare states. Researchers appear
fairly unified in their claim that part of the explanation lays in the 1970s Oil Crisis (among others
in that time), the resulting “stagflation” in the United States (a phenomenon characterized by both
high inflation and stagnant economic growth), a global recession, and a shaken faith in Keynesian
economics (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013; Mudge 2008). However, these explanations
remain incomplete because they fail to explain why some western states turned to neoliberalism
for solutions while others remained highly resistant to the austerity measures neoliberal policy
demanded of welfare states.
Prasad (2006) has suggested that the difference in state adoptions of neoliberalism can be
attributed to whether the previously existing welfare state apparatuses were constructed in concert
with business groups, or despite them. She comes to argue that those welfare regimes that were
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crafted in a way that portrayed business interests as adversaries to be controlled or defeated
resulted in a business-conservative backlash that led to the adoption of pro-business neoliberalism
(Prasad 2006). However, her support for these claims (while lauded by the academic community)
is not conclusive, as her analysis spans only the 1980s, and her work has been criticized for
minimizing the role of race in Reagan’s anti-welfare campaigns and for failing to adequately
consider competing theories and the role of the state in the neoliberalizing process (Brady 2009).
Another explanation claims that neoliberalism was able to become so powerful in part
because it was able to be aligned with neoconservative ideology (Brown 2006). Among the many
proposed sources of neoliberal power, few appear as antithetical as a marriage of interests
between neoliberalism and America’s neoconservative right-wing. Neoconservatism is an
ideology which began to gain power during the Vietnam War era in response to a growing
postmodernism in the United States, which saw a rise in valuation of individual self-actualization,
innovation, the satisfaction of material desires, and moral relativism, in contrast to tradition,
religiosity, and unity (Amable 2011; Bell 1978; Fourcade and Healy 2007). While it is seldom the
focus of research, much research on neoliberalism has assumed a relationship between neoliberal
and neoconservative ideologies. However, the mechanism behind this connection has not been
explicitly explored – the literature takes it as an assumption upon which to support other
arguments. However, it bears repeating that the assumed correlation between neoliberal business
groups and socially conservative values is not in question. Rather, researchers have been too
quick to accept the bonding of two very different (arguably opposed in their values) ideologies
which has had dramatic effects on both domestic and international scales (Amable 2011; Brown
2006; Fourcade and Healy 2007).
Brown (2006) provides the most direct attention to explaining the sources of the
neoliberal-neoconservative bond by outlining how the very theoretical bases of neoliberalism and
neoconservative ideology allow for their alliance, among which is that both ideologies call for
similar policy outcomes. One example given is that both neoconservatism and neoliberalism tend
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to value limits on popular sovereignty (albeit for different reasons). Neoconservatism is strongly
connected to values of religiosity and this manifests in an understanding that there should be
strong leadership figures who guide the morality of social units (Brown 2006). This can operate
on the level of a father guiding a household, or a president guiding a country. As a child might be
sanctioned by the family head for immoral behavior, so might individuals be punished for poor
choices by the markets in which they operate. Where neoconservatism sees strong moral
leadership as the source of justice in social groups, neoliberalism counts on the market to
dispense justice to those who do not follow its rules (Granovetter 1985; Polanyi 1944; Stiglitz
2008).
This mutual belief in powerful forces which resolve conflicts and dispense justice
(whether in the form of abstract ‘market forces’ or a materially-existent leader) helps to explain
how neoliberalism and neoconservatism can unify through mutual support for limited popular
sovereignty. For neoconservatism, favor for limited popular sovereignty takes the form of a
belief that once a leader is selected, that leader should be trusted to make expert decisions to
benefit their constituents (Amable 2011). This tends to translate into a lack of support for popular
social movements, as neoconservatism places a higher value on unity (which movements might
threaten) than fairness or equity (Amable 2011; Brown 2006). Further, within neoconservative
groups, these value-based expectations are reinforced by semi-religious belief in absolute truth
driven by inner conviction – a position unassailable by fact or argument (Amable 2011; Brown
2006).
Similarly, neoliberalism delegitimizes collective action in part because social movements
commonly look beyond markets for solutions to grievances (often to the state), a violation of the
principle that markets should be trusted in their functions (Brown 2006; Fourcade-Gourinchas
and Babb 2002; Pakulski and Waters 1996). Social movements are rendered meaningless because
neoliberal ideology attributes inequalities to individual failings and so aggrieved parties should
look to improve themselves in order to improve their situation (meaning that structural issues
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commonly addressed by social movements could not possibly exist) (Brown 2006; Granovetter
1985).
Much like that demanded by neoconservatism, neoliberal ideology requires total belief in
the ability of markets to efficiently allocate resources to where they are needed, even when this
belief is not reinforced by reality (Davis 2009; Polanyi 1944; Stiglitz 2008). Brown argues that
these shared characteristics make neoliberalism and neoconservatism well matched, as they
permit cooperation in a variety of policy goals. One example of this cooperation is the attempt to
curtail or eliminate public welfare. Neoliberal ideology does not tolerate such systems because
they protect people from market forces, can reduce market competition, and can strongly affect
the supply of labor (Burt 1995; Kreuger 1974; Pacewicz 2013; Piven and Cloward 1971; Stiglitz
2008). Likewise, neoconservatives oppose such policies because they can be seen as reducing the
costs of immoral behaviors (such as laziness, drug use, or willful irresponsibility), thus enabling
further violation of neoconservative social values (such as productivity, health, and reliability)
(Amable 2011; Brown 2006; Piven and Cloward 1971; Somers and Block 2005).
From Abstract to Concrete
Let us consider a case study of how changes in regulation can affect the stability of an
industry, and more broadly, the economy: the 1980s Savings & Loan Crisis. Savings and loan
banks first appeared in the US in 1831. Modeled on British building associations, they focused
from the beginning on providing affordable mortgages by pooling the savings of depositors
(Egnal 2006; Haveman and Rao 1997). The story of S&Ls was slow and boring until the
appearance of American banking regulation after the Great Depression, during which S&Ls
received deposit insurance but remained less regulated than banks (Egnal 2006). By 1965, thrifts
provided nearly half of all mortgages (Egnal 2006). While most stayed small, there were a few
larger and more diversified S&Ls, much like in the credit union industry (Egnal 2006; Haveman
and Rao 1997). The recent history of savings and loans (abbreviated to S&Ls, also known as
thrifts) and the way they have been regarded since the 1980s is captured by the observation that,
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“Savings and loans associations seemed a sleepy corner of the financial services
world until a wave of failures… rocked the industry and the nation. When the
dust settled in the 1990s, almost 1,300 thrifts had closed their doors, and
taxpayers were stuck with a bill for $160 billion. (Egnal 2006, p. 2)”
With the stagflation that developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the newly
neoliberalizing political climate demanded deregulation as a solution for hard-hit thrifts (Egnal
2006; Kim and Miner 2007). After an episode of radical deregulation, and ostensibly emboldened
by deposit insurance, S&Ls gained access to national markets. With such a dramatic shift and
corresponding growth in the face of deregulation, it became common for thrifts to “…provide full
financing for a broad spectrum of investments with little or no down payment.(Bernstein 1994)”
This pattern quickly became unsustainable and came to a head in the mid-1980s, with the Savings
& Loan Crisis.
With the beginning of the deregulatory trend in the early 80s, S&Ls were not only able to
reach a national customer base but were able to offer products at higher interest rates than
previously possible (Bernstein 1994). By 1982, interest on their older loans was no longer
sufficient to pay the higher interest rates more recently used by thrifts to attract investors, made
possible by the pre-repeal softening of enforcement of Regulation Q (Bernstein 1994; Egnal
2006). Once again, the solution was further deregulation. This “…generated hasty, at times
foolish, and even corrupt decision making. Operating in unrestricted and almost unknown
territory, S&Ls became involved in questionable investment schemes, many of them unsecured,
some very risky. (Bernstein 1994, p. 8)” Starting the decade with $800 million in assets, industry
assets fell to negative $4.1 billion within three years. Despite a brief boost in assets facilitated by
early 1980s deregulation, net assets were again dropping by 1985, closing the decade nearly
$20billion in losses (FDIC 2000). By the end of the decade, 563 thrifts had failed (compared to
143 the previous 45 years), and there had been more than 1,100 forced and voluntary mergers of
struggling and insolvent institutions (FDIC 2000).
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Figure 1.1. Number of S&L Banks and Federal Credit Unions in the
1980s

Figure 1.2. Percent Change in Net Income of S&L Banks and
Federal Credit Unions

While many S&L banks failed and closed their doors, a comparison of the number of
institutions and total assets shows a seemingly paradoxical situation of asset growth simultaneous
to institutional decline among both credit unions4 and savings and loan banks (Figure 1.1).

Unless otherwise specified, the phrase “credit unions” will refer to federally chartered natural person credit unions, as
opposed to corporate credit unions or state-chartered credit unions.
4
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However, more accurate variables such as change in net income, mergers, and failures gives a
more detailed story. Visible in Figure 1.2, percent change in net income for credit unions is
generally positive, but more importantly, stable throughout the tumultuous 1980s, the only
dramatic change being in a sudden 400% growth of net income in 1981, from -72% in 1980. This
is explainable by changes in interest rates, loan activity, and changes in credit union investment
activity. In particular, in 1981 credit unions rolled their investments over into shorter-term
portfolios to take advantage of the year’s higher interest rates (NCUA 1981). Then, nearly one
third of credit union income came from investments, up from about 25% in 1980 and 16.5% in
1979 (NCUA 1981).
Savings and loan assets, however, experienced dramatic instability during this period;
after all, it was called the Savings & Loan Crisis. Particularly interesting was a nearly 8,000%
drop in net income in 1987, likely because in 1986 the crisis came to a head, marking the
beginning of the massive failures and liquidations that characterized the crisis. The Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) closed or resolved 296 institutions beginning in
1986 until 1989, at which point the closures were taken over by the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) until 1995 (Curry and Shibut 2000). In keeping with the extent of the crisis, S&L net
income (in both percent change and absolute value) fluctuated and fell during the mid- and late1980s.
For the credit union industry, however, the 1980s was a period of financial growth. This
was fueled in part by a multi-decade merger movement in the industry, which explains in part
why the number of credit unions decreased despite an increase in assets (Figure 1.2)(Dopico and
Wilcox 2009). The latter half of the 20th century overall was a period of massive growth for the
credit union industry, as the merger movement allowed for the existence of larger firms with
greater economies of scale (following a process of deregulation that allowed for asset growth
across all the FIRE industries). Credit unions, despite their relatively higher regulation levels,
have not been immune to the process of financialization nor the effects of the savings and loan
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Figure 1.3. Number of Failures & Mergers of
Institutions
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crisis, as Figure 1.3 demonstrates. Though more than 1,000 savings and loan institutions had
failed or been liquidated by the end of the crisis, credit unions also had several failures and forced
closures. However, unlike for savings and loan banks, the number of these incidents smoothed
over the course of the crisis.
The period from 2000 to 2014 saw a continued decline in the number of institutions
regardless of fluctuations in income, indicating that both mergers and closures continued with the
2007 financial crisis (Figure 1.4). S&Ls experienced consistent growth until 2005, before
plunging sharply through the initial Financial Crisis; an expected change given that most of their
business is based on mortgages and other loans. Yet a significant takeaway from these two figures
is that while credit unions were not immune to the crisis, they appear more stable; their
fluctuations were not nearly so sharp as savings and loans.
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Figure 1.4. Number of S&L Banks and Federal Credit Unions 2000-2016

Figure 1.5. Number of Failures and Mergers of Failing or Struggling
Institutions 2000-2014

How can we reconcile this conclusion with the data in Figure 1.5, which shows that when
counting failures and forced mergers credit unions seem equally unstable as savings and loans?
There are a few possible explanations. First, from the 1980s to the present, the number of credit
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unions with assets over $500Million has increased, meaning that the common perception of credit
unions being small institutions is increasingly inaccurate (Dopico and Wilcox 2009).
This is relevant because when discussing failures during the financial crisis, the general
conclusion is that it was mostly very small credit unions which were failing (ABA 2010). The
failure of small institutions during economically difficult times is consistent with the idea of
economies of scale, and the risks of being a small institution in the semi-periphery of a market
field (Negro, Visentin and Swaminathan 2014). Not only do small credit unions have smaller
margins of safety and fewer liquid assets to get them through emergencies, but their lack of assets
may also place them on a lower priority level to be saved by the NCUSIF than bigger institutions,
possibly along the lines of a ‘Too Big to Fail’ effect.
It is the observation of the development and fallout of the Savings & Loan crisis, the
2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis and ensuing global recession, and calls to deregulate credit
unions that drive the analysis to be included in this dissertation. While the above data was
sufficient to identify a trend of Credit Union resilience, the crisis not only heavily damaged the
Savings & Loan industry, it also left a mess of regulatory recordkeeping such that it was not
possible to collect sufficient time series data to allow Credit Union performance to be compared
long-term to that of Savings & Loans. Between1960 and 2015, Savings and Loans saw oversight
authority be transferred across at least four government departments and agencies, several of
which no longer exist. This left possession of annual reports and other long-term data highly
disorganized and difficult to locate, a finding that forced the exclusion of Savings & Loans from
the meat of this study. However, an examination of Commercial Banks during the same period
showed that while their outcomes were quite different from Savings & Loans, banks experienced
similar (if less dramatic) patterns of struggle during economic crises. Given the pressure that
Credit Unions are now facing to conform to business patterns resembling those of Commercial
Banks, I found that the differences between the stability patterns of banks and credit unions
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creates an opportunity for a sort of natural experiment in which I can compare the effect of
changes in regulatory policy on both industries.
Banks and Credit Unions through Crises
What background does this give us? What were key differences between banks and credit
unions during the Savings & Loan Crisis (the effects of which certainly were not limited to
S&Ls) and during the 2000s, which include the Subprime Mortgage Crisis? Much like the
previous institutional comparisons, both commercial banks and credit unions showed a decreasing
number of institutions in the 1980s, compared with increases in absolute values of assets (Figure
1.6). This is consistent with the outcomes of the previously discussed credit union merger
movement, along with the similar pattern followed by banks as deregulation allowed banks to
offer an increasing variety of services under one roof. Appropriate to the difference in their
market share, especially in the 1980s, commercial bank assets are nearly on a different scale as
that of credit unions, but in each of these comparisons the patterns are what is revealing.
In Figure 1.7, we see a comparison of credit union and commercial bank failures and
mergers during the 1980s. As was visible in Figure 1.3, failures and mergers for credit unions had
an inverse relationship throughout the 1980s, due in part to credit unions taking advantage of
mergers to resolve the issue of failing institutions, rather than forced liquidation. This pattern,
combined with their generally more conservative practices, allowed credit unions to delay and
minimize the effects of the Savings & Loan crisis. Commercial banks, however, showed positive
correlations between failures and mergers during the crisis – both increased and decreased around
the same times. While credit union failures and mergers both decreased from 1983-1989,
commercial banks saw consistent increases in both failures and mergers from 1981 until 1989.
This shows that their structure and practices led commercial banks to experience the damage of
the S&L crisis faster, giving them less time to adjust and minimize losses. Likewise, it shows that
banks leverages mergers less effectively than credit unions to minimize failures. From this we can
see that while the crisis was not as catastrophic for banks as it was for Savings & Loans (for
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Figure 1.6. Count of Credit Unions and Commercial Banks, Assets per
Institution ($Thousands), 1980-1990.

Figure 1.7. Count of Institutional Failures and Mergers, Credit Unions and
Commercial Banks, 1980-1990.

which the crisis was named), they suffered its effects to a greater extent early on than credit
unions did.
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Figure 1.8. Count of Credit Union and Commercial Bank Institutions with
Percent Change in Assets, 2000-2014/2016.

Transitioning to the next substantial crisis, the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and subsequent
global market failures and recessions, we again see commercial banks follow a similar pattern
relative to credit unions. Let us again return to the comparison of numbers of institutions and
assets during this period. Figure 1.8 (right axis) shows the continued decline in the number of
institutions for both credit unions and commercial banks. Ever since changes in regulatory policy
allowed institutions to merge and offer wider services more freely, both types of institutions saw
increased industry concentration – fewer institutions with more assets between them, as they
became able to serve wider consumer markets.
The left two axes represent percent change in assets for each type of institution. This
chart may be confusing, for there are a few things to keep in mind as it is read. The first axis
represents change in assets for commercial banks. The second, credit unions. The axis for
commercial banks spans a much larger range than it does for credit unions, as commercial banks
experienced far more dramatic peaks and valleys than credit unions did, especially as the
subprime mortgage crisis took root. The top horizontal red line shows the zero value for
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Figure 1.9. Count of Credit Union and Commercial Bank Failures and Mergers,
2000-2014/2016.

commercial banks, demonstrating that not only did their assets growth fall sharply below zero as
the crisis began, but they continuously rose and fell close to it throughout the crisis. Compare this
to the change in asset growth for credit unions, whose zero value is represented by the bottom red
line. Though they too saw sharp peaks and valleys in asset growth and loss, credit unions did not
flirt nearly so closely with a zero or subzero value as banks did. However, the fact that they show
peaks and valleys such as this demonstrates that deregulation did affect credit unions’ stability
and outcomes.
The difference in the stability and security of banks and credit unions is also well
demonstrated by Figure 1.9, which compares counts of failures and mergers for both types of
institutions. The first part that draws the eye are the two peaks toward the middle of the graph.
These represent both failures (higher peak) and mergers (lower, grey peak) for commercial banks.
Though their annual non-crisis counts of failures were lower than that of credit unions,
commercial banks suffered mightily, from when the crisis struck in 2008 until the global
recession is generally considered to have ended in 2013. Meanwhile, credit unions saw only a
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slightly elevated increase in failures during the period, but this loss was fairly consistent each
year across the period – it was a level loss before returning to pre-crisis failure levels. Further,
credit unions actually saw a decrease in mergers during the crisis period, demonstrating that
contrary to their pattern in the 1980s, it cannot be clearly deduced that credit unions were using
mergers as an alternative to failures. The effect simply was not the same.
Meaning and Steps Ahead
These comparisons show that the commercial banks can be compared to credit unions in
a similar way as savings and loans. Banks continue to show sharper struggles during periods of
crisis than credit unions, showing that there is something that can be learned from comparing
differences in how each type of institution is regulated. Thus, this study will continue with a
comparison of changes in regulatory law for banks and credit unions, and how those changes
appear to affect their ability to weather economic crises. Why does this matter? For a few
reasons. First, markets are generally treated as being guided by natural forces, intervention into
which is like dropping a dam in a river without having ever thought of where the water would go.
Assessing the extent to which regulation can actually provide stability demonstrates that, to
continue the metaphor, we have the means to predict what will happen to the flow of water when
a dam is constructed and can do so safely. Second, this can demonstrate that there is a benefit to
modifying market and industry functions to protect the people that interact and exist within their
bounds, and that an everybody-for-themselves model of regulation is unnecessary and damaging.
Finally, when crises strike, it is often the poorest and most marginalized who lose out
first. They may lose their savings, pensions if they have them at all, and are the first to lose their
jobs when consumer spending drops, and the first to be denied credit to get themselves through
the slump. When regulation is proposed, industries are often quick to claim that they cannot
survive under such restrictions, or that having to provide services more equitably would destroy
them. Yet when protective and market-opening regulations are in place, some of which require
more equitable services for consumers, institutions tend to fare better during times of economic
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hardship. It is difficult to imagine how, with an unemployment rate over 22%, how much worse
the economic damage would be during the COVID recession if banks were allowed to widely
foreclose on homes and landlords allowed to evict for lack of rent payment. And as during every
crisis, the poor and marginalized are hurt the worst.
This is the driving concern behind this project about regulation and institutions’ assets
which, on its surface level, has no concern about inequalities or problems facing marginalized
groups. Understanding how these organizations are affected by policies that aim to equalize their
markets or protect consumers is vital to being able to make arguments for policies that will
protect the marginalized. To make this case, this dissertation must follow certain steps to assert its
validity and make its arguments effectively. To this end, this document will follow the structure
outlined below.
The next chapter, “Building an Institution into an Industry,” will provide the reader with
the basic information needed to understand the rest of the document, beginning with a discussion
of the consumer fiancé industry. It will describe the general structure of American consumer
finance, and why in some ways, what people do with their basic bank accounts and home loans
can matter more than the trading of high value stocks and derivatives. Then, it will discuss the
structure of credit unions and their historical forms and development. Important in this section is
the discussion of the value systems and social concerns the drove the creation of American credit
unions, and how that influenced their structure and long-term functioning.
The third chapter, “Theories of Financial Regulation, Firms, and Institutional Stability,”
will begin to more clearly advance the argument that regulation protects economic stability. It
will involve a more explicit discussion of the theories guiding this research. It will lay out the
sociological and social-economic theories about what ensures market stability, and how those
theories relate to the consumer finance industry. I will then build on the structure and functioning
of the key theory used for this study, expanding into a detailed description of how major
regulatory changes have affected credit unions, especially during times of instability. This will
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lead to some preliminary comparisons of the effects of some policies on financial outcomes in
these industries, which will lay the foundation for the time series analysis.
Chapter 4 will provide details on the manner of analysis I will be using, the variables I
will use to measure credit unions’ and commercial banks’ failure and growth rates. It will also
provide the hypotheses I will be testing, and reason behind their selection. This will involve a
discussion of the sources of my data, the construction of specific variables, and the reasoning
behind how statistical models are specified and altered. Chapter 5 will begin by comparing the
different circumstances and stabilities of the credit union and banking industries of the United
States. Then I will display and describe the results of the comparative time-series models,
showing the substantial effects of regulatory change on both industries, particularly that of
regulation meant to open markets. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of how the results
can be explained by the Fligstein’s cultural model of market function. Chapter 6 will continue this
analysis, examining of the extent to which credit unions and commercial banks might have
become more similar, and what portion of that change can be explained by changes taking place
after 1980. The chapter finds that while they have not yet become substantively similar in
function and safe practices, current trends in deregulation may eventually have such an effect, a
finding that broadly supports sociological concerns about the importance of regulation in market
economies.
The seventh chapter will serve the function of a discussion and conclusion section, and
has been titled, “Conclusions & Next Steps for Research.” This chapter will review the findings
of the time-series models and theory to paint a picture of how ideological conditions have shaped
regulatory policies industry behavior through economic crises. It will then discuss what these
results could mean for broader populations, and how this may or may not connect to broader
economic patterns. It will then end with what should be done with the findings of this study, and
how future works may address this relatively under-explored topic.
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Chapter Two: Building an Institution into an Industry
The United States financial industry is a behemoth that often seems beyond the
comprehension of the common person. People know that they manage their household finances
via deposits at an institution they casually call “the bank”, believe that they should be saving
more than they do, and perhaps dream of one day investing their money via… probably an
investment bank? They will google how that works. They might be a member of a credit union
because they heard it can offer better home or auto loan rates, and that they must qualify
somehow – probably through their place of employment - to get an account. They almost
certainly cannot tell you more about how a credit union is different from a commercial bank.
For much of the American population a shroud of mysticism surrounds the financial
industry, and much of what is known is limited to personal day-to-day financial transactions,
colloquialisms, and stereotypes. Yet even within the confines of the consumer finance industry,
there are meaningful differences between institution types that influence not only the products
they offer to consumers, but also their obligations to those consumers, their political clout, and
their risk of failure and stability. Because of this common gap in knowledge surrounding finance,
it is important to clarify the basic structure and functioning of the US consumer finance industry.
In this chapter I will provide an overview of the consumer finance industry in general,
and then narrow down to credit unions’ role in that consumer finance industry. I will then briefly
describe the historical foundations of each type of institution and its development over time,
including key regulatory moments and battles with Banks for market influence.
Consumer Banking
American consumer banking, also known as retail banking, refers to the grouping of
products and services that banks generally provide to consumers and small business through
various channels (Clark et al. 2007). Consumer banking services are often organized according to
three interrelated dimensions: the customers served, the products and services offered, and how
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customers are connected to those services (Clark et al. 2007). Small banks may often offer these
services almost exclusively, while large banks such as Bank of America or Wells Fargo typically
have separate retail banking business units that have their own management and reporting
structures (Clark et al. 2007; Hanc 2004). These services tend to include taking deposits for
checking and savings accounts, personal and auto loans, mortgages, certain types of certificate
deposits, and sometimes IRA (retirement) accounts. Retail deposits are generally at the core of
their business, as they provide a low-cost and stable source of income and are a major source of
fee-based income (Clark et al. 2007).
Table 2.1. Systemic and Consumer needs served by Consumer Finance institutions
1. Moving
The financial system must provide a mechanism for the transfers of money
funds between
and payments for goods and services. In the consumer sector, the payments
consumers and function would include cash, checks, debit cards (including prepaid), credit
other actors
cards, online funds transfer tools like PayPal, Automated Clearing House
(payments).
(ACH) transactions, etc.
2. Moving
Functions are embodied in products and services, including savings accounts
funds forward
and CDs, mutual funds, workplace retirement programs, and Social Security.
in time (saving
and investing).
3. Moving
This function is embodied in household credit, which ranges from shorterfunds backward term unsecured borrowing (e.g., credit and charge cards, banking overdraft
in time
protection, and payday loans), to longer-term unsecured borrowing (e.g.,
(borrowing and student loans, person-to-person lending), to secured borrowing (e.g., auto
credit).
loans, mortgage loans, and margin loans).
4. Managing
The risk-management function is satisfied through a variety of products and
risk
services, including insurance (health, life, property and casualty, disability),
(insurance).
the purchase of certain financial products (e.g., put options to protect one's
portfolio against declines), precautionary savings, social networks, and
government safety nets.
5. Providing
Organizations that provide consumers with financial advice. Sources include
information
informal social networks, investment clubs, formal media, bankers,
and advice
salesmen, and security brokers. It has also come to include computerized
about these
models (such as Financial Engines®), chat boards, account aggregators
decisions.
(such as Mint.com), and product comparison sites.
Adapted from Tufano 2009; Ryan, Trumbull, & Tufano 2011).
Consumer banking is vastly different from investment banking (e.g., Goldman Sachs),
hedge funds (e.g., Blackrock), and venture capital firms. These latter corporations take very high
risks to make high profits, but they are highly specialized in what they do. They generally do not
take consumer deposits and engage in checking, and are not the friendly face in thousands of
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communities. Nor do they provide mortgages and consumer loans. They are very large investors
relying on making money on large ventures. Despite the observation that consumer finance plays
a relatively small place in the field of financial economics, its role in the economy itself is far
larger. Peter Tufano has argued that the significance of consumer finance in the economy can be
assessed along any of four functions he says consumer finance serves (Table 2.1 above). It used
to be that these needs were addressed for consumers by financial experts as banks, mutual fund
brokers, and so on. However, changes in regulation, taxation, and government policy have shifted
responsibility for managing these needs to the consumer, resulting in a concurrent increase in
household debts and risk. Ryan, Trumbull and Tufano (2010)note that while rising levels of debt
have had benefits (such as increased access to home ownership, transport, and education) they
have also identified cause for concern. They identify research which has found that as consumer
responsibility for financial wellbeing has increased,
“…most consumers are ill equipped to make financial decisions that would keep
their balance sheets healthy- whether that means having enough money in the
bank to handle an emergency (or to expand wealth), or keeping their risk
exposure low (by, for example, keeping their debt loads down).(p. 37)”
Such work has confirmed common claims that most Americans fail to grasp basic
financial concepts such as calculating interest, understanding the terms of loans and
mortgages, and accounting for inflation. Financial institutions have been all too glad to
shed this responsibility and are reticent to pick it back up.
Compounding the concerns about consumers adopting higher levels of risk and debt
relative to their assets is the consequent risk to the economy should financial institutions begin to
struggle and fail – an eventuality in which ever-larger institutions can take consumers and the rest
of the economy with them. How big of a chunk of the economy is composed of consumer finance
and retail banking? It can be somewhat hard to capture, but, for example, retail banking
constitutes for about 50-75% of the revenues at many large bank holding companies, including
those too big to fail firms. Observe Figure 2.1, which shows Clark & company’s estimates of
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retail revenue as a share of overall income at some of the US’ biggest banks. This is in part
because retail banking has been seen as a fairly safe, stable source of income that can help bolster
banks against the volatility of riskier items of business such as trading and capital market
activities (Clark et al. 2007). Of course, the Subprime mortgage crisis can also demonstrate the
consequences of relying too heavily on this arm of finance while shrinking safety margins.
Figure 2.1. Retail Revenue as a Share of Overall Income Across Major US Banks, 2001-2005.

(Clark et al. 2007)
Analyses of consumer banking tends to be divided into the size of banks studied, as
community banking is different from credit unions and operates at a smaller level than the large
branch networks built by the largest banks, even though all of them offer consumer banking
services (Clark et al. 2007; Hanc 2004; Treasury 2017). If the focus of this study were narrowed
to community banks, which are generally considered to be banks with less than $1 Billion in
assets, economies of scale could quickly come to mismatch credit unions (Treasury 2017). This is
because while credit unions are generally thought of as being similar to community banks in size
and customer base, the credit union merger movement of the 1970s and 1980s led to dramatic
growth in credit union assets, increasing the number of institutions with over $100 million,
$500million, and $1billion in assets. However, this is more difficult to capture on a disaggregated
level, as credit unions are not significantly organized according to asset size to the extent that
banks are.
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Credit Unions: Institutional Form & Function
Credit unions are not-for-profit cooperative financial institutions owned by account
holders united by a “common bond”, such as university affiliation or place of employment. Their
services are limited to those most used by consumers – savings, loans & mortgages, checking
accounts, ATM and online banking access, and certain forms of investments. Appearing at first in
the United States as small, cooperative credit organizations in 1909, credit unions (CUs) in the
contemporary US have operated through a three-tier system of services (ABA 2010; Croteau
1949). When CUs first appeared in the United States, they were much smaller than banks, and
they initially struggled to demonstrate that they had the equity and institutional integrity
necessary for dealings with other firms (Bergengren 1937; Morman 1920; Orchard 1938). Under
this premise, and to reduce competition from credit unions, banks successfully lobbied to
encourage more binding regulations to be placed on CUs, largely limiting them to local functions.
In 1968, the first corporate credit unions were formed, to provide the thousands of
existing natural person credit unions (those that directly serve consumers) with interstate services,
liquidity, investment opportunities, and services such as ACH deposits and check clearing (ABA
2010; Bergengren 1937; Croteau 1956; Orchard 1938). Shortly after their formation, a need for a
central resource for corporate credit unions became clear, and in 1974 the US Central Credit
Union was formed. US CCU served only corporate credit unions, and provided higher-level
liquidity, certain government-backed investments, and industry forecasting and data, ultimately
functioning like a central bank. In the United States, each of these organizations are monitored
and regulated by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), which fills a role very
similar to the FDIC.
In fact, many of these institutions were formed between 1965 and 1985, and time of
massive change and growth for Credit Unions. Shortly after the first corporate credit unions were
formed in 1968, the NCUA was organized by an act of Congress (1970). At the same time, the
National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCU-SIF) was formed, for the first time providing
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deposit insurance for credit unions; starting at $20,000 at the time, deposits are now insured up to
$100,000, much like with the FDIC (NCUA 2020).
Credit Unions’ US Origin Story
Historically, credit unions have been small institutions, which meant that while they were
fairly stable, that was only noticeable when considered relative to their size and the economies of
scale they struggled with. This was not accidental – Credit Unions were initially intended to be
relatively small, local entities that supported their communities. Proponents early on, and even
today, have often described the growth of credit unions as a movement; Roy Bergengren,
described as one of the credit union movements’ early marketing geniuses (Croteau 1949), argued
that,
“The credit union seeks to perform a high and important public service, a service
the value of which is all out of proportion to any expenditures of the government
for organization work. It seeks to eliminate the wastes of high-rate money lending,
turning into new buying power what interest over-charges working people have
hitherto paid to high-rate money lenders. …Usury is a great social and economic
curse, worse in its effect than many diseases; a curse which the government is
warranted in stamping out, but which can be stamped out only by the creation of
normal credit resources for the masses of the people. What then is the real job of
co- operative finance? It is to prove that there is a better motivation in human
affairs than the private acquisition of things; to demonstrate that the brotherhood
of man is good business; that the great service of credit can be developed for
average human beings by average human beings working intelligently together.5
That was the Raiffeisen conception. That conception is being carried forward
faithfully by the credit unions of the United States. (Bergengren 1937, p. 6)”6
Early credit unions were both supported and constrained by their early circumstances,
and their relationship with regulation was quixotic. Upon their US appearance and legislative
definition (beginning in Massachusetts the same year) in 1909, credit unions were already
involved in regulatory debates. Based on heavily cooperative models from Germany and Canada
(as opposed to similar models developing in Italy and the UK), there were a few key differences.
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Italics added for emphasis.
The earliest institutions to inspire American Credit Unions came from the UK, France, and Germany. Raiffeisenbanks
are German cooperative banks that were among that early set, and continue to exist in Austria and (separately)
Germany as a group of cooperative banks known as Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken and derived their name from
the credit union ‘pioneer’ Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen.
6
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Contrary to models in other countries, the 1909 Massachusetts credit union law extended the
group membership base to include occupational groups (as well as residential), imposed
compulsory inspection by the Bank Commissioner's office, and more precisely defined the work
of the various committees intended to run the credit unions (Croteau 1949).
A similar law was passed in New York in 1913 to enable the organization of credit
unions in that state, but it introduced several weaknesses to the credit union model. In 1912, it
was discovered that President Taft commissioned a study of the institutions, which was possibly
going to designate the New York model as “a model of imitation”. HW Wolff, a prominent figure
in the study of British cooperative finance institutions who actively consulted on the formation of
US institutions, drafted a long memo (to later be reprinted in a book of his) protesting the
“…excessive regulation of the most minute character” found in the New York law (Croteau
1949). He felt that this indicated that the legislature did not have sufficient confidence in the
business model’s viability. He also argued that the legislation did not limit dividends (which he
considered a violation of true cooperative principles), failed to provide for refunds to borrowers
that were proportionate to profits, and failed to provide for investment in a central bank, which
could serve as a clearing house for CUs and a link to money markets (Croteau 1949). He
particularly argued against seemingly arbitrary limits on unsecured loans and the prohibition of
loans to officers who had “presumably…jointed the Union in order to be able to borrow. (Croteau
1949)” He also argued that there should be periodic inspections of credit unions by someone
authorized by a union of Credit Unions, “whose action is bound to add force to the whole class of
institutions, (Croteau 1949)” which by today’s logic sounds like an argument for self-regulation
by credit union association insiders. While this line of criticism did sway the decision of the
commission, which did not end up endorsing the New York Act model, it did not significantly
influence subsequent legislation; the Massachusetts-New York acts ended up as the basis for laws
passed by 43 states, the District of Columbia, and finally by the Federal government in 1934
(Croteau 1949; Croteau 1956).
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Despite these concerns about the level of regulation imposed upon Credit Unions, they
largely managed to flourish. By 1947, there were over 8,900 Credit Unions in the United States,
with over 3 million members (Croteau 1949). In 2020 dollars, by this time CUs had $6.5Billion in
assets and $2.45Billion in outstanding loans. Credit Unions across 44 states and the District of
Columbia had developed regional leagues who were associated with the Credit Union National
Association (CUNA), an organization similar to the American Bankers Association and is still
prominent today (Croteau 1949). At the time, the CUNA was an international organization, also
having members in nine Canadian provinces, Hawaii, Jamaica, and British Guiana, and operated
on an annual budget of $125,000 (about $1.6Million in today’s dollars).
However, it is also worth noting that the rapid expansion of the American Credit Union
had several sources. Initially, officers and committee members running credit unions did so with
little or no pay; work was largely voluntary. As such, early credit unions benefitted from a base of
enthusiastic proponents who were able and inclined to work for free in the name of promoting
these organizations (Bergengren 1937; Croteau 1949; Croteau 1956; Orchard 1938). Second, the
credit union movement benefitted substantially from promotion by Edward Filene, a wealthy
Boston merchant and philanthropist (for whom the industry-prominent credit union think-tank,
the Filene Institute, was named), and Roy Bergengren, a Massachusetts lawyer who was able to
travel the country, promoting the CU business model in communities and to state legislatures
(Croteau 1949).
Third, for the first half-century of credit unions’ US history, they had little competition
for their particular services. Before the deregulation movement in the 1970s, there were clear
lines between the types of depository institutions and the services they offered. Commercial
banks primarily offered checkable deposits and made commercial loans; Savings and Loans
offered fixed rate savings accounts and made residential mortgages; lastly, Credit unions mostly
offered share accounts on which they paid dividends and made consumer installment loans
(Kaushik and Lopez 1994).
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This relative lack of competition is what allowed for CUs’ rapid growth. In 1947, there
were a little over 8,900 credit unions. Just over twenty years later, there were 23,866 Credit
unions. Yet beginning in the 1970s, financial markets began to change. The dominant economic
ideology began to shift from a Keynesian model that supported stronger regulation to a more
(politically) liberal that moved away from protective regulation to that which opened markets, if
not outright deregulation.
Credit Unions’ Contemporary Forms
In the 1970s began a pattern of legislation resulting in a shift in the nature of financial
regulation. Regulations meant to protect the public from the excesses of the market were rolled
back, and either replaced with rules ostensibly meant to open markets and promote competition
by allowing firms more control over their functions and offerings. Included in these changes were
laws allowing previously forbidden mergers, and a substantial relaxing of the “common bond”
requirement, which meant that credit unions’ potential customer base grew dramatically. Both
items will be discussed below, as they both played a role in reshaping the credit union industry
and strongly affected their growth in market share.
First, let us discuss the mergers. Mergers first began to rise in the late 1970s, not because
of legislative change, but economic. The economic downturn of the late 1970s led many
employers to shut down or move. However, at the time over 80% of credit unions’ membership
was occupation-based, which meant that credit unions whose members were limited to that
employer were left with few options (Culp 1997). Culp explains that,
“The NCUA testified that if a sponsor business decided to shut down, relocate,
file for bankruptcy, or lay off workers, the credit union had the following options:
(i) convert to a community charter; (ii) convert to a state charter if the state had
broader field of membership policies; (iii) merge with another credit union with the
same sponsor; or (iv) liquidate.(p 5)”
Having recently eased the requirements for mergers, and along with the general pattern of
regulatory rollback at the time, in 1982 the NCUA announced that merged credit unions could
have multiple Common Bonds in their charter (Culp 1997). This decision had a dramatic effect on
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the industry, and both the lead-in and outcome of this decision can be seen in Figure 2.2. In 1981,
251 federally insured credit unions were forced to decide to liquidate, which by nature strained
the federal credit union insurance fund (NCUSIF). After 1981, the number of liquidations fell to
Figure 2.2. Credit Union Failures & Mergers, 1975-1995.

160 in 1982 and to 50 in 1983. Conversely, this change in rules allowed many credit unions to
instead opt for mergers, as there were numerous institutions who were well matched and had
everything they needed to merge, but were prevented by existing regulation from doing so (Culp
1997; Dopico and Wilcox 2009; Wilcox and Dopico 2011).
An interesting outcome of this decision was that credit unions were able to ride out the
savings & loan crisis by merging when poorly affected, so they remained in good shape due to
their conservative lending practices and the “flight to safety” effect. This also had the effect of
obscuring the circumstances wherein CUs might normally have failed due to insolvency. Though
the pattern of the 1980s also seems to indicate that if it weren’t for the Common Bond
requirement forcing CUs to remain aligned with businesses or institutions which could fail, credit
unions would have had the size and assets necessary to weather the economic downturn of the
1970s-early 1980s in far better shape.
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The easing of the common bond requirement strongly influenced the outcomes observed
above and served to inflame the turf war between banks and credit unions. On April 20, 1982, the
NCUA announced its policy change in the federal register, which reported that.
“The NCUA Board has adopted a policy statement clarifying its interpretation of
…the Federal Credit Union Act …[to] permit a Federal credit union, which
purchases the loans of a liquidating credit union, to offer membership to the
borrowers whose loans have been purchased, and (2) authorized the granting of
charters, charter amendments, conversions to Federal charters, and mergers to
credit unions which desire to serve multiple occupational groups. This action was
taken in response to interest expressed by credit unions. It is intended to clarify
NCUA's policy on membership in Federal credit unions, to make portfolios of
loans sold by the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund more attractive to
potential Federal credit union purchasers, and to ensure the continued availability
of credit union service.(p 25)”7
This change in policy led to massive growth in the industry, though the merger
movement meant that the absolute numbers of credit unions dropped. By 1996, nearly half of all
credit unions were formed as “multiple-group” credit unions. Together, that held about 78% of
the industry’s total assets, and about 78% of the industry’s total loans (held by federal credit
unions) (Culp 1997).
During the 1990s, beginning about eight years after this common bond revision and the
subsequent swell in growth, the banking industry began its fight again the NCUA’s new policy
interpretation. In 1990, First National Bank in North Carolina sued the AT&T Family Federal
Credit Union over its new membership applications. In 1995, in two separate suits, the NCUA
was sued by First City Bank in Tennessee, and by a group of banks via the Texas Banker’s
Association over the same issue. In the latter case, the US District Court for the District of
Columbia ruled in favor of the addition of employee groups to the credit union membership, but
against the addition of associational groups (Culp 1997).
This issue ended up being fought on two fronts. The first is via the courts, as the case of
First National Bank v. AT&T Family and the NCUA was taken to the Supreme Court, which
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Italics added for emphasis.

39

began hearing arguments in October of 1997 (Culp 1997). The second front was via Congress, as
the American Bankers Association (ABA) and other banking associations began heavily lobbying
Congress to amend the FCUA (Federal Credit Union Act of 1934) to codify a narrow
interpretation of its Common Bond requirement, specifying only one occupational group per
credit union (Culp 1997). This effort was also fought by the CUNA (Credit Union National
Association) and similar groups, leading to the House sub-committee on Financial Institutions
and Consumer Credit holding hearings on the future of the credit union industry. Shortly before
and after this session, three bills were introduced to clarify the common bond provision: one by
Rep. Martin Frost (H.R. 57, 105th Cong.), one by Rep. Steve LaTourette (H.R. 1151, 105), and
one by Rep. Ron Paul (H.R. 1121, 105th Cong.)(Culp 1997). The Credit Union Membership
Access Act was enacted on August 7, 1998 (Congress 1998; Culp 1997).
The result is the plainly visible growth of the credit union industry into what we see
today. Figure 2.3 shows that after the initial NCUA decision in 1984, there was a noticeable
upswing in both the assets and loans outstanding held by the industry. Shortly after the passage of
the Credit Union Membership Access Act in 1998, there was a sharper increase in assets and
loans, a growth that was barely slowed during the Subprime Mortgage Crisis (particularly for the
growth in assets). Figure 2.4 shows that as the number of mergers since 1980 led to a dramatic
drop in the count of active credit unions, membership rose by tens of millions over the years. It
even appears that growth in members increased during economic downturns, especially during
the 80s, 90s, and 2001.
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Figure 2.3. Credit Union Assets & Loans Outstanding, 1960-2015.

Figure 2.4. Credit Union Counts of Institutions and Memebrships, 1975-2015.
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As of 2015, Credit Unions continued their pattern of steady growth, but of also pushing
the boundaries of their regulation. The 2015 NCUA Annual report observed that,
“By the end of the year, membership at the nation’s 6,021 federally insured credit
unions had grown to more than 102.7 million members, and assets stood at more
than $1.2 trillion. …new loans at federally insured credit unions grew by nearly
15.8 percent for the year, reflecting significant growth in auto lending and
residential mortgages. (p 16)”
Yet this same report also noted regulatory reduction and simplification as a primary priority,
citing a period of economic stability.
Figure 2.5. Credit Union Failures & Mergers, 1976-2015.

A question that has been central to this project is that of credit unions’ relative stability
long term, and whether they have become more, or less, stable. The second question is why. The
answer to the first question is a clear ‘yes’. If we treat both liquidation and forced merger as
measures of failure, we still have a clearly dropping or leveling trend since the 1980s (Figure
2.5). Having discussed the dramatic growth in the industry, it would seem apparent that this
decrease in failures and mergers has coincided with growth in assets and overall size. Yet
observing the graphs in Figure 2.6, we see that there is little relationship between credit union
size and measures of their stability and failure.
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Figure 2.6. Scatter Plots of Credit Union Liquidations (Failures), Mergers, % Change in Net
Income, and Loan-Share Ratio with Average Assets (Thousands) per CU.

Table 2.2. Correlations between Union Liquidations (Failures), Mergers, % Change in Net
Income, Loan-Share Ratio, and Average Assets (Thousands) per CU
Average Assets per Credit Union
CU Failures
-0.576***
CU Mergers
+0.079
CU % Change in Net Income
-0.202
CU Loan-Share Ratio
-0.312*
Both Figure 2.6 and Table 2.2 show that while there is a decent, negative correlation
between outright failures and credit union size, this relationship does not stand up well when
considered with other data. This is made visible by the weakness and lack of significance of
related correlations. There is a significantly strong, inverse relationship between mergers and
failures. Credit Union failures and mergers have a highly significant correlation of -0.623 (not
pictured above). If credit union stability and failures were most strongly affected by credit union
size, then given the close relationship between failure and merger, one would also expect size
(measured here in average assets per institution) to have a strong, significant relationship with
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credit union mergers. Yet that expectation is not borne out here. Table 2.2 shows no significant
relationship between mergers and size. In fact, the p-value for that correlation is 0.567, indicating
that not only is there no significant relationship, but that it seems very unlikely to be a result of
Type II error.
An additional point to keep in mind with these graphs is that they are not biased by a high
number of zero cases. Rather, there are many cases on the graphs which appear near-zero because
the combination of rapid asset growth with industry consolidation has resulted in a sharp rise in
assets-per-institution. In this case, from 1960 to 2015 assets range from an average of $257,000
per institution to over $151million per institution. So, while the top-left graph of Figure 2.6
would appear strong support for the size-makes-stability argument, an examination of my other
stability measures would substantially weaken that claim. For example, after an initial spike of
mergers, the correlation between mergers and size flattens substantially and narrows slowly.
There is virtually no relationship between change in net income and assets per institution
(bottom-left), and loan-share ratio fluctuates dramatically with assets per institution to the point
that there appears no meaningful relationship. This determination is supported by the correlations
reported in Table 2.2.
Relevant Academic Treatment
Sociological work on credit unions in the US has been sparse, surprising given the ways
in which credit unions have closer institutional ties to their communities than similar institutions
and how their services are more closely directed to consumers’ daily needs than many banks
(Bergengren 1937; Bundt, Chiesa and Keating 1989; Croteau 1949; Croteau 1956; Kaushik and
Lopez 1994; Lune and Martinez 1999; Patin and McNiel 1991; Taylor 1971). Instead, this topic
has been more consistently addressed by social economists.
A substantial chunk of work on credit unions and their stability appears to belong to the
organizational wing of social research, which generally uses them as a convenient but not unique
demonstration of existing theory, rather than credit unions being identified as central to the
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research itself. Instead, CUs, due often to their small size and local focus, have been used to test
theories of how organizations grow and how they might push the boundaries of functions served
by other similar institutions, such as savings and loan banks or payday lenders (Barron 1999;
Barron, West and Hannan 1994). For example, Barron found that larger credit unions tended to be
more stable than small credit unions, a point which supports arguments that the higher equity and
liquidity afforded to larger institutions protects them, but also contradicts claims that during the
2007 financial crisis, in both the US and Germany, it was the larger firms that suffered most due
to having the ability to invest more heavily in toxic assets (Barron 1999; Detzer et al. 2013;
Hüfner 2010; Newman 2010). One explanation for this inconsistency is that both larger and
smaller firms may enjoy increased stability, and that it is instead mid-sized firms which exist in a
“danger zone” with high failure risk; it can be said that “large organizations capture the
advantages of generalism, small organizations the advantages of specialism, and medium-sized
organizations the liabilities of both.(Haveman 1993)”
Others have argued that instead of size alone, it is also firms’ position within the market
and the level of consolidation occurring in their environment which affects their stability (Lune
and Martinez 1999; Negro, Visentin and Swaminathan 2014). For example, commenting upon the
trend of financial institution consolidation that developed with post-1970s deregulation, Negro
and company argued that similar to the style of separation exemplified by world systems theory,
markets can also be divided into “fringe”, “near-center”, and “center” segments based on size and
market share, the former segment occupied by firms such as payday lenders, and the latter
occupied by larger organizations like large, universal banks (Barron, West and Hannan 1994;
Negro, Visentin and Swaminathan 2014; Wallerstein 2011). In this case, credit unions would be
said to be less stable than banks due to their smaller size and position in the near-center space
(Negro, Visentin and Swaminathan 2014). This results in a higher risk of failure because not only
does their smaller size prevent them from leveraging economies of scale, but as banks consolidate
and grow larger, they compete more intensely with credit unions, further weakening the unions’
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market position (Barron, West and Hannan 1994; Feinberg 2008; Negro, Visentin and
Swaminathan 2014).
Another area of credit union research tends to make use of a more institutionalist
perspective, in which researchers explore how institutional structures or related constraints drive
their behaviors. Much of this research is in keeping with Fligstein’s work on market fields, social
spaces which involve competitive market-based interaction. In these spaces, actors or firms may
occupy different positions which may give them an advantage or disadvantage relative to other
firms and which may structure their relationships with other institutions or the state (Fligstein
2002; Fligstein and Freeland 1995; Fligstein and McAdam 2014). Research on this topic includes
explorations of how different actors such as the firms themselves, regulators, and competitors
seek to find balanced social relations which allow for firms to grow, regulators to work
effectively, and competitions to remain stable (Fligstein 2002; Lune and Martinez 1999). While
in general practice there tends to be a failure to reach a balance due to a lack of highly organized
firm-state relations, researchers continue to explore the role of relationships in governing
capitalist institutions, a trend which has largely but not entirely skipped credit unions (Fligstein
2002; Lune and Martinez 1999).
In keeping with these theories, some have found that credit union organizational behavior
is influenced by issues such as firm-regulator interactions. Regarding the former point, despite
their legal status as non-profit-seeking entities, many credit unions still seek high returns on
investments for their members, and still periodically come into conflict with regulators (Bundt,
Chiesa and Keating 1989; Lune and Martinez 1999). One observation has noted that despite the
variations in common-bond type and complexities of bank credit, regulators and legal entities
tend to treat credit unions the same as other financial firms, which may occasionally inhibit
growth (Bundt, Chiesa and Keating 1989). Yet this very issue invites questions about whether
credit unions, if regulated less heavily, would behave more like banks. For example, credit
unions, like other financial institutions, may still attempt to get around regulations through
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“…mechanisms [which] include concealment, whereby an organization may pretend to comply;
buffering, whereby an organization may ‘decouple’ its activities from the sources of the
regulatory or normative pressure; and escape, wherein an organization will leave the domain
entirely.(Lune and Martinez 1999)” Such practices are reminiscent of and may possibly lead to
attempts at regulatory capture, or support for further deregulation.
Instead of size, I theorize that it is instead regulation and its effects on the economy that
have allowed credit unions their relative, increasing levels of stability. We see this not only
because of the change in regulation associated with a shift in the dominant economic ideology of
the US, but because we have recently seen an example of what may happen during times of
substantial deregulation. I refer, of course, to the previously discussed Savings & Loan crisis of
the 1980s and 1990s. This was a crisis which is largely agreed to be the result of industry
deregulation, and likewise, the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008 is often thought of resulting
from a mix of deregulation and delayed or under-regulation of new financial commodities such as
certain types of derivatives. As it is, the question remains as to what extent regulation has
changed for either of these American industries, and how such has affected their stability.
What this chapter accomplishes, then, is to give us a broad overview of the arena under
examination: the consumer finance industry, its importance to the economy overall, and credit
unions’ role and history in that field. Noteworthy is that credit unions in the United States were
formed to address social needs. It was known even then that poorer populations might have good
reason to need access to credit, and were often rejected by banks, if there even were banks that
served their area. While one could certainly investigate moralistic and racial elements of who was
served by early credit unions (were farmers looked upon as being more morally worthy than the
urban poor? How did racial discrimination look in credit unions?), it cannot be ignored that they
sought to give underserved populations access to consumer finance markets, and that their
business model was catered to those groups’ needs. Thus, the reason why early credit union
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promotional materials framed them as emancipatory institutions who were themselves a
movement.8
This also points again to the value of how certain limits placed on financial institutions
can cause them to better serve the public good. Such a notion is difficult to truly reconcile with
the destructive, or self-destructive as Polanyi (1944) argued, nature of capitalism. Can a system
so innately destructive ever be brought to heel? Varieties of capitalism theories seek to explore
this possibility, and such is certainly compatible with the theoretical perspective I intend to
employ. This perspective explores how markets exist as social structures where, as happens in
capitalist systems and as argued by conflict paradigms, groups compete for finite resources. In
this case, credit unions and banks, though initially serving separate groups, came to share the
same competitive space, and thus had to compete for limited market share and consumer groups.
The role of regulation in this change is important for what it says about who even can reasonably
be served by markets, and if capitalism can be made into something more equitable.

As an aside, this raises the interesting question of whether the “credit union movement”, if a movement at
all, could be considered to be among the earliest “Astroturf” social movements.
8
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Chapter Three: Theories of Financial Regulation, Firms, and Institutional Stability
Though the topic was left largely to economists until the 1980s, most of the sociological
work on economic and market stability is focused on invalidating the foundational premises of
free market theory a la economists such as Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, or Milton Friedman
(Bourdieu and Nice 1998; Burt 1988; Granovetter 1985; Gupta and Lad 1983; Keiman and Teles
; Lie 1991; Lie 1997; Stiglitz 2008; Stiglitz 2010). Regarding free-market theories grounded in
Adam Smith’s works, sociologists have strongly rejected the claim that humans are rationally
self-interested, isolated decision-makers whose natural inclination is to barter (Polanyi 1944;
Smith 1776; Stiglitz 2008). This claim has led modern economists to the conclusion that markets
must be the most natural form of exchange, justifying the alleged social benefits of unregulated
(free) markets (Granovetter 1985; Hayek 2014; Polanyi 1944; Stiglitz 2008).
Instead, sociologists argue that markets are innately embedded in non-individual human
social relations; that markets originate from, are driven by, and cannot exist apart from, human
interaction, cultures, and other social contexts (Block and Somers 1984; Granovetter 1985; Lie
1991; Piven and Cloward 1971). Because of this, we see no valid justification for markets being
the ‘natural’ form of exchange, nor for market societies to be humanity’s truest inclination.
Ample sociological, historical, and anthropological research has found that, predating and
existing alongside markets, there have been systems based on redistribution of resources and
reciprocal exchange (Fligstein 2002; Fligstein and Dauter 2007; Granovetter 1985; Polanyi 1944;
Stiglitz 2008). This stands in contrast to the economists’ treatment of exchange in markets being
determined by material needs rationally assessed by humans seeking to maximize benefit and
minimize cost (Polanyi 1944; Stiglitz 2008; Stiglitz 2010). Thus, freeing markets based on their
supposed ‘natural’ origins is unsupported theoretical reasoning.
This line of criticism leads directly into assessments of whether markets in a capitalist
society are inherently stable or unstable, an assumption which necessarily undergirds discussions
of regulation. It is worth keeping in mind at this point that there is a difference between economic
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stability and market stability, though the two concepts here are innately closely linked as the
United States is home to a market-based economy. Broadly speaking, a stable economy is one
that has consistent and sustainable GDP growth, relatively steady and predicable price changes,
low inflation, and does not experience dramatic swings in supply or demand of the assets upon
which it is most dependent. In the United States, among others, the economy is highly dependent
on stable financial markets. Market stability is assessed along similar lines; it is not necessarily
the total lack of failure, which even capitalist values indicate is impossible and undesirable.
Rather, institutions in stable markets would have relatively low, somewhat predictable failure or
merger rates. They should provide relatively stable prices, or price changes that follow moderate
patterns, such that actors are able to conduct their business with confidence. These actors may
include business owners, managers, investors, and consumers. The idea is that entities will
engage with markets that satisfy their needs for some level of security out of self-interest.
Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis
In keeping with the criticisms of free market stability, social economist Hyman Minsky
developed what he called the financial instability hypothesis, a variant of Keynesian theory which
argued that neoclassical theories of market function fail to account for the economic, political,
social, and psychological relations which influence market behaviors. Minsky’s theory finds its
socio-institutional elements from his concern about time as a variable (Minsky 1984). As he
noted in 1978,
“An economy with a Wall Street cannot be static. Yesterday’s debts and capital
asset acquisitions must be validated by today’s cash flows; today’s cash flows are
largely determined by today’s investment; today’s investment will or will not be
validated depending upon the cash flows that are generated tomorrow. Therefore,
the economic theory that is relevant for an economy with a Wall Street cannot be
static; it cannot abstract from time. (Minsky 1984, p. 105)”
It is thus debt, this exchange of money today for money later, which renders markets
social, because the passage of time innate to lending and repayment processes allows for changes
in investor confidence or interest, workers’ saving and spending behaviors, and the state’s
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regulatory apparatus. That is, the pull of money today being influenced by the history of
investment in turn causes changes in social behaviors which will affect market behaviors.
As the passage of time affects social behavior in investing, any of three investment
systems develop, all designed to achieve socially and economically pressured relationships
between cash flow and debt acquisition. Minsky labels these three investment types as:
1. Hedge
2. Speculative
3. Ponzi
In hedge financing, firms can fulfill their contractual debt obligations with their existing
cash flows; banks or governments with floating debt tend to demonstrate hedge financing
(Minsky 1984, p.92). Speculative units are those that can meet their commitments by ‘rolling
over’ their liabilities – that is, by taking out new loans to pay other, current debts, an option
justified by anticipated cash flows that can cover these accumulated debts (Minsky 1984; Minsky
1992). For Ponzi type systems, however, cash flows from operations aren’t enough to cover debts
or the interest on those debts – they can only meet their commitments by either selling their
assets, or by borrowing more money, leading to cascading problems over time as their equity
plummets while their future income evaporates before it is earned because of debt obligations
(Minsky 1984; Minsky 1992).
Being aware of these investment types and their associated risks can help us to consider
how, for example, CEOs may make financially risky moves in the name of profit, rather than
simple greed or corruption. Minsky notes that any capitalist system depends on the ability to
finance business operations via either cash flow from normal operations, or through debt (Minsky
2008). He states that, “A capitalist economy is characterized by a layered set of payment
commitments that are stated in financial contracts”, which codify the conditions and expectations
between lenders and borrowers (Minsky 2008). and the ability to borrow money is dependent on
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both lenders’ and borrowers’ expectations that future income will be able to meet the conditions
of repayment. Let us consider an example.
From the perspective of borrowers, such as large firms, the shareholder value system
demands ever-increasing profitability, often measured via equity and the value of company assets.
Not only do CEOs face pressure from shareholders but given how frequently they are paid in
stock in the same company, their short-term success is closely tied with the growth of their firm.
As such, they are incentivized to always provide a positive quarterly outlook through the
balancing of debt, investment, and other assets.
If the amount of borrowing is within a safe margin of expected future returns, mostly
within the realm of hedge financing, this system works well. During periods of extended
economic stability, both investors and borrowers become very confident that in the long run, the
business will continue to turn a good profit. This confidence is based on the previous experience
of lenders and firms: projections of future cash flows are based on previous cash flows, the
margin of safety is estimated based on the adequacy of margins in the past, and the willingness to
depend on refinancing as a source of emergency funds depends on how well refinancing markets
have performed in the past (Minsky 2008). This is also the reason that this system has
proliferated so well. Many CEOs comfortable with higher-risk systems jumped eagerly into this
system, and for however long profited enormously. For those CEOs feeling more conservative in
their choices, the massive profits realized by their peers substantially increased pressure for them
to follow the same pattern, as to shareholders, failing to take advantage of these opportunities
when risk seems so low would look like poor leadership or worse, a mis-reading for the markets.
And CEOs unwilling to do what it takes to ensure consistently growing quarterly profits are
easily replaced with those who were willing to take what initially appear to be small risks.
However, such assumes that sociopolitical or socioeconomic conditions are either static
or that they follow rigid patterns. As both lenders and firms begin to feel secure, they are willing
to make investments with narrower margins of safety, allowing speculative or Ponzi structures to
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develop (Minsky 2008). Not only do CEOs need to demonstrate increasing rates of profit and
growth, and thus are incentivized to make riskier investments, but investors become secure
enough to support this incentive. Thus, we begin to see patterns of risky lending appear and
proliferate, as groups on both sides of the exchange of funds become overconfident in market
performance.
As any of these three investment schemes proliferate, the proportion of the economy
ruled by each changes, a development which Minsky argues is what makes capitalist economies
innately prone to cyclical patterns of stability and instability. If hedge financing dominates, then
the economy should be stable for a time, even possibly reaching the equilibrium which
neoclassical economists say is the natural tendency for markets (Minsky 1992). However, the
longer the period of stability, the greater the urge to engage in speculative or Ponzi investments,
as in the example above. As these schemes proliferate and come to constitute larger portions of
the economy, that economy will become unstable under the weight of risky investments.
Recall that the riskiness of these investment types comes from how, having borrowed
money, the borrowing firm can make its loan payments. Under speculative and Ponzi systems,
especially the latter, the ability to continually take out loans to finance current activities
eventually dries up, and if the necessary cash flow has not appeared, the only way to make
payments is to either sell assets or seek a bailout. Once a firm is forced to sell assets to keep up
with its payments, investors and lenders quickly lose confidence in the solvency of the institution,
and either demand more immediate repayment, or pull their support. In the case of smaller
businesses, they may just quietly shut down. If this happens to larger firms, the failure of one
large business or institution may lead to the failure of others, resulting in a market failure. If the
market constitutes a sufficient portion of the economy, collapse becomes possible. It is this
cyclical pattern of stable and unstable periods and investment schemes which demands the
stabilizing presence of a state which can either impose a stronger regulatory regime (reducing the

53

frequency and scope of risky investments) or serve as an efficient lender of last resort to avoid
financial crises and possible economic collapse (Minsky 2008).
What makes this a social theory is the extent to which this stabilizing and destabilizing
process is driven by human and interfirm relations, industry structure, and confidence and risk.
The conditions under which risky investment is encouraged or discouraged are determined by
institutional and market structures which are mediated by government intervention (or lack
thereof) and by assumptions about market function. Yet these assumptions are not made only by
executives in board rooms, but also by modes of institutional and economic data collection and
interpretation, behavioral precedent, and group interpretations of market conditions and
regulatory changes. It is the combination of these factors which makes this set of theoretical
assumptions relevant to this dissertation project, as it ties a very specific set of economic
processes to also-specific social processes, all of which can be observed in the consumer finance
industries.
The Sociological Perspective on Self-Regulation: Illusory Agreements, Blue Moons, &
Related Squabbles
While the criticisms of free market economics and its claims about self-regulation are
largely based in theoretical problems, empirical work has also assessed the plausibility of selfregulation. Defining self-regulation is important here, as the term can have subtly different, but
substantively important distinctions. For example, Gupta & Lad define self-regulation as a
“…process whereby an industry-level, as opposed to a governmental- or firm-level, organization
(such as a trade association or a professional society) sets and enforces rules and standards
relating to the conduct of firms in the industry. (Gupta and Lad 1983)” They go on to elaborate
that this doesn’t imply a complete replacement of direct government regulation with industrycontrolled regulation, as more often the two coexist. However, they say that the distinction is that
the main responsibilities for the creation and enforcement of standards rest with industry bodies
rather than government agencies (Gupta and Lad 1983). Another interpretation of the term self-
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regulation is defined as “the systematic undertaking by private, regulated organizations of
governance responsibilities traditionally allocated to government regulators, including standardsetting, compliance monitoring, and enforcement.(Short 2013)” In this case, self-regulation is
understood to absolutely coexist within a government-led regulatory regime, with a more even
balance between industry-led compliance and government oversight.
Regardless of the balance between government and industry cooperation in selfregulation, research so far likens successful implementation to be possible under only certain
“blue moon” conditions; rare, but realistically occurring (Short 2013). These conditions for selfregulation appear only when regulators and regulated actors or industries have a shared basic
understanding of what norms underlie regulatory goals and agree about the foundational values of
the regulatory regime, resembling a more collegial structure (Prasad 2006; Short 2013). “Blue
moon” conditions would also require close firm- or industry-level monitoring by government
regulators and one in which firms believe they and their competitors are unlikely to get away with
breaking the rules, thus encouraging compliance while also assuring firms that compliance would
not place them at a competitive disadvantage (Short 2013; Short and Toffel 2010).
Short condenses these and similar circumstances into three requirements for effective
self-regulation to develop: reasonably shared understanding and consensus between regulators
and regulated entities about those rules; appropriate resources for government regulators to
implement and enforce those rules; and adequate judgment on the part of regulators to practice
restraint in the use of those rules and refrain from forcing companies to adopt self-regulating
procedures (Short 2013). Prasad has made the latter requirement in her work, in which she argues
that regulatory systems based on adversarial relations between the state and business can result in
anti-regulatory backlash (Prasad 2006; Prasad 2012; Short 2013). Yet self-guided responses on
the part of firms in anticipation of regulatory crackdowns are certainly not impossible. Dobbin
and Sutton have observed that anticipated changes in regulation can produce early changes in
firm behavior, though it is questionable whether such can truly be called self-regulation (Dobbin
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and Sutton 1998). In short, self-regulation must still exist within a strong regulatory regime, a
requirement far outside the conditions set by free market theory.
However, these ideal “blue moon” conditions seldom develop, leading to issues of
noncompliance. Instead, self-regulation usually appears when these regimes are lacking, creating
a “regulatory void” (Short 2013). Short identifies three types of these voids, all of which can
derail attempts to foster self-regulation: knowledge, political, and institutional voids (2013).
Knowledge voids may appear in the circumstances identified as a major flaw in free-market
theory: the limited availability of information and the strategic use of informational inequities
(Short 2013). An activity must be observable, known, and understood to be regulated. Such a lack
of knowledge can cause the failure of a regulatory regime altogether, arguably what occurred in
the 2007-2008 financial crisis. As Short describes,
“Regulators often lack sufficient information, understanding, and foresight to
regulate effectively. When regulators lack information, do not fully comprehend
the problem to be regulated, or neglect to anticipate and adapt to changes in
circumstances, regulation may fail to solve the problems it sought to address, it
may exacerbate those problems, or it may create new and unanticipated problems
(Anthoff and Hahn 2010 in Short 2013, p 7).”
This perfectly describes many of the conditions that led to the crisis.
Into the (Regulatory) Void: A Crisis Waiting to Happen
Regulatory voids can also be political when they come from the active contestation of the
norms governing the behavior of regulated industries (Short 2013). Politics can “… prevent the
enactment of law or the articulation of clear rules or standards when there is a lack of consensus
among the relevant actors about the nature or existence of a problem and what rules should
govern it.(Short 2013)” When the US economy faced economic crises from several fronts in the
1970s, the dominant pro-regulation Keynesian economic policies of the time were blamed. Promarket groups who were impressed by Milton Friedman’s policy prescription for Chile were able
to use the stagflation of the 1970s to gather increased support for the liberalization and
deregulation of the US economy. Their efforts began to see results in the 1980s when neoliberal
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policy preferences were adopted by Ronald Reagan’s economic policy advisors, and then by
Reagan himself (Prasad 2006). Thus began a line of neoliberal policy changes, few of which had
so great an effect on long-term economic stability as the slow dissolution of the Glass-Steagall
Act, which resulted in the deregulation of the FIRE industries (Krippner 2011; Prasad 2006).
The Glass-Steagall Act is the colloquial term for two pieces of legislation: the first GlassSteagall Act of 1932 and the much more extensive Banking Act of 1933 (Bell 1978; Duménil and
Levy 2011; Krippner 2011). Though the legislation was far-reaching, particular provisions of
these acts prohibited companies from: engaging in both commercial and investment banking;
outlawed payment of interest on checking accounts and certain other deposits; restricted
speculative uses of bank credit; and severely restricted the roles banks could play in brokering
loans for themselves or other parties (Davis 2009; Duménil and Levy 2011; Sorkin 2010).
The piecemeal dissolution of these regulations which took place over the 1980s and
1990s are what led to the Savings and Loan crisis, as well as an explosion of corporate mergers
and acquisitions which were previously outlawed by Glass-Steagall (Davis 2009; Reinhart and
Rogoff 2009). With the repeal of these key provisions came a slew of other deregulatory
campaigns. The rise of the internet in this deregulated environment made new types of financial
transactions, commodities, and speculation possible, from freer speculation on derivatives to the
exchange of credit default swaps before the 2007-2008 financial crisis (Blinder 2013; Davis
2009; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Households were encouraged to reimagine their skills as
capital to be developed at their jobs, while their financial capital accumulated; by the end of the
1990s, over half the population of the United States were shareholders, a new line of common
practice that benefitted the FIRE industries and developed a greater constituency demanding
deregulation (Davis 2009; Krippner 2011). During this period of deregulation, neoliberal
ideology continued its spread into mainstream economic training and reasoning, giving rise to the
Shareholder Value model of corporate governance (Callinicos 2003; Carruthers and Kim 2011;
Davis 2009). This model meant that CEOs were expected to maximize profit and the value of
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company shares (stocks) for the benefit of shareholders who received dividends from those
profits (many of whom are also elites) (Keister 2002; Keister 2005; Keister 2014). The increased
focus on short term profits fed the ideological resistance to regulation, as it by nature put a cap on
profit growth rates.
Regulatory Capture & Disablement: Killing with Kindness & Strangulation
These circumstances can also lead to regulatory capture, as regulation's idealized goal of
reducing public externalities is often overwhelmed or distorted by how political imperatives
might differently motivate and constrain regulators (Short 2013). According to capture theory,
business has the greatest “organizable” interests in controlling or co-opting regulation, and when
there is great political contestation over the goals of regulation, business interests can infiltrate
regulating organizations. As lobbyists for powerful and rich firms provide politicians with the
most technically sophisticated analyses and drafts of laws, these rich firms then go beyond
‘drafts’ to actually employing former employees of the regulating firms. Since firms can pay
more (in the American context) than government agencies, regulating employees anticipate later
careers working as lobbyists in the private sector, creating a ‘revolving door’. Under capture, the
regulating agency becomes very hospitable to the policy recommendations of big business. From
the consumer’s point of view, the public’s interests are too diffuse to make a difference. As a
result, the regulatory agencies’ staff or commission members become aligned with rich firms
(Laffont and Mortimer 2002; Levine and Forrence 1990; Stiglitz 2000).
Some may refer to this as corruption, but even in advanced democracies with high levels
of transparency and media freedom, the complexities of these regulatory commissions favor large
firms. NGOs representing the public may add a complication of more public representation, but
the argument is that they will never have the resources that large firms can command. Only
during crises when media scrutiny becomes intense, may large firm advantage be neutralized for
a short period of time, resulting in possible bursts of regulation (e.g., the Glass-Steagall and other
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acts in the 1930s, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act and other acts more recently).
But after the crisis, the capture theory reasserts its power and slowly takes over again.
Disablement theory related capture theory, but it is both more political and less
recognized. Evidence shows that “…since the late twentieth century, there has been a concerted
political movement in the United States and elsewhere to defund administrative agencies and
derail regulatory initiatives, creating gaping and persistent voids in the regulatory state. (Short
2013; Short and Toffel 2010)” In this case, a federal regulatory agency is composed of appointees
from two or more political parties. The party of business can disable the regulatory agency by
opposing most measures of regulation. As a result, votes on implementing regulations can be
easily disabled by tie votes. A variation of disablement concerns many agencies but especially
those that rely on appointed staff such as the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). In this
case, appointments of an unfavored party are held up in Congress so the board is understaffed and
largely cannot function.
…Or Maybe the System is Simply Built to Fail
This model is reminiscent of elite theories such as those forwarded by William Domhoff
(2014) and George Stigler (1975). A government regulator faces pressure from businesses and
electoral pressure from consumers, a relationship initially consistent with Fligstein’s market
theory. In this case, the business pressure is always more powerful, and as a result, regulations are
only passed only for the benefit of large firms. Regulation can benefit business in through two
different mechanisms: direct subsidies, or protection from regulation. Subsidies may encourage
new entrants into the market, but protection against new entrants is more desirable from the
business point of view. Subsidies are more effective when a business can pit governments against
each other when promising new jobs (e.g., large corporations locate plants in states that give them
subsidies and tax relief). Small firms will be unable to leverage state governments in this way and
consumers will generally be ignored. Domhoff’s approach is based on power resources in that
firms that control large amounts of revenues, profits and jobs will get their way since politicians
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depend upon their support. Stigler proceeds from public choice premises in that (1) large firms
are a small and homogenous group and can act as a collectivity more easily, while small firms
will have collective action problems, and (2) consumers will not organize because they face even
greater collective action problems and low potential benefits (free rider problems). In a sense, this
theory combines contrary bedfellows.
Finally, institutional problems can lead to regulatory voids when, regardless of the
presence of shared values or norms, institutions lack the capacity or competence to enforce
regulations (Short 2013). They may be entirely absent, or lack the resources and skills needed for
monitoring and enforcement, such as was seen with the EPA of 1996-1998, which it was only
capable of inspecting 1% of facilities subject to major antipollution rules (Short 2013). It was
been argued that the United States continues to face substantial problems in this respect, as
whenever markets are given opportunities to self-regulate, as the idea of the invisible hand and
proper institutional structure implies they should, events such as the 1980s Savings and Loan
Crisis, Great Recession, or European Sovereign Debt crisis occur (Calavita, Tillman and Pontell
1997; Epstein 2005; Glasberg and Skidmore 1997; Glynn 2006; Haveman 1993; Minsky 2008;
Stiglitz 2008; Stiglitz 2010). By contrast, in Germany there has been a tradition of strongly
organized employer and trade union federations regulating the welfare state with the government
as a third party. This form of “self-management” pervades many bureaucratic agencies. As a
result, the German state has a tradition of strong regulation in many different areas of society
(OECD 2012). For instance the Stadesamt (Office of Vital Statistics) regulates the first names
that can be given to a child (e.g., rejecting Whoopis), and regulates shopping hours in general
and the location of big-box stores in particular so much so that Walmart withdrew from Germany
after a ten year presence (Christopherson 2007). from the American perspective, Germany is an
odd combination of democracy (self-administration, co-determination of corporate boards, and
works councils), but with a state with strong powers and an elite bureaucracy.
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Given the issues endemic to self-regulation in a capitalist society, the reasons to leave the
largest portion of regulatory authority to the state become much easier to process. The state is
broadly considered the most effective regulatory authority once the above issues in self-regulation
are considered and controlled for. While the specific reasons that the state is the best regulator
vary somewhat widely, there is a broad understanding, even among businesses, that the state is
better equipped to impose market-stabilizing rules than often irrational firms, brokers, or
investors (Furner 2009; Pacewicz 2013). Not only have firms themselves demanded regulation to
restore confidence in the event of crises, but research on the democracies of western and northern
Europe indicate that there does exist a balance of higher government intervention which allows
for increased economic stability, along with enough flexibility to allow for economic growth
(Brady, Kiser and Beckfield 2005; Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001; Majone
1994; Pacewicz 2013; Prasad 2006). But, consistent with Short’s argument, the combination or
sociopolitical circumstances in each market-regulatory situation necessitate a balance between
actors in determining regulatory capacity. Recently, Prasad (2012) focuses more intently on
regulation and includes a Wilenskian tax backlash, or neo-Skocpolian theory of backlash. Harold
Wilensky (2002; 1965) focused on visible taxes such as income tax causing government backlash,
and non-visible taxes like the value-added tax avoiding backlash. Theda Skocpol (1995) indicated
that the US developed overly generous welfare systems with the Civil War pensions and Mothers
Pensions. A backlash developed, especially from the south that was ineligible for pensions since
they were the rebels and lost the war.
First, Prasad argues the regulatory system creates strong adversarial laws, and as a result,
the US state overreacts to crisis with very strong regulatory policies implemented by aggressive
bureaucrats (Prasad 2006). However, business and society lash back against this overreach with
capture and then anti-state policies that then severely cut back on regulations with a mantra of
keeping the state out of the affairs of the market and people’s lives. Second, the US tax and
regulatory system also overreacts with very high personal and corporate income taxes (not
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relatively invisible value added taxes), and the backlash comes in terms of tax avoidance
(backstage evasion) and neo-liberal attempts to advance tax cuts (front stage protest and
power)(Prasad 2006). and third, the US and Europe differ because of ‘demand.’ In the US, the
overabundance of production results in a consumption focus on taxing the rich and helping the
poor mainly through access to credit, which solves conflicts by enabling the purchase of more
products and houses. Reducing production raises prices and by implication the income of (for
example) farmers, serving as a form of income control or protection (Prasad 2012). In Europe, the
focus is on production and consumption comes from improved competition in world markets with
the state providing a social wage. Essentially, these are ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ theories of
regulation and policy. Prasad’s theory is a dual theory of stage one policy of demand versus
supply and then stage two policy of tax and regulatory backlash in the US (but not in Europe).
Though she does not say it, this theory is cyclical: adversarial policy leads to backlash policy
leads to adversarial policy leads to backlash policy.
Within this framework, and given such governmental fragmentation of power, business is
quite privileged. Critiques of state incompetence, largely due to fragmentation and constraints,
then portray the private business sector as inherently competent and fair. During the few times
that consensus can be reached about regulation (i.e., during economic crises or massive fraud like
Enron), the American response is to create strong laws that tend to be later reversed (Prasad,
2012). The result consists of low status bureaucrats trying to enforce strong laws while facing
private sector firms with armies of lawyers and very large amounts of resources (not to mention
access to politicians). Business largely controls regulation by capture, or it waits out the crisis
until it can return to normal. A process that makes this easier is the ‘cooptation’ of leading
politicians and regulatory bureaucrats by firms employing them as lobbyists in the process called
“the revolving door” (OECD 2014; OpenSecrets.org 2014).
An additional point to consider is the nature of power relation in regulation. Given that
every time we follow the speed limit while driving or enjoy a cup of non-toxic coffee, we are
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experiencing effective regulation at work (Ford 2013). Such examples demonstrate the finding
that regulation itself usually works invisibly and often, and is most often problematized when it is
the subject of a power struggle (Silbey 2013). The regulation that we most often study used
instead to selectively favor certain social or economic groups, such as in the legislative battles
between banking and credit union regulation (ABA 2010; Bergengren 1937; Croteau 1949;
Croteau 1956; Silbey 2013). The issue is increasingly often less about how much regulation than
what kinds of regulation, and their contents and effects (Carey 2013; Ford 2013; Gupta and Lad
1983; Pacewicz 2013; Reichman and Sefiha 2013; Sampson and Bloor 2007; Schneiberg and
Bartley 2001; Short 2013; Short and Toffel 2010; Silbey 2013). Sociological works have
historically treated regulation as a zero-sum game; to regulate or not to regulate, the corporations
win, or the people win. However, we now need to note how regulation as a process is subject to
power struggles as with any social phenomenon, not only between businesses and citizens or
workers, but also between firms and industries (Desmond 2013; Pacewicz 2013; Way 2005).
The Political-Cultural Theory of Markets & Its Connection to Regulation
Having recognized a dearth of sociological theory focused on market creation and
function, Neil Fligstein developed what he called the Political-Cultural theory of markets,
intending to provide an explicitly sociological approach to a traditionally economics-based topic.
The core claims of how markets function according to this theory are available in Table 3.1. With
reference to Bourdieu and McAdam, Fligstein’s theory, consistent with D’Aunno, Succi &
Alexander (2000), argues that markets are fields in which firms and other groups interact, act out
power struggles, and seek to guarantee their stability. He discusses several factors within fields
and within individual firms that can endanger a firm’s survival, which can include uncooperative
suppliers, price competition, interpersonal conflicts and intra-firm politics, and the ever-present
possibility that products may become obsolete (Fligstein 2002).
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Table 3.1. Core Claims of Political-Cultural Theory of Markets
1. At the beginning of a new market, the largest firms are the most likely to create a
conception of control and a political coalition to control competition.
2. Power struggles within firms are over who can solve the problem of how to best
organize the firm to deal with competition. The winners of the struggle impose
their organizational culture and design on the firm.
3. Through intended and unintended actions, states can thwart the actions of firms to
create stable conceptions of control.
4. The liability of newness͟ in new markets reflects, in part, their lack of social
structure and a conception of control; that is, it reflects participants’ inability to
control competition.
5. New markets borrow conceptions of control from nearby markets, particularly
when firms from other markets choose to enter the new market.
6. In markets with stable conceptions of control, market participants widely agree on
the conception of control and the status hierarchies and strategies it implies.
7. Incumbent firms pay attention to the actions of other incumbent firms, not
challenger firms, while challenger firms focus on incumbents’ behavior.
8. Firms in stable markets continue to use the governing conception of control, even
when confronted with outside invasion or general economic crisis.
9. Market crisis is observed when incumbent firms begin to fail.
10. Transformation of existing markets results from exogenous forces: invasion,
economic crisis, or political intervention by states.
11. Invaders are more likely to come from nearby than from distant markets.
12. When firms begin to fail, the intraorganizational power struggle heats up, leading
to higher turnover of top personnel and greater activism by boards of directors and
non-management shareholders. New sets of organizational actors attempt to
reconstruct the firm along the lines of the invaders.
These uncertainties drive firms’ efforts to achieve dominance and security in their field, guided
by their conceptions of control, which he defines by noting that,
“Markets create local cultures that define who is an incumbent and who is a
challenger and why (i.e., they define the social structure). They prescribe how
competition will work in each market. They also provide actors with cognitive
frames to interpret the actions of other organizations. (Fligstein 2002, p.18)”
The conception of control is one of the driving concepts behind the entire theory, as it captures
the reason for institutional struggles within and between markets.
Market Incumbents & Transformations
According to this theory, for example, when a new market is formed, it is the largest
firms which are likely to create the baseline conception of control, and to use their political power
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to control competition and protect their vision of the market’s function (Fligstein 2002).
However, these conceptions of control are not necessarily stable, and are frequently explicitly
unstable. It often takes state intervention via a strong regulatory regime to establish a stable
conception of control to guide the behavior of incumbent and challenging firms (Fligstein 2002).
However, when a stable conception of control is established, market participants are likely to
agree on the corresponding hierarchies and strategies that that conception demands. This means
that firms will consistently use this conception of control to govern their behavior even when
confronted with market invasions or economic crises (Fligstein 2002; Short 2013). This
perspective is like that espoused by Short (2013) and Ford (2013), in that it finds markets to be
stable when mutually agreed-upon and recognized rules are followed.
This framework is not limited to a static view of stable markets, however. Markets are
likely to face instability not only because of flaws in their conception of control, but possibly
because they lack one altogether as can happen in new markets (Fligstein 2002). This can lead to
more direct power struggles between firms or market crises in the case that incumbent firms
begin to fail (Fligstein 2002). Beyond issues of internal stability, however, Fligstein identifies
three exogenous forces that can transform markets: invasion by outside firms or markets,
economic crises, or political intervention by states. Invasion is more likely to occur from nearby
markets and can happen when a firm begins to fail. This increases intra-organizational power
struggles, “…leading to higher turnover of top personnel and greater activism by boards of
directors and non-management shareholders. (Fligstein 2002)” New organizational actors appear
and attempt to rebuild the firm according to the visions of the invaders.
Economic crises can powerfully affect a market in multiple ways. They can lead to shifts
in demand, create openings for invading firms, or force state intervention, all of which would
challenge or change the dominant conception of control. Further, firms in any given market are
dependent on suppliers, availability of capital, labor markets, customers, and the flexibility of
various state rules (Fligstein 2002). These changes are largely outside the control of individual
65

firms. Yet because of the possibility of state intervention, there is constant interaction between
market and state actors which can cause problems for an existing conception of control (Fligstein
2002). These can “…undermine existing agreements by threatening …firms, either by
withholding resources or through the direct invasion of firms from nearby markets. (Fligstein
2002, p. 84)” This means that the constant interplay between states, markets, and firms can lead
to a number of exogenous shocks that could lead vulnerable firms open to failure or invasion,
either because of an economic crisis or a change in conception of control to which a firm cannot
adjust. This is more likely when the initial conception of control was based on unstable norms or
behaviors, such as in a regulatory void.
Policy Domains & the Role of Regulation
Because the conception of control established in a new or existing market may be
predicated on unstable behavioral patterns, the state plays a substantial role in Fligstein’s theory
of markets. This is where the Political-Cultural theory’s explanation of regulation comes in.
Rather than making use of the profit-maximization model of social behavior, this framework
requires the consideration of firm survival as the driver of market relations.
The financial market field is a space with numerous actors who are all trying to achieve
dominance over that space (Fligstein 2002). Doing this requires the establishment of a culture
which guides social relations between actors in much the same way it does in any social setting
(Fligstein 2002). As this culture allows actors to continuously interpret the meanings of the
actions of others, recall Minsky’s argument that lenders are continually reviewing the history and
behavior of firms in order to determine the most profitable, safe financial relations possible
(Fligstein 2002; Minsky 2008). Some actors will be better benefitted by cultural arrangements
than others, and will use those acceptable cultural rules to reproduce their power in the face of
challenges (Fligstein 2002).
According to the Political-Cultural theory of markets, regulation, and the economic
outcomes it has for a given market is determined by the structure of the policy domain in a
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market. Policy domains are a facet of an existing social order where a given set of actors claim
the power to make and enforce the rules by which all of the other actors must behave (Fligstein
2002). Simply put, policy domains are where the rules for fields are made and enforced and are
usually but not necessarily dominated by states. Given the increasing power leveraged by
business, it can be said that economic outcomes in a market field are driven by the structure of
policy domains: whether they are built around the state’s capacity to intervene in and mediate the
economy, or around a social groups’ (in this case, firms’) power to dictate the terms of that state
intervention (Fligstein 2002). The outcomes possible in a market field, such as widespread
profitability or stability, are determined by whether the firms make the rules, or whether the state
makes the rules. Just as Minsky’s theory leads to support for regulation, so comes the basis for
Fligstein’s call for state regulation of the economy.
Fligstein is one among many social theorists who supports the argument that, left alone,
capitalist systems are self-destructive. Because market fields are inherently competitive and
conflictual, they create instability for both producers and consumers. With the increase of
unregulated economic exchange, and as prices begin to be set through this relatively unregulated
exchange, “social relationships are up for grabs;… in order to stabilize the existence of a given
firm, its owners and managers will do anything to control others…” which can lead to
monopolies or investment schemes that lead to market failure or economic crises (Fligstein 2002,
p. 19). This problem of stability is what pushes firms toward dependence on the state. Highly
unstable markets can threaten the survival of all the firms they contain (Fligstein 2002).
Depending on the size of a collection of markets, and how interconnected firms are within and
between those markets, the failure of one can lead to economic failure. Thus, the state is required
to intervene to create and enforce stability-producing rules.
Credit Unions, Banks, and the Lobby
How does the theory described above map onto the development of credit unions, and
what can it tell us about the future of credit unions and the consumer finance industry overall?
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The political-cultural theory of markets is useful to explain the interrelation and outcomes of the
CU and CB industries in a few ways. First, it proposes an explanation of the firm-government
relations that affect and justify regulation in a way that is sensitive to the ideological changes
observed during the 1980s. Second, it justifies the argument that credit unions belonged to either
a) a separate, smaller market than consumer banks operated in, or b) existed within a niche of the
same market, such that they were not regarded as competition to Commercial Banks. Third, it can
explain why credit unions' outcomes changed so dramatically after the 1980s. In the following
sections, I will elaborate on the above points.
First, I will discuss how this theory can be applied to explain the change in the United
States’ guiding economic ideology. While I do not test this portion of the theory directly, such is
not necessary. There has been ample research and writing on how the United States has changed
the way it approaches economics and all of the cultural trappings of such, and it is a nearly
universal observation that the 1980s were a profoundly influential part of that process. However,
the results of my analyses should demonstrate outcomes consistent with this ideological shift that
are consistent with its general dictates. Second, I will use this theory to justify my claim that
credit unions operated essentially 9 in a separate market from commercial banks, and that it was
the combination of economic crisis and subsequent government action that changed the structure
of these markets. Lastly, I will explain how this theory can explain the change in credit union
outcomes after the 1980s, relative to those of commercial banks. Though I cannot directly test
each step of that process with the data available, the outcomes of my models should be consistent
with the predictions this theory should provide. If not, it would be an indication that my data was
either mis-specified, or that the theory requires revision, a normal part of the scientific process.
The Political-Cultural Theory on Financialization, Neoliberalism, and their Significance for
Regulation
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A point to keep in mind regarding policy domains is that they can change. A comparison
of the pre-Reagan regulatory era with the present indicates that we have likely seen a shift in the
dominant policy domains over the past 40 years. Between the 1960s through the 1990s, we have
moved to a policy domain dominated by a coalition between capitalists and the state. This has
been made possible by the parallel developments of neoliberalism and financialization which
must be understood in order situate them in the Political-Cultural theory.
Financialization
Perhaps one of the most succinct definitions of financialization comes from Lin &
Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) who describe it as “two interdependent processes…the rising
dominance of the finance sector…[and] the increasing participation of non-finance firms in the
financial services and investment markets.” An example of the former process is that in 1950,
only 0.5% of world exports came from funds raised on international financial markets. By 1996,
that number increased to exceed 20% of world exports (Baker, Epstein & Pollin 1998 in: Epstein
2005). The latter process is sometimes more striking, yet less studied: the amount of income that
non-financial firms got from financial activities (such as investments) rose from 20% of profits in
the 1970s to anywhere between 40% and 60% of their total profits by 2010 (Lin and TomaskovicDevey 2013). Within forty years, the share of profits derived from financial transactions in nonfinancial industries at least doubled. Another broader definition of financialization refers to the
general primacy and ascendancy of the finance industries, financial markets, financial institutions
and financial motives in domestic and international economies (Epstein 2005).
A common theme in the sociological literature ties financialization to the rise of
neoliberal policy in the 1970s and 1980s. As previously discussed, neoliberal ideology promoted
seeking market solutions to social problems, rearranging regulation to protect markets and
businesses instead of citizens, and resulted in the dissolution of depression-era restrictions on
financial industries (Krippner 2011; Prasad 2006; Prasad 2012). However, the beginning of
financialization itself is often placed between the late 1980s and 1990s and is certainly agreed to
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have been affecting the American economy by the time that the Dotcom bubble10 burst, leading to
the early-2000s financial crisis. Krippner argues that Financialization was the largely coincidental
result of attempts to shift political responsibility for citizen welfare from politicians to the market,
and while it was made possible by neoliberal policies, it may not necessarily have been an
“intentional part of any political project (Krippner 2011)”.
Neoliberalism
While neoliberalism’s founding ideas date back at least to the 1930s and 1940s, it was
brought to prominence by certain groups of economists, including Milton Friedman and the
Chicago School (Davies 2014; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Furner 2009; Harvey 2007).
In fact, two events can demonstrate how the ideology began to show politically significant effects
by the early 1970s. The first occurred in the wake of anticommunist and anti-collectivist
sentiment within the business community, which saw the distribution of the Powell Memorandum
within the US Chamber of Commerce, calling for a concerted effort among businesses to
aggressively promote neoliberal policies (Powell 1971). The second was Milton Friedman and the
Chicago School influence in liberalizing Chile’s economy after Pinochet’s military coup (Davies
2014; Furner 2009; Stiglitz 2008). While they were able to bring the economy to a state of
consistent GDP growth, it came at the cost of dramatic increases in poverty and suffering
amongst the poor (Furner 2009). Before Chile’s economy ultimately crashed, neoliberal policies
had already been hailed for the aggressive growth and profit they produced. The idea had taken
root.
By the 1960s, neoliberal ideology had already reached influential actors and had become
a process of collective action guided by belief in the ‘free market’. As neoliberalism gained
political support in the 1960s and 70s, the United States saw cultural shifts with roots in the
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contemporary values of modernism and economic liberalism that paired well with neoliberal
ideology, propelling it further. Many of the cultural changes occurring over the last 40 years were
anticipated by many social scientists concerned about newly looming economic realities,
including Daniel Bell, David Harvey, and Pierre Bourdieu (Bell 1978; Bourdieu and Nice 1998;
Granovetter 1985; Harvey 1988; Piven and Cloward 1971).
The latter half of the 20th Century saw dramatic increases in values such as
individualism, self-fulfillment (as opposed to fulfilling community interests), and personal
success measured by net worth. These were also accompanied by growing preferences for
expanded access to credit and the belief that the solutions to life’s problems (and the source of the
problems themselves) originate from individual decisions (Bell 1978; Fourcade and Healy 2007;
Krippner 2011; Mudge 2008; Prasad 2012). These ideals, many of which have long been
associated with modernism and an American aesthetic, took on a new tone with the added
element of market fundamentalism (a key underpinning of neoliberal ideology). The result was an
implicit belief that personal troubles originated with (and could only be solved by) the individual
and that social issues originated from and should be solved by markets (Bell 1978; Block and
Somers 2014; Mills 1956; Mills 1959; Mudge 2008; Somers and Block 2005)11. A problem could
not exist that could not be explained by personal failures or market failures, a perspective that
virtually invalidates structural inequalities.
As these ideological shifts permeated powerful groups and were disseminated to the
public enough to become ‘common knowledge’, political support grew for policies which were in
line with neoliberal creed. When trying to consider how this enabled financialization, we can
think of Krippner’s argument regarding risk. She argued that intentionally or not, much of the
regulatory changes that made financialization possible were the result of politicians trying to shift
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responsibility for social welfare and public provisions onto the market, thus avoiding making
potentially unpopular political decisions (such as raising taxes or modifying welfare policy
directly)(Krippner 2011; Krippner 2014). This directly deferred political responsibility for social
problems to the market, and relied on market fundamentalist arguments to justify any positive or
negative outcomes, thus avoiding any risk to a politician’s electoral goals (Krippner 2011). This
would not have been possible without the establishment of a widespread, politically supportable
claim of the primacy of market solutions for public problems. Today we continue to see market
solutions provided for numerous social problems in the United States (from health insurance
access to incarceration and mental health)(Block and Somers 1984; Block and Somers 2014;
Somers and Block 2005).
The Political-Cultural Application
Financialization and the ascension of neoliberalism caused a change in policy domain
because they changed the rules in a way that powerfully advantaged commercial banks. It came to
pass that when an issue concerned financial markets, the policy domain came to be dictated by
the largest financial firms, usually commercial and investment banks. Though the state remained
the enforcer of rules, agents of the financial industry increasingly came to write those rules. Thus,
their principles, the largest investment and commercial banks, came to dictate the terms of state
intervention.
Recall the timeline of these events: neoliberalism rose to primacy in the United States
between the 1970s and 1980s. Financialization developed in the wake of that period of
deregulation, appearing between the late 1980s and 1990s, and was an empirical reality by the
time the Dotcom bubble burst between 2000 and 2001. By 2002, Fligstein observed that “The
United States is the purest case of a society in which capitalist banks are able to use the policy
domains of the state for their own interests.” This is because the events previously discussed led
the dominant policy domain of the United States to change to one that minimized state power
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over markets (especially financial markets) and defined the success of a business to a very narrow
set of bounds focused on maximizing shareholder profit. Consider the details below.
Since the changes in policy leading up to the 1990s, the Government is usually unable
directly intervene in markets, and when it does so, it is regulatory. However, regulation of
financial markets has become minimal, rules almost always advantage banks, and regulatory
policy is often heavily influenced (if not outright written by) the leading banks in the sector.
Before the neoliberal wave of deregulation, US competition laws prevented cooperation between
banks, thus decreasing their ability to control markets directly. After these rules were relaxed, US
banks could enter joint ventures with their major competitors. The combination of deregulation
allowing for massive banking mergers and increasing coordination among the largest banks led
directly to the development of commercial banks that, during the Subprime mortgage crisis, were
deemed “too big to fail”. That is, major US banks had become so big, so interdependent, and
managed the assets of so many people, businesses, and government entities, that economists
predicted that their failure would cause a full US economic collapse. Such a thing was simply
impossible with the financial rules that existed before the wave of neoliberal deregulation.
With these changes came financialization, which included changes in the cultural norms
driving financial and non-financial markets. This included the rise of the shareholder value
model, in which businesses’ success came to be measured by their quarterly profits, not just in
terms of their absolute value or growth, but in terms of an increasing rate of growth. It was no
longer enough that they be more profitable – they now had to generate profits at an everincreasing pace. These events and the changes they represent perfectly align with the definition
offered of a policy domain, and thus indicate that, without question, the policy domain changed.
Credit unions were by no means immune to this shift in the policy domain guiding the
financial industry and the many markets it contained. Credit Unions are organizations composed
of humans, many of whom could have had careers that included any number of types of financial
entities before they joined the credit union industry. Thus, the change in policy domain that began
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in the early 1980s meant that over time, credit unions began to face powerful internal and external
pressures to modify their traditional structure and imitate banks. They had already long fought
regulatory limitations on their activities, and now had many of those limitations lifted. They now
faced political and cultural pressure to show ever-increasing growth that resembled a neoliberal
pattern, even if they were not-for-profit entities. Their success and stability were still assessed
with many of the same measures as banks, meaning that if they wanted to claim to be stable,
successful institutions, they had to play the same game as their competitors. Yet given their
historical and structural difference from banks, how was it possible for credit unions, almost
universally imagined as a financial resource for rural farmers, to ever compete with commercial
banks? Remember that Fligstein identified three external factors that can transform markets:
economic crises, political intervention by states, or invasion by outside firms or markets. In the
1980s, all three factors came into play. And Credit Unions rode the wave.
Credit Unions: A Case Study of Colliding Markets
When Credit Unions arrived on the scene in the US, the consumer finance environment
was very different than it is today. Credit Unions did not compete with commercial banks. The
state of financial regulation meant that credit unions and commercial banks simply offered
different services, and thus worked within different markets. Such was especially true after the
Glass-Steagall and Banking acts of the early 1930s, passed in response to the Great Depression.
The services that credit unions offered at the time, basic deposit-taking, small loans, mortgages
and the like, were more generally offered by cooperative banks (similar but structurally different
institutions from CUs) or builder’s associations (precursors to Savings & Loans).
With the passage of the Federal Credit Union Act in 1934 was the establishment of the
Federal Credit Union Division, under the authority of the Farm Credit Administration. This
agency was responsible for the chartering and management of federal credit unions. In 1942, the
FCU Division was transferred to the FDIC, six years after which it was moved from the FDIC to
the Federal Security Administration and renamed the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions (BFCU).
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Moving one more time to the newly created Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the
Bureau became self-sufficient over the next seventeen years, as it came to be financed by fees on
federal credit unions. In 1970 the NCUA was formed by congress and replaced the Bureau, a
circumstance lasting to today.
This bit of history is relevant because even before the NCUA was formed, and before
they came to become real competition for banks in the consumer finance industry, credit unions
were growing fast. Many of the initial arguments for the close regulation of credit unions, and the
limitation of their services was based on arguments about their small size and ostensibly high
risk. From the 1940s onward, CUs sought to establish their place in the market and become a
meaningful competitor to incumbent firms. In 1964, the BFCU demonstrated this point. While
noting that the absolute value of assets and loans was still far below that of Commercial Banks,
by that point, banks had become a target. In the 1964 Annual Report, the BFCU noted that Credit
Unions were growing fast, with their growth rates beginning to outpace those of Banks in the late
1950s (Figures 3.2 & 3.1). With this growth in size, and in reach beginning with the deregulation
of the 1980s, credit unions and their relationship with banks began to demonstrate the macrolevel processes identified by Fligstein.
Before the 1960s, credit unions and commercial banks served different markets. Credit
Unions navigated and quickly became incumbent (though not necessarily dominant) in incredibly
narrow market fields – they served either specific 1) associational or occupational groups, or 2)
very narrow geographic locations. For these narrowly defined groups, they provided narrow
consumer finance services: they took deposits, they made installment loans, and perhaps very
small business loans. In rural and low-income areas, upon which they made a priority of serving
in the early 20th century, they had virtually no competition. This allowed them to spread quickly –
they became entrants, rather than invaders, in literally thousands of marginally neglected markets
across the country. By 1935, 38 states and the District of Columbia had enacted credit union laws
(NCUA 2020).
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Figure 3.1. Growth in Consumer Installment Loans made by Federal Credit Unions and All
Other Financial Institutions, 1940-64.

Source: BFCU Annual Report, 1964, p.23; https://www.ncua.gov/news/annual-reports

Figure 3.2 .Growth in Total Assets of Commercial Banks, Savings and Loan Associations, and
Federal Credit Unions, 1945-64.

Source: BFCU Annual Report, 1964, p.24; https://www.ncua.gov/news/annual-reports
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It was on June 26, 1934, with the enactment of the Federal Credit Union Act by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, that federal charters could be offered for Credit Unions. On October 1st,
Morris Sheppard FCU in Texarkana became the first federally chartered credit union (NCUA
2020). With the federal charter came the possibility of more uniform regulation, increased
legitimacy, and a more prominent voice in advocating for and expanding the industry. It was with
the former goal in mind that the first head of the Federal Credit Union Division, Claude Orchard,
worked to further develop laws and regulations governing credit unions for the next 19 years.
This was a substantial win for the development of a credit union industry, for while the various
federal agencies managing federal charters could not lobby congress, they provided a means for
advocates to more directly engage federal agencies on behalf of credit unions, and a more direct
avenue through which they could seek to grow the industry.
The 1970s were the beginning of a broad expansion of CU services, abilities, and growth
opportunities, continuing into the mid-1990s. The decade was set off well with the establishment
of the NCUA, and the less-discussed NCUSIF (National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund),
which provided Federal and qualifying state credit unions with deposit insurance, for a mandatory
fee. Legislation passed in the mid-1970s granted credit unions extensions to qualify for that
insurance, involvement with student loans, increased merger options, flexible regulation of
interest rates, and share draft accounts.12 They also gained the authorization to act as fiscal agents
of the state, which meant they could offer services such as taking bonds and money orders,
cashing out bonds, and accepting federal deposits (PL 95-417 1977).
With the passage of major deregulatory laws in the 1980s, particularly the DIDMCA
(Depository Institutions Deregulation & Monetary Control Act) of 1980, Garn-St Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, and the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of
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PL 91-206 Amendment to the Federal Credit Union Act; PL 91-468 Credit Union Share Insurance Act; PL 92-318
Education Amendments of 1972; PL 93-383 Housing and Community Development Act of 1974; PL 93-495 of 1974,
PL 96-161 (replaced by DIDMCA in 1980, but key effect retained).
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1984, Credit Unions gained numerous abilities and benefits, which included interest rate
deregulation, broadened merger options, and access to mortgage-backed securities.
These regulatory changes boosted credit unions growth. While other consumer financial
institutions also got a boost during this time, the difference was that credit unions took only a
small fraction of the damage that came to banks and S&Ls during the Savings & Loan crisis. As
financial institutions sought to climb out of the trough of the S&L Crisis, in 1994 came the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. This allowed financial
institutions opportunities for interstate branching and mergers, an ability that was granted to
credit unions as well. This 25-year stretch constituted Credit Unions’ shift from being an entity in
a neighboring market, to an open challenger. But rather than credit unions invading commercial
banks’ markets, their fringe market was absorbed into a broader consumer finance market.
Following the form of Fligstein’s Political-Cultural Theory of Markets, we can clarify the
process that took place. Looking to Figure 3.3, we can see two markets. Market A represents a
Marginal Consumer Finance Market (Circle A). It represents the aggregated, tightly limited
regional and associational markets in which Credit Unions traditionally had to operate. This
Figure 3.3. Market Field Expansion and Absorption, with Market
Incumbents Meeting.
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market is deemed marginal because the consumers in this market are those which the broader
consumer finance market (Circle B in Figure 3.3) considers unappealing or inaccessible: too
specialized to target specifically (i.e. Detroit Railroad Company employees, or UK students), too
poor or unreliable to make money from (urban working-class communities in Minneapolis, or
small farmers), or too spread out to market to or conduct business with (such as rural areas where
it takes 45-minutes to drive anywhere). Yet Credit Unions, builder’s associations, savings & loans
(earlier in their history), and cooperative community banks thrived in these markets in the earlymid 20th century. As Credit Unions grew swiftly between the great depression and into the 1970s
due to their conservative financial practices, competitive savings & loan rates, and lack of access
to risky investments, they were able to become well-established incumbents in these markets.
They were known and recognized among their target consumers and established a good
reputation via their non-profit models and community investment & education practices. They
played well into the conception of control that dominated these markets, along just those lines.
However, unlike community banks who sought only to serve customers within their welldefined region, credit union philosophy was based on a set of more universalist ideals. This is
well demonstrated in the article “Coöperative Consumer Credit” written by Claude Orchard,
named head of the newly formed Federal Credit Union Division in 1934:
“As the credit unions became established they grew to serve another purpose
which, in the eyes of many, outranked even the credit service in importance. This
was the promotion and encouragement of thrift. …[However,] the chief
usefulness of the credit union really lies in a function which includes both these
laudable services but which goes much beyond them. …Anyone who has studied
the problems of living of the American man will appreciate that much discord
and deprivation of his existence comes from failure properly manage his
finances. Partly he has never known a different practice and partly through the
lack of facilities, the working man all too simply lives from pay day to spending
between times. It is a mode of life which contrasts strongly with that which he
might achieve for himself through a reasoned management of his personal
finances. …Not uncommonly the beginning of regular saving, opening up
possibilities of broader future activities, has marked the beginning of a whole
new outlook for the worker's narrow life.(Orchard 1938)”
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It was these universalist notions, the idea that they had a responsibility to provide “the
beginning of a whole new outlook for the worker’s narrow life”, rather than the traditionally
capitalist value of profit that made early credit unions seek to grow beyond their initially limited
base. This almost philanthropic vision may not have survived to today, but it was enough to push
credit unions to fight to expand their markets, reduce their limitations, and to eventually compete
with banks for a growing slice of the broader consumer finance industry. Fligstein noted that
“Incumbent firms pay attention to the actions of other incumbent firms, not challenger firms,
while challenger firms focus on incumbents’ behavior. (Fligstein 2002)” It is clear that since at
least as early as 1960 (though likely far earlier), Credit Unions could fit either side of this
statement; either as incumbents in a market monitoring their neighboring incumbents, or as the
lines between the markets began to dissolve, as a challenger focusing on the behavior of the
incumbent. In its 1964 Annual Report, the BFCU recognized that the difference in their collective
assets made credit unions a far cry from being a serious competitor of commercial banks. Yet
there was good reason to include banking data in credit unions’ annual reports: they knew who
the big fish was, and they wanted its pond.
It was with the deregulation of the 1970s to the mid-1990s that it happened that “Through
intended and unintended actions, states [thwarted] the actions of firms to create stable
conceptions of control (Fligstein 2002).” By deregulating the consumer finance industry in its
broadest sense, the US State apparatus increased the size of both credit unions’ potential
customer base and commercial banks’ interest in a portion of the consumer finance market that
they had previously largely written off. This led to the A→B portion of Figure 3.3, wherein 1) the
Marginal Consumer Finance market was absorbed into the broader consumer finance market, and
2) Credit Unions, who would have become invading firms had the merge not happened, went
from a neighboring incumbent straight into the challenger position. Either way, the result was that
an additional player entered a newly expanded market just before a crisis, weathered the crisis
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better than its new peers, and was presented with new opportunities for growth without having to
undergo a substantial recovery period.
However, while credit unions as an industry broadly weathered the crisis well, the story is
a bit more complicated. It is worth noting that Credit Unions were able to accomplish this by two
means. First are their previously discussed structure: credit unions had less incentive and less
ability to participate in the risky investments that dragged banks and savings & loans into deep
troughs from which many never returned. The second means are the result of deregulation
allowing something relatively novel for credit unions: they were able to take a page from
commercial banks’ book. Another reason that failures were low was because of a newly possible
flood of mergers, which allowed the industry to avoid substantial losses in both assets and
membership, both of which grew during the S&L crisis (See Figure 3.4). However, such was
accomplished arguably because they took a note from banks’ books – the NCUSIF, much like the
FDIC’s reserves, was decimated (Figure 3.5). Insurance losses increased just before the S&L
Crisis tipped off due to economic conditions causing numerous businesses to fail, many of which

Figure 3.4. Credit Union Assets and Membership across the Savings & Loan Crisis, 19751995.
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Figure 3.5. National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund, Losses & Operating Expenses in
Current $Thousands, 1978-1996.

Source: NCUA Annual Report, 1987 & 1996.
sponsored credit unions. Such a circumstance forced credit unions to either change their charter to
a new “common bond”, which could cause a massive loss of membership, or to fail by
liquidation. This resulted in the NCUA beginning to loosen the Common Bond requirement, an
issue discussed in Chapter 2.
Fligstein also noted that “Transformation of existing markets results from exogenous
forces: invasion, economic crisis, or political intervention by states. (2002)” In this case, a market
transformation absolutely took place, due certainly to economic crisis and political intervention.
The result was a substantially larger, more open market. And credit unions, like any challenger
firm, aligned with the dominant conception of control, despite that such conflicted openly with
credit unions’ stated values. It also happened that during the 1980s, the dominant conception of
control was changing.
The changes in FIRE industry regulation during the 1980s and 1990s have expanded
market access for credit unions, allowing them to challenge banks for a greater share of the
consumer banking industry. This challenges the dominant conception of control, as the theory
places command over the conception of control at the hands of the incumbent firms (Fligstein
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2002). However, the increase in market competition changes firms’ sense of security, for both
incumbents and challengers (as any challenge of an incumbent carries risk)(Fligstein 2002).
While the increase in competition did allow for credit union growth, it also placed pressure on
credit unions to take advantage of the regulatory environment to grow during a time where the
shareholder value ideology was taking root. As that ideology demands quarterly increases in
assets and profits, credit unions faced increasing pressure to show that they were keeping up.
With the shift in the policy domain that was occurring at the same time, the opportunity was ripe
for credit unions to push the boundaries of regulatory compliance.
What Happens at the Intersection of a Changing Policy Domain and a Market Collision?
A question that bridges this section on theory and the empirical work to follow is that of
how this shift can be captured empirically and be used to chart a causal argument. The answer to
that question is regulation and industry stability. As the consumer finance industry was shaken up
by the market crises of the S&L Crisis, the stagflation of the 1970s, dramatic drops in regulation
(especially those involving investment, interest rates, and mergers), followed by technological
change, both credit unions and banks had opportunities for meteoric growth, and risky behavior.
From the late 1970s to approximately 2000, there was a nearly solid blanket of domestic
crises, recessions, or international crises affecting US firms. And while these periods certainly
saw spikes in failures and mergers for both commercial banks and credit unions, there are notable
differences. First, as can be seen in Figure 3.6, Credit Unions had consistently decreasing failure
rates. Second, based on changes in failure rates, the credit union industry recovered from shocks
more quickly than banks, and took much longer to begin to suffer during crises than banks (see
1983-1990 and 2007-2015). Third, while failure rates did increase during serious crises, after the
regulatory change of the 1980s, credit union were not nearly so affected as banks, which have
since been more diversified in their product and investment involvements. It is worth asking
whether this regulatory change allowed credit unions to grow as they so quickly have, yet the
differences maintained between them and banks has prevented them from experiencing the same
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Figure 3.6. Credit Union and Commercial Bank Failures Mapped
over Economic Crises and Recessions, 1960-2015.

sharp spikes in failure as banks have during crises. This raises the question of whether the trend
of deregulation has led to banks experiencing relatively more instability than credit unions as they
have been freed to a greater extent than credit unions. Likewise, as credit unions have been
granted more freedom, and clearly benefitted from it, is there any indication that this could lead to
longer-term stability issues?
These are the questions that the next chapters will seek to answer. It appears reasonable
to assert that according to this theoretical perspective, we should see credit unions become more
like banks in terms of asset patterns, failure rates, and growth in income. We should see that
regulatory change over the course of neoliberalism’s ascendancy should transform credit unions
into more profitable, if potentially less stable forms. The next chapter will describe how I will
measure these patterns, to demonstrate how the data reflects the changes wrought by a neoliberal
policy domain and the accompanying trend of financialization.
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Chapter Four: Methods & Data
In this chapter, I will detail the methods I will use to assess the consequences of the
Policy Domain shift toward a neoliberal system where the state values large firms and relative
market freedom. First, I provide a reminder of the specific research questions guiding this study,
and how those have informed the hypotheses I will use to conduct the statistical analysis. I will
also briefly discuss the sources used to build the data set and challenges faced in doing so. After
this will come a detailed discussion of the variables, including their calculation where
appropriate, and the substantive meaning of their values. This will be done for both dependent
and independent variables, with brief attention given to controls. Last, I will specify the ways that
I have used and will use the data collected, and the type of statistical analyses that will follow.
This will involve a description of the form that the models will take via linear equations for each
set of hypotheses.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Question 1 reads: Was there a meaningful difference between the stability of the
Credit Union and Consumer Banking industries before the 1980s, and how have both industries’
stability been affected by the subsequent political-economic changes? This question is the most
important of the two because it addresses the most fundamental claims of the project. The first is
an observational claim: Credit Unions experience failure and stability in a way that is
fundamentally different from commercial banks. This claim has already been largely confirmed
via a discussion of descriptive statistics, but the how or why of it has not been. That is where my
first hypothesis comes in:
H1.1: The effect of regulations on credit unions’ and banks’ stability & failure will be
greater than some of the effects of institutional size, spread, or market share.
This hypothesis not only seeks to directly test the first research question, but it also is
phrased to acknowledge two sets of alternative hypotheses. First are two implied null hypotheses:
that regulation as I have measured it will have no significant effect on credit unions and bank
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failure rates, and that the effects of regulation would be comparatively smaller than other
significant drivers of failure, such as insufficient market share or assets. It also seeks to
acknowledge that while this project applies the study of neoliberalism and markets to a novel
topic, it should still be conducted in conversation with the pre-existing organizational literature on
credit unions.
Research question 2 reads: Will the changes in economic ideology and market structure
cause credit unions and banks to develop increasingly similar levels of stability?
The hypotheses for research question 2 would rely more heavily on interrupted models. I
expect that the failure & instability of credit unions will be, on average, lower than that of
commercial banks, but the failure & instability of credit unions will increasingly resemble that of
banks for each subsequent decade after 1980 as credit unions gain increased access to and
challenge markets dominated by banks. Thus, as Credit Unions’ markets converge with those of
Commercial Banks and they become market “Challengers”:
H2.1: As their Challenger status solidifies (measured by increased market share), Credit
Unions will experience increased growth similar to Commercial Banks beginning
1983.
H2.2: As their Challenger status solidifies (measured by increased market share), Credit
unions will experience decreased rates of instability and failure similar to those of
Commercial Banks beginning 1983.
Data Sources for Time Series Analysis
Given the date range of the project, getting quality time-series data has been a challenge;
most major sources of internationally comparative data, such as the OECD (Organization for
Economic Cooperating and Development) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, do not supply
easily downloadable data sets that extend earlier than the 1980s or 1990s. Because the necessary
functioning of time-series regression with lagged variables reduces the number of cases included
in regression models, quantitative data collection extended as far back as 1960 where possible, to
protect model quality and power. Because of these requirements, most statistical data has come
from historical annual reports of various government agencies, industry and related professional
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associations, and similar organizations, most notably the National Credit Union Administration,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the St. Louis Federal Reserve’s FRED database.
These reports have been collected from the websites of the agencies themselves.
An unfortunate hinderance to data collection was access to time series savings & loan
data, which resulted in dropping S&Ls from the study. This difficulty was largely due to the large
number of regulatory agencies that were assigned to Savings & Loans from 1980 to 2011, many
of which are now defunct. That has made location of records, completion of annual reports, and
determining online access very time intensive. Savings & Loans would have been dropped from
the study months earlier, but I came into contact with a very prominent scholar of savings & loans
who enthusiastically offered me full access to their decades’ worth of quantitative and historical
data (some of which included records which did not exist anywhere else), which is located in
Alabama. Unfortunately, after months of attempting to arrange a travel date and receiving no
responses, I had to make the practical decision to move on with the data that I did have.
Unfortunately, the Savings & Loan data that I had collected without this help had too many
substantial gaps to make it useable for this project.
Data & Variables
Dependent Variables
The most important dependent variables will measure incidences of institutional failure
and signs of institutional instability, both of which are easier to measure as national-level
aggregates than for the entire FIRE industry. Some annual reports for regulatory agencies include
statistics for, specifically, number of firm failures, mergers mandated by regulators due to
impending failure often termed “assisted mergers”, or charters closed for sometimes specified
reasons for the types of organizations under their purview. For organizations such as the NCUA,
this data by nature relates only to credit unions, but includes failures, assisted mergers, and
unassisted mergers.
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For this specific study, I have been able to locate specific variables for liquidations,
mergers, (percent) change in net income, and the loan-to-share/savings ratio. These constitute
the dependent variables for this study, along with a count of charter cancellations for Hypothesis
2 models. For credit unions, these variables were provided directly by the NCUA’s Annual
Reports, which are generally reported in five- or ten-year tables. For banks, these variables were
collected via annual tables from the FDIC’s webpage for historic banking statistics. Change in net
income for banks was collected via the FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) from the St.
Louis Federal Reserve. These will compose the measures of solvency, liquidity, and failures.
Institutional Failures
Given this study’s focus on measures of instability and failure, failure as a dependent
variable is among the most important. While locating most credit union data was straightforward
via the NCUA’s Annual Reports, it was much harder to find for banks, to the point that I had to
consider functional equivalents. For credit unions I used an annual count of involuntary
liquidations - the number of credit unions who, due to imminent failure, were forced by the
NCUA to liquidate their assets and close their charters. While this is a useful direct measure, it
was insufficient as the sole dependent variable for this study for three reasons: first, most often,
credit unions do not fail – they merge. This was especially true during the merger movement of
the 1970s but remains a frequently used option for struggling credit unions. Second, the NCUA
annual reports do not track Voluntary liquidations, possibly because the distinction between the
two is that in voluntary liquidations, the failing credit union can fund its own liquidation from its
reserves, while involuntary liquidations require cash assistance from the NCUSIF to cover
“member share payouts and other liabilities of the credit union.(NCUA 1987)” Third, while
values were available for a given year in that year’s annual report, values for 1960-1974 had to be
collected from the 1977 report. This presented a difficulty because before 1977, NCUA reports
did not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary liquidations. While my connection in the
Filene Institute (a think tank devoted to credit unions) has stated that this distinction is not
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substantively meaningful, there is a possibility that numbers of failed credit unions may be
inflated prior to 1975.
For commercial banks, long-term failure data was difficult to track down. I eventually
located it among a set of FDIC Historical Banking Statistics in a separate part of their website
from most other data. This measure was based on a combined count of “assisted mergers” (which
means they were funded and facilitated by the regulator) and “payoffs”, in which a bank is closed
and its assets sold off by the regulator to pay its debts. Both were designated by the FDIC as
measures of failures. Together, these two variables convey a part of the broad notion of failure
and instability – these are the institutions whose conditions were such that they could not be
safely or practically merged with other institutions without the aid of the federal regulator.
Mergers
Credit Union mergers were collected directly from NCUA reports. Similar to failures,
Credit unions do not generally merge (as counted by NCUA reports) unless they face the threat of
failure. Thus, mergers constitute another portion of the measure of failure. In this case, the
variable is the total of both assisted mergers (funded by the NCUA) and unassisted mergers
(facilitated by the NCUA, but not requiring financial assistance). This not only because they are
functionally equivalent for the purposes of this study, but also because NCUA annual reports did
not distinguish between assisted and unassisted mergers until 1981.
Commercial Bank mergers, like failures, were collected from FDIC tables and are
considered officially to be a form of failure. However, this set of mergers is distinct from those
included in the Failure variable because they are “mergers, consolidations or absorptions entered
into as a result of supervisory actions” by the FDIC or other regulator, not because of risk of
failure per se. Thus, partially a reason that this variable could not have simply been folded into
the Failure variable but was worth measuring separately. This is considered to be functionally
equivalent to the CU Merger variable because these institutions were not necessarily doing so
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poorly that they had to be liquidated, but because their performance or instability was such that
they could no longer be permitted to run themselves.
(Percent) Change in net income (CNI)
The Net Income of a consumer financial institution balance between the institution’s
operating revenues and its expenses. Put most simply, net income is leftover profit after costs and
expenses have been deducted. Net income is commonly used by investors to ascertain the health
of an investment because it shows the extent to which incoming money is exceeding expenses.
Thus, change in net income can help us to see the beginnings of a trend of losses for institutions,
or to possibly spot trouble coming before profit actually hit a negative – slowing growth in net
income can indicate difficult times or an institution. It can also help investors or consumers to
identify patterns of more sustained growth. But it can also be used to help identify bubbles,
especially if the change in net income is positive and sharply increasing. Because of these factors,
Change in Net Income is more a measure of stability than failure. For both Commercial Banks
and Credit Unions, Change in Net Income was acquired directly from the FDIC and NCUA,
respectively.
Loan-to-share (CU)
Much like CNI, Loan to savings ratios (or shares, which are the credit union’s functional
equivalent to savings) are indicators of institutional and industry health. The LS ratio is an
indicator of whether an institution will have enough money to cover a sudden train on its
resources, such as a creditor calling a debt. A high LS ratio is regarded as risky because it
indicates that an institution might not be able to handle a sudden shock. On an industry level,
such as is represented by my data, a broadly high LS ratio could indicate a pattern of risk-taking
behaviors, as a large portion of institutions are not preparing for unexpected problems. For this
project, ratios for both credit unions and commercial banks were copied directly from the NCUA
and FDIC.
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Convergence Variables
An additional set of dependent variables for this study are those meant to indicate the
extent to which Banks and Credit Unions are becoming more alike, and whether that trend (or
lack thereof) is being affected by change in regulation. These variables exist for each category of
dependent variables: institutional failures, mergers, and change in net income. Because credit
union and banking industry convergence is unexplored within the sociological field, I kept this
measure simple. For each category of dependent variables (failures, mergers, and change in net
income), a convergence variable was calculated thusly:
% 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =

(𝐶𝑈 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 ÷ # 𝐶𝑈 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)
(𝐶𝐵 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 ÷ # 𝐶𝐵 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)

% 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =

(𝐶𝑈 𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 ÷ # 𝐶𝑈 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)
(𝐶𝐵 𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 ÷ # 𝐶𝐵 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)

% 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑁𝐼 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜13 =

𝐶𝑈 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐶𝐵 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒

Figure 4.1 shows the convergence in Credit Union and Commercial Bank Failures and
Mergers. In these variables, a value over 100% would mean that the credit union failure or merger
rate was higher than that of banks. So, high convergence for these variables would mean a value
close to 100%. Divergence would be a value very far above or below 100%. So, a convergence
ratio close to zero, as we see in many cases below would mean that regardless of their actual
individual failure or merger rates, credit unions rates were far below those of banks. An
interesting observation stemming from this graph is that convergence in failures was so low
during the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Great Recession because there were far more bank
failures than credit union failures. However, the opposite can be said for mergers; credit unions
merged at a far higher rate than banks during the crisis. This can be observed more directly in

13

Because Change in Net Income was already in the form of a ratio rather than a count variable, no initial conversion
to a rate/ratio was necessary.
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Figures 4.2 and 4.3, wherein you can see the convergence variables alongside the rates from
which they are calculated.
Figure 4.1. Convergence in CU and CB Failure and Merger Rates, 19602015

*Missing values out outliers: 1960=308.7%, 1962= 299%, 1972=625%.
Other gaps represent missing data.

Figure 4.2. Convergence in CU and CB Failures with Count of CU
and CB Failures, 1984-2015.
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Figure 4.3. Convergence in CU and CB Mergers with Count of CU and CB
Mergers, 1984-2015.

Independent Variables
Regulation
Regulation is the most important explanatory variable to this study, and the hardest to
measure effectively. It is used in this study to capture the change in economic ideology that
occurred between the 1970s and 1990s, and most strongly during the 1980s. This is because a
necessary consequence of this specific ideological change requires a different perspective on the
role of regulation in the economy, and thus necessitates a change in regulation. As such, the
models contained in Chapters 5 and 6 capture and control for the changes in regulatory regime
caused by the ideological shift, and thus reflect its consequences for Credit Union growth and
stability.
The simplest measure would be a count of numbers of regulatory rules whose purview
includes Credit Unions and Banks, respectively. In the United States, these can be gathered from
the Federal Register, and can be compiled along the lines used by Carey (2013). However, given
the findings of Ford (2013), Silbey (2013), and Pacewicz (2013), the most effective measures of
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regulation will be those that consider the purpose of a given set of rules. Ascertaining the portion
of regulation meant to protect markets, open them, or protect competition requires careful work.
To compute the final variables, major regulatory legislation was collected for both banks and
credit unions from 1960 to 2015, only using the final forms of the laws as signed into effect.
These were examined to isolate sections that concerned credit unions and/or banks (respectively),
which were compiled into an annual count, including any documented delays in implementation.
For example, a section of a 1991 law requiring increased disclosures would be counted but would
be counted as beginning in 1993 if the law specified “this section shall take effect two years from
the date signed into law”.
The initial result was a large set of variables, each showing the number of regulatory
sections active in each law each year. See Figure 4.4 for an example, taken from a subset of the
Credit Union Social Protective variable. Each year before a law was signed into effect has a zero
value. If that law had 15 sections affecting credit unions, but was repealed after ten years, then it
would have a value of 15 for ten years, before returning to zero. These laws were then summed
across each year, forming the final regulation counts. Four separate variables were calculated this
way: a count of market-opening sections applying to credit unions (cumocnt), a count of sections
Figure 4.4. Example of calculation of Protective Regulation for Credit Unions; "cuercnt"
variable.
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seeking to protect the public the activity or failure of credit unions (cuercnt), and a set of the
same for banks (cbmocnt and cbercnt).
The resulting variables seek to measure three things: the number of regulations being
passed, whether they are meant to protect the public or promote business (or both), and the
relative strength of the pro-business or pro-public sections. While this variable is more
sophisticated than Casey’s (2013) method and does begin to capture in important distinction in
the purpose of regulation for which Pacewicz (2013) argued, it does have several shortcomings
that reflect the difficulty in effectively measuring regulation. First, because the variable required
the examination of specific sections of laws, it was quite labor and time intensive. One
consequence of that is that even though I had the information necessary to do so, it was not
feasible to establish a baseline regulation level prior to 1960, which meant that my count had to
begin at zero. This essentially turns the variable into an index using 1960 as a reference year,
evaluating regulatory change since then.
A second shortcoming is that given the number of laws passed each year, it was not
feasible to conduct an exhaustive search of laws potentially influencing Credit Union and
Banking regulation. This is especially true given the somewhat common practice of including
“riders” on some pieces of legislation that affect policy on very different subject areas. The result
was that I narrowed my focus mostly to significant pieces of legislation for credit unions and
banks, though there are exceptions. An unfortunate result of this limitation is that this variable
serves as a conservative measure of the effects of a sample of major legislative acts but falls far
short of an aggregate measure of the regulatory environment. The selection of Banking legislation
came from a list provided by the FDIC, while a list of Credit Union legislation came from the
Filene Institute. There was overlap between these lists, especially for legislation passed during
economic crises. The lists were also supplemented by a small handful of relevant laws I located
during fact-checking.

95

Institutional Size
Institutional size is a simple calculation which contain the average assets per institution
each year. It is a literal calculation of industry-level assets divided by count of institutions. It is
meant to serve as one of two measures of industry growth (for the second, see Market Share
below), in this case capturing growth in the size of institutions made possible in part by
innovation in product and the breakdown of regulations limiting institutional growth. For credit
unions, this data came from the NCUA’s annual reports, which consistently feature this
information. For Commercial banks, this data was collected from the FRED database, but was not
available prior to 1984.
Market Share per Industry
For this variable, I have calculated (for commercial banks and credit unions, respectively)
market share measures by dividing the income of each industry by the total assets of the US
financial industry, less Federal Reserve banks. I have also calculated a ratio variable measuring
the gap between the market share of each industry. Though better measures of market share do
exist, due to the time constraints I worked with this variable does an acceptable job of reflecting
the relative size of the credit union and commercial banking industries relative to each other and
other institutions vying for financial industry dominance. Industry income was collected from
NCUA Annual Reports for credit unions, the FDIC’s historical banking statistics for commercial
banks. Aggregate financial industry assets were collected from the St. Louis FRED.
Control Variables
Control variables include measures of the percent change in GDP and dummy variables
for recessions, economic crises, and levels of risk present in the financial industry. Recession is a
binary variable based on the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)’s recession
indicator as available via the St. Louis FRED (FED 2020c). It itself is a measure of business cycle
expansions and contractions data, where a value of 1 is a recessionary period, and a 0 is an
expansionary period (FED 2020c). Likewise, Economic crisis was computed from a list of major
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economic crises of the 20th and 21 centuries, which was then cut to include only domestic US
crises or those that significantly affected the US (such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the
“eurozone crisis” of the 2010s). See Table 4.1 for a list of crises included in the measure. I
controlled for market tightness, which is a concept meant to capture risk present within financial
industries – “tight” financial conditions indicate high risk and lower levels of credit and leverage
available within financial markets. Put simply, a high value means a riskier market environment
(Fed 2020a). This was measured using the Chicago Federal Reserve’s Financial Conditions Index
and was collected from the St. Louis FRED (FED 2020b). I also controlled for political variables
via an index I calculated of the partisan composition of Congress, the Senate, and the Presidency.
Table 4.1. Economic Crises included in the binary econcris variable, 1960-2015.
Year
Crisis Name
1973
1970s Energy Crisis: 1973-1980 (OPEC oil shock, 1979 crisis)
1983
Savings & Loan Crisis: 1983-1996
1997
Asian Financial Crisis: 1997-1999
1997

Dotcom Bubble 1997-2001

2006

US Housing Bubble: 2006-2012

2007

US Financial Crisis: 2007-2009

2008

US Auto Industry: 2008-2010

2009

European Sovereign Debt Crisis: 2009-2013

Methods, Theoretical Lags, & Model Estimation
Quantitative data for this project accomplishes several purposes. First is to provide
descriptive statistics to demonstrate temporal transformations in industry variables. This project
also uses several multivariate graphic data visualizations in the building of this narrative and will
make use of quantitative data to conduct time-series analysis. Time-series analysis provides a few
advantages to relying solely on narratives or cross-sectional regressions. First, time-series
analysis provides a more precise analysis by looking at political and economic variables as they
change from year to year (Janoski and Hicks 1994). It can protect the quality of a narrative
argument by analyzing the time-order in series of events and their effects upon each other.
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Second, time-series analysis of the type I use involves ‘lags’, which allow my equations
to account for the time delay between the passage and implementation of new regulations or
related policies (Janoski and Hicks 1994). This method also allows an equation to compute more
theoretically complex distributed lags (X = .25Xt-1+.50Xt-2+25Xt-3). For this study, initial lags
were estimated for their practical realism and relevance to the Socio-Political Theory. Within
these boundaries, the decision for the best lag per variable and model was made based on how it
affected overall model quality and stability, the primary drivers of that decision being 1) the level
of autocorrelation captured in a model with a given realistic lag and 2) whether a change in a lag
produced an extremely high or low adjusted R-squared, as such would indicate a severely misestimated model. Then, before being finalized, a given lag was again evaluated for its fit with my
theoretical arguments, the bounds of reality, and alignment with the nature of the given
independent variable, the dependent variable, and the number of cases available.
Within a given trio of models, this resulted in a range of 0-2 years for industry variables,
1-2 years for economic variables, and 2-3 years for political variables. lags for market-opening
regulation were kept shorter (0-2 years), as this regulation is generally desired and fought for by
industries, and they tend to prepare in advance for the perceived benefits of such policies. Lags
for social protective regulation tended to range from 2-4 years, as industries generally resist these
legislative changes, and anticipate that lobbying will at least slow down enactment, if not stop it
altogether before potential repeal (the Dodd-Frank Act of 2008 being a key example).
For example, it is commonly understood that it can take 2-3 years after a new political
administration comes into power before the full effect of their policies can be observed. Thus, a
lag of 2-3 years for a “(left or right) party power” is common. However, this is an observed
tendency – there is no solid rule for this observation. Thus, if a two-year lag for party power
introduces untenable levels of autocorrelation into the model, it is theoretically reasonable and
practical to consider a three-year lag. There is an arguably very broad range of theoretically
plausible lags for regulatory variables – though I attempted to keep them to a short 0-4 years,
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arguments can be made for lags as many as ten years for far-reaching legislation. Exploring such
was impractical for the amount of data I have, and many market-level effects of the regulation I
observe can be reasonably expected to appear within a few years.
Third, time-series analysis considers an additional error term in that what happens in one
year affects what happens in the next year (i.e., a violation of independence in regression
assumptions). This autocorrelation can be controlled in a number of ways through lagged
dependent variables that eat up considerable variance from the explanation that a true causal
variable could explain without it, or MLE methods that do this internally through various STATA
programs (Janoski and Hicks 1994).
For this project, I used the Prais-Winsten program for time series regression in Stata
(command prais), with Cochran-Orcutt estimation to test each model for autocorrelation. These
methods provide a much more rigorous test of whether causal relationship exists over time, or
whether variables are trending together (i.e., autocorrelation and/or multicollinearity), thus
strengthening any evidence supporting or refuting existing theory. One advantageous element of
this method is the post-estimation statistic that is included with any basic prais model: the
Durbin-Watson statistic. The Durbin-Watson is a test for autocorrelation in the residuals of a
regression model, which returns a value between 0 and 4. A score 2 indicates no autocorrelation.
Below two indicates positive autocorrelation, and above two indicates negative autocorrelation.
Levels between 1.5 and 2.5 are generally considered normal and acceptable. Because this project
can be divided into major time periods, I have also used interrupted time series analysis to
identify major periods in which political circumstances have shaped major policy.
Model Estimation for Research Question 1
My first research question requires a mix of descriptive statistics and predictive models.
As a reminder, the question asks: Is there a meaningful difference the stability of the Credit
Union and Consumer Banking industries, and how have both industries’ stability been affected by
regulatory change? The first sentence clause of this research question has been verified via
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descriptive statistics. Ideally, this descriptive analysis would be supplemented by a method of
means-comparison such as a T-Test or ANCOVA. Unfortunately, time-series data (especially
when assessing policy change) is not well suited to methods such as t-testing because of its
predilection for non-stationarity, seasonality, and autocorrelation (Lagarde 2012; Box & Tiao
1975). Non-stationarity refers to a “natural” trend (such as an upward slope) that can exist in data
independently of other events. This complicates attempts to compare means because a variable’s
mean value (and variance) naturally change over time, leading to bias in results (Lagarde 2012).
Most significant are the issues of autocorrelation and seasonality. It is well known that
autocorrelation present in data violates one of the assumptions driving OLS analysis, leading to
inaccurate p-values for coefficients – even when dividing data by time periods (Lagarde 2012;
Box & Tiao 1975). While this mathematical problem is addressed by the regression models I am
using for my broader analysis, it renders methods such as t-testing and ANOVA inappropriate for
this data. Finally, seasonal effects in data (in my case, something like a business cycle) can cause
inconsistent variance patterns in a variable and requires controls to be included in an analysis.
This is possible in my prais models, but not in common means-testing methods. Such can be
accomplished via ARIMA but doing so was not practical given the context of this study.
To demonstrate how both industries’ stability been affected by regulatory change, a time
series analysis was required. Keeping in mind the general regression model to be employed is:
yi = a +ß1 X i, t-z + ß2 X i, t-z + ß3 X i, t-z + ß4 X i, t-z

…

ßn X i, t-z + e

where:
y = dependent variable
a = constant
ß1, ßn =independent variable coefficients
X1, Xn = any given independent variable
t-z = the level of lag present for any variable in the time series regression
e = both the error term innate to regression and the additional error term present in time
series regression.
i = industry type (credit unions or commercial banks)
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Hypothesis one reads,
H1.1: The effect of regulations on credit unions’ and banks’ stability & failure will be
greater than some of the effects of institutional size, spread, or market share.
This hypothesis was tested with the following equation, applied to each dependent
variable:
Stability/Failure

= a +ß1 RegulatoryChanget-z + ß2 MarketSharet-z+ ß3 #Firms t-z
+ ß4 #CharterTerminationst-z + ß5 Recession t-z
+ ß6 MarketTightness-z +ß7 RightPartyPowert-z + e

Once these base models were composed, they were separated into interrupted time series
models based on significant events, major legislative changes, or other major time periods.
Because of its historical significance in terms of both ideological and regulatory change,
iterations of these models were run which began in each iteration between 1982 and 1986. Both
descriptive statistics and model patterns show that 1983 was the year in which these crucial
changes were beginning to affect economic outcomes. As such, interrupted models have been
specified to include years greater than 1982, to assess the extent to which the changes specifically
tied to the 1980s affected their outcomes. This was done with interrupted models instead of a
dummy variable because the number of factors was greater than could practically be conveyed via
binomial variables.
As a reminder, Research Question 2 asks whether changes in regulatory policy over time
would cause credit unions and banks to develop increasingly similar levels of stability. This led to
the following hypotheses:
H2.1: As their Challenger status solidifies (measured by increased market share), Credit
Unions will experience increased growth similar to Commercial Banks beginning
1983.
H2.2: As their Challenger status solidifies (measured by increased market share), Credit
unions will experience decreased rates of instability and failure similar to those of
Commercial Banks beginning 1983.
These can be thought of as convergence hypotheses, so called because I anticipate that a
consequence of the regulatory changes of the 1980s will result in credit unions facing pressure to
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compete more openly with commercial banks, possibly in part by emulating their practices.
Though I cannot directly test whether they adopted the operational norms of commercial banks, I
can assess whether the changes that took place after 1982 led to credit unions more closely
resembling banks in terms of stability and growth rates. I do this by running models testing
whether regulatory and market change focusing on credit unions has led to a reduction of the
differences in their outcomes. Thus, the model is specified as:
Convergence:

= a +ß1 RegulatoryChanget-z + ß2 MarketSharet-z+ ß3 #Firms t-z
+ ß4 #CharterTerminationst-z + ß5 Recession t-z
+ ß6 MarketTightnesst-z +ß7 RightPartyPowert-z + e

Having discussed the variables, model specification, and origins of the data used, it is
now time to proceed with the analysis itself. The analysis will begin sequentially with a test of the
first research question, with particular attention given to comparing the effects of regulation with
the effect of broader economic, political, and industry variables. I will then explain the
significance of the first set of findings. Chapter 6 will focus on the second research question, that
being the assessment of whether regulatory or other variables are leading to industry behavioral
convergence and then as an abbreviated analysis to assess the significance of legislative changes
occurring after 1980.
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Chapter Five: What Has Driven Credit Union Change?
A foundational claim justifying this project is that credit unions have significantly
different rates of failure and instability than banks. A second claim guiding this project is that of
previous sociological research on Credit Unions, which has argued that organizational variables
are most important in determining an industry’s stability – variables including things such as
institutional age, size, and assets relative to its competitors. The importance of economies of
scale, for example, is well demonstrated. But the question remains: to what extent can these
factors be overruled by regulatory change?
This has driven the specific phrasing of my first research question, which asks whether
there is a meaningful difference the stability of the Credit Union and Consumer Banking
industries, and how have both industries’ stability been affected by regulatory change. My
hypothetical answer to this question was that there would be a substantive difference caused by
regulation, and that the effect of that regulation would partially outweigh some of the effects of
institutional size, spread, or market share. The models below empirically test that claim. All
regression models presented have been found to have acceptable measures of autocorrelation, and
correlation tables have been run for every equation (including lags). In the interest of constructing
the most valid and reliable models possible, any sources of collinearity have been checked for
their effects on the models and removed where appropriate. Where some variables could have
been removed with little effect on the models’ outcomes, they were kept because of both their
theoretical importance and to situate this work within a larger empirical context.
Regulation as a Primary Determinant of Industry Stability
The first hypothesis states that the effect of regulations on credit unions’ and banks’
stability and failures will be greater than some of the effects of institutional size, spread, or
market share. Dependent variables for these models can be placed into two categories – variables
measuring failure and variables measuring stability. The first two sets of models use measures of
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failure as their dependent variable, those measures being counts of institutional liquidations per
industry, and mergers per industry (as the mergers captured by this data largely include forced
mergers involving institutions who would otherwise fail). The contents of Tables A and B
discussed below use these as their dependent variables.
Model 1: Industry & Economy-Level Factors Influencing Institutional Failures
In Figure 5.1, you can see a connected plot of each of these variables over time. These
graphs demonstrate a few important points. First, before the mid-1980s, the gap between these
two industries was very large, with credit unions showing a higher absolute number of failures.
Second, by 1983, this gap has not only nearly vanished, but during crises the number of failures is
substantially smaller than that of banks. In the absence of any more rigorous analysis, this would
lead one to conclude that credit unions have consistently shown reduced failure rates since the
1990s, coming to compete and occasionally better banks’ failure rates. Hold this thought, as we
will return to it.
Model 1 of Table 5.1 shows a baseline regression for the effects of industry, economic,
and political factors affecting bank failures. This model shows that while financial industry
market share has the single greatest effect on number of institutional failures, the cumulative
Figure 5.1. Annual Number and Percentage of Failures for Credit
Unions and Banks.
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effect of industry variables versus economic variables is roughly equivalent. Financial industry
market share accounted for .778 standard deviations of change in the number of bank failures, the
size of this effect is about 169% of the size of the next largest effect, that of the Effective federal
funds rate. However, it is interesting to note that the Federal Funds rate had a diminishing effect
on the number of institutional failures, growth in market share appears to increase the incidence
of failures. The effects of charter terminations, levels of risk present in the economy, and right
party power are all between .3 and .4 standard deviations. From this baseline then, we can see
that the cumulative effects of industry variables and economic variables is nearly equivalent,
followed by a relatively smaller effect of right party politics.
Introducing Market-opening regulations, shifts this balance, but not as strongly as
expected (Model 2). By far, market-opening regulations has the greatest effect of all other factors
– over twice that of Market Share, whose effect fell only to 0.45 standard deviations, showing
that regulatory change had a greater effect than market share. In the face of the effect of marketopening regulations, the power of institutional factors as a group gives way completely to the
influence of economic and political variables. Aside from market share, only Charter terminations
had any near-significant effect, with a beta coefficient of .269. However, when considering the
effects of economic and political variables, we see the federal funds rate at lead with a failuredecreasing effect of -.458 SD, followed by the similarly strong damaging effects of Financial
industry risk with a beta of .463, followed by right party power at 0.313. From these results, we
can observe that the consideration of the effect of market-opening regulation boosts the relative
significance and power of economic variables. Let us keep this in mind as we proceed.
The introduction of protective regulations goes even further to transform the previous
relationships, to the point that the pattern of strongest relationships reverses. While for model two
the effects of industry characteristics fell far short of the effects of political-economic factors, in
model three we see a clear dominance of industry factors in affecting bank failures. First, while

105

106

Table 5.1. Effects of Industry, Economic, & Regulatory Change on Commercial Bank & Credit Union Failures, 1972/1977-2015
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
VARIABLES
CB
CB
CB
CU Failures CU Failures CU Failures
Failures
Failures
Failures
# Market- Opening Regulations t-0
-0.981**
-0.894**
(0.0461)
(0.239)
# Social protective Regulations t-4
-0.581*
-0.477
(0.0353)
(0.0182)
Average Institutional Size (Assets per
-0.0683
0.141
0.505
0.0396
0.356
0.0290
Institution) t-2
(2.60e-05)
(2.41e-05)
(3.25e-05)
(0.000678)
(0.000451)
(0.000596)
Financial Industry Market Share
0.778*
0.450
0.692*
0.224
-0.0152
0.158
(282.9)
(274.9)
(260.2)
(13,058)
(11,179)
(13,911)
t-2
# Charter Terminations
0.360*
0.269+
0.356*
-0.280*
-0.267*
-0.306*
(0.0255)
(0.0239)
(0.0244)
(0.0505)
(0.0500)
(0.0520)
t-2
Binary: Recessions t-1
0.0400
-0.0228
0.0310
0.158*
0.0366
0.115
(10.56)
(10.18)
(10.15)
(12.16)
(14.47)
(13.37)
Binary: Economic Crises
0.102
0.0729
0.110
0.165+
0.0761
0.158+
(11.19)
(10.27)
(10.70)
(14.04)
(15.12)
(14.22)
t-2
Chicago Fed Financial Risk Index
0.372**
0.461***
0.346**
-0.0628
0.0996
-0.0186
(High = Higher Risk) t-1
(8.917)
(8.414)
(8.610)
(9.334)
(12.60)
(10.14)
Right Party Power
0.304**
0.313***
0.317***
-0.122
-0.0657
-0.125
(6.451)
(5.858)
(6.176)
(7.877)
(9.361)
(7.997)
t-3
Effective Federal Funds Rate
-0.458**
-0.490**
-0.415*
0.216
0.267
0.156
(2.571)
(2.339)
(2.482)
(2.778)
(3.090)
(2.976)
t-1
Binary: CU Merger Movement
-0.272
0.131
-0.214
(32.80)
(35.40)
(32.70)
t-0
Constant
(83.00)
(101.2)
(76.92)
(103.8)
(57.93)
(142.6)
Observations
41
41
41
39
39
39
R-squared
0.484
0.471
0.50
0.24
0.653
0.24
Durbin Watson
1.51
1.67
1.65
1.56
1.76
1.63
Beta Coefficients reported – standard coefficients available in the appendix. Standard errors in parentheses. Lags reported with
variable names. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

Social Protective regulations have a strong, significantly negative effect on bank failures (with a
beta coefficient of -0.581), this effect was outweighed by the failure-inducing power of financial
industry market share by a decent margin. Beyond this, the two variables most strongly affecting
number of bank failures are the number of charter terminations (with a beta coefficient of .356)
and financial industry market share (-0.415). Lastly, we do find that in Model 3, an increase in the
federal funds rate appears to lead to a .415 standard deviation decrease in the number of bank
failures. So, from Table 5.1’s models 1-3, we can conclude that the effects of industry variables
are far less consistent than those of broader economic factors. Controlling for market-opening
regulation boosts the effect of broader economic variables on failures, while controlling for social
protective effects slightly increases the model power of industry-measuring variables.
Moving onto the credit union models shows a marked difference in model outcomes.
Model 4 of Table 5.1 shows the baseline model for credit unions without controlling for
regulation. There we see that the only variables significantly affecting credit unions failures are
recessions, crises, and indirectly, charter terminations. Yet the low R-squared for the model
rightly indicated that there are factors beyond what is measured here that likely play a bigger role
in determining credit union failures. One of these factors appears to be market-opening
regulation. In Model 5, we again introduce this first regulatory variable, but for credit unions the
variable strength and significance does not group itself the way it did for banks. Here, Marketopening regulation was highly significant and had the model’s strongest effect on bank failures,
one of only two significant results. The only other significant variable was that of Charter
Terminations, whose model strength was nearly a third of the other variable’s; a beta coefficient
of only -0.27 SD. This allows the conclusion that aside from charter terminations, there is no
substantial difference between the effects of political-economic or industry variables on credit
union failures once market-opening regulation is factored into the equation, which itself shows
the strongest effect.
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Model 6 introduces the social protective variable to the model, and again the outcome is
different from that of banks. This model did not generate widely significant results, though it did
follow some predictable trends. Charter terminations continued to have a significant effect on
failures, Social protective regulation did not have a significant effect on credit union failures in
this model; in this case, consistent with general economic expectations, economic crises increased
credit union failures by a factor of about .15 standard deviations.
From the preceding discussion of Table 5.1, an initial conclusion would be that these
results largely support my first hypothesis, that being that the effects of regulation will ultimately
outweigh those of industry or broader economic variables. When not controlling for regulation,
industry variables have little substantive effect on institutional failures, while the bulk of effects
comes from macroeconomic factors. Considering collinearity between industry variables, it is
possible that the scales would normally tip a bit further in support of industry influence on
institutional stability. When controlling for market-opening regulation, we see a shift in the
models toward broad economic variables having a larger effect on bank failures. When
controlling for protective regulations, we see instead a shift wherein industry-based measures
have a slightly larger cumulative effect on bank and credit union failures per model, but not an
effect greater than that of macroeconomic factors.
This pattern is not replicated in the models of credit union failure – instead we see, across
each model, a more even distribution of political-economic and industry-related factors
influencing credit union failure. One finding to note as it relates to my hypotheses (see Table
Table 5.1.1. Summary of Effects of Regulation Types on Number of Institutional
Failures, Annual, 1972-2015.
Beta Coefficients
# Commercial Bank
# Credit Union
Failures Per Year
Failures Per Year
Market-Opening Regulation
-0.981**
-0.894**
Social Protective Regulation
-0.581*
-0.477
Unstandardized coefficients
Market-Opening Regulation
-0.130**
-0.737**
Social Protective Regulation
-0.075*
-0.222
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5.1.1 for model summary) is that nearly across the board, regulation had a substantially more
powerful effect on both banking and credit union failures than any other variable in the models
(Protective regulations were a close second in their influence on commercial bank failures). Yet
while both sets of regulations has strong, significant correlations with reduced incidences of
institutional failure, the strength of these effects differs substantially across industries.14 In Table
5.1.1 are the beta coefficients reported with the models, and then below are the original model
coefficients (full models with unstandardized coefficients can be found in the appendix). For both
Banks and credit unions, protective regulations have a highly significant, but relatively small
effect in reducing institutional failures. Market-opening regulation an even smaller though similar
effect for banks. Yet for credit unions, market-opening regulation had a substantially larger effect
on the annual count of failures – there is an almost near 1:1 ratio of regulatory law sections and
individual institutions kept from liquidation.
This outcome was unexpected. Credit unions have been kept small due to relatively
heavier regulatory restrictions than banks. A broad shift toward market-opening regulation
(generally perceived as deregulation) since the 1980s has allowed credit unions a wider variety of
services and greater access to membership. Most significantly perhaps, has been the ability to
merge, leading to a notable drop in the count of institutions coinciding with a leap in industrywide assets (Figure 5.2. An additional question to consider as we move on to the next set of
models, the influence of the same factors on credit union and bank mergers, will be whether we
see these same patterns emerge.
Since the mid-1970s, Credit Unions have consistently shown a larger number of mergers
than commercial banks (Figure 5.3). Prior to 1983 the size of this gap can be explained by the
occurrence of a large merger movement in the credit union industry from approximately 1970 to

14

As an aside, it is worth noting that Table 5.1.1 also demonstrates why one cannot compare beta coefficients across
models!
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Figure 5.2. Count of Credit Union Institutions and Assets, 1960-2015.

Figure 5.3. Commercial Bank and Credit Union Mergers, 1960-2015.

1983. After 1983 the gap between the number of credit union mergers and commercial bank
mergers immediately begins to diminish, with credit unions’ numbers of mergers decreasing even
during times where banks experienced increased numbers (late 1980s and 2007-2010). However,
the number of mergers clearly remains substantially higher than they were prior to the mid-1970s.
This may partially explain both the dramatic drop in failures and why market-opening regulation
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Figure 5.4. Credit Union Liquidations (Failures) and Mergers,
1960-2015.

has such a strong effect on failures – this merger movement was made possible by marketopening regulation, and led institutions that would otherwise fail to instead merge with healthy
institutions. Even though the count of mergers remains substantially high, there are two other
possible observations: the number of mergers is declining, but also varies substantially from year
to year. Combined with a count of failures (Figure 5.4), it appears that mergers have largely
replaced liquidation as a means of handling failing institutions. However, assessing the true
impact of regulation on mergers will depend on the results below.
Model 2: Industry & Economy-Level Factors Influencing Institutional Mergers
Table 5.2 shows the effects of our political, economic, and industry measures on the
annual count of commercial bank and credit union mergers. An examination of our baseline
Model 1 shows a nearly-even split in the cumulative influence of political-economic and industry
variables. Of the three industry variables, two showed significant, strong, positive effects on the
annual count of bank mergers. Financial Industry market share again had the strongest effect on
mergers, by a factor of nearly 0.69 standard deviations. Next in its effect strength (third overall
for the model) was the number of charter terminations, an increase of which led to a
corresponding increase of 0.414 standard deviations in the count of mergers.
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The second-strongest effect in the model came from the Effective Federal Funds rate,
which had a negative effect of .451 standard deviations on the annual count of bank mergers. The
Chicago Federal Reserve’s Financial Risk index also showed that the levels of risk present in the
financial industry had a positive, significant effect on bank mergers as well, along with right party
power.
Table 5.2’s Model 2, much like Table 5.1, introduces the effects of market-opening
regulation on mergers, and its results are, substantively, nearly identical. Once again, marketopening regulation has a significant, reductive effect on mergers, and with a beta of -0.788 it is
nearly twice the strength of the model’s next significant variable, Financial Industry Risk Index.
While Charter terminations does significantly affect mergers, one can also see that like Table
5.1’s first model, political-economic variables significantly affects bank mergers, with the
greatest influence coming from the Financial Risk Index and the Federal Reserve Funds Rate.
Thus, ultimately, we can say that Models 1 and 2 have a virtually equivalent effect on both bank
failures and mergers.
Model 3 also follows a pattern much like Table 5.1’s third model. Social protective
regulation continues to have a significant, negative effect on mergers, by a factor of nearly 0.425
standard deviations, an effect that far outweighs the others in the model except for financial
industry market share (0.596). Charter terminations, financial risk levels in the economy, and
right-party power all had positive, significant effects on the number of banks mergers by a beta
range between 0.3 and 0.41. Conversely, an increase in the federal funds rate had an equivalent.
Moving on to credit unions, the baseline Model 4 shows a broader range of highly
significant, relatively strong effects than was observed in the first two baseline models for banks.
Compared to the other variables in the model, credit union mergers appear most strongly affected
by the economic factors of financial industry risk levels with a highly significant beta coefficient
of 0.793 (which is linked to increased mergers) and correlated with charter terminations, with a
beta of 0.760 standard deviations.
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Table 5.2. Effects of Industry, Economic, & Regulatory Change Commercial on Bank & Credit Union Mergers, 1972/1974-2015
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
VARIABLES
CB Mergers CB Mergers CB Mergers CU Mergers CU Mergers CU Mergers
# Market- Opening Regulations
-0.788*
-0.464+
(0.0456)
(0.372)
t-0, t-4
# Social protective Regulations
-0.552*
-0.425*
(0.0326)
(0.163)
t-1, t-4
0.691*
0.425
0.596*
0.416***
0.291*
0.182
Financial Industry Market Share t-2
(280.0)
(282.6)
(254.8)
(14,116)
(17,039)
(18,318)
0.414**
0.308*
0.412**
0.760***
0.629***
0.639***
# Charter Terminations t-1
(0.0250)
(0.0251)
(0.0239)
(0.0680)
(0.0856)
(0.120)
Average Institutional Size (Assets per
-0.0844
0.0580
0.460
-0.494
0.238
0.0707
Institution) t-2
(2.51e-05)
(2.40e-05)
(3.40e-05)
(0.000311)
(0.000568)
(0.000438)
-0.00614
-0.0669
-0.0197
-0.324***
-0.291**
-0.0212
Binary: Recessions CB t-1, CU t-2
(10.31)
(10.59)
(9.997)
(26.35)
(26.12)
(24.18)
0.0950
0.114
0.106
-0.0522
-0.0644
-0.0989
Binary: Economic Crises CB t-3, CU t-2
(11.48)
(10.95)
(11.11)
(17.23)
(17.38)
(23.04)
Chicago Fed Financial Risk Index
0.381**
0.462***
0.361**
0.558***
0.532***
0.122
(High = Higher Risk) CB t-1, CU L2
(8.150)
(8.125)
(7.892)
(15.86)
(15.61)
(18.82)
0.283**
0.310***
0.301**
0.291**
0.215*
0.0968
Right Party Power t-3
(6.135)
(5.866)
(5.923)
(13.27)
(14.17)
(17.85)
-0.451**
-0.474**
-0.403*
-0.0792
0.106
0.0571
Effective Federal Funds Rate t-1
(2.346)
(2/227)
(2.289)
(3.563)
(4.612)
(5.839)
-0.223*
-0.566*
-0.490*
Binary: CU Merger Movement t-0
(33.02)
(64.01)
(55.93)
Constant
(79.52)
(83.17)
(72.74)
(111.8)
(167.3)
(184.8)
Observations
41
41
41
40
40
40
R-squared
0.410
0.472
0.467
0.913
0.912
0.860
Durbin Watson
1.41
1.75
1.61
2.04
2.11
1.98
Beta Coefficients reported – standard coefficients available in the appendix. Standard errors in parentheses. Lags reported with variable
names. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

Worth noting are the moderately strong effects of financial industry market share and
average institutional size. For every percentage point increase in market share, we see an increase
Credit Union mergers by 0.416 standard deviation, while an increase in the average assets per
institution has a slightly larger but opposite effect on mergers – for every $1,000 increase in
average assets, we see a .494 standard deviation decrease in the annual number of credit union
mergers.
Introducing the effects of market-opening regulation (Model 5) surprisingly does not
narrow down the number of significant influences on credit union mergers, indicating some
interesting findings. As in previous models, market-opening regulation has a significant effect,
though in this model leading to a decrease in mergers by only about 0.464 SDs. Both Market
Share and Charter terminations continue to have significant, positive effects on the number of
credit union mergers, though to a lesser extent than in model 3 (0.291 and 0.629, respectively).
The financial risk index and right party power are virtually unchanged from Model 3 – both
correlated with an increase in the count of credit union mergers. Model 6 had much simpler
outcomes – protective regulation has a negative effect on the count of mergers, though it was not
the strongest effect of the significant variables. Like in Model 5, charter terminations have a
significantly positive effect on mergers, the only other key variable showing significance.
A safe, second preliminary conclusion then, is that the first hypothesis is only partially
confirmed by this model – that both credit union and bank mergers were most strongly affected
by regulation than industry. Second, is that for commercial banks, there is little substantive
difference between the effects of our models upon commercial banks’ failure and merger
occurrences. In both cases, both types of regulation had negative effects upon the number of bank
failures and mergers, and market-opening regulation appeared to increase the influence of
economic variables, while increases in protective regulation tended to boost the effects of
industry-based variables. However, models for credit unions did not yield such a clear result.
Credit unions tended to be affected consistently by variables from each category at any given
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time, and differences between the effects of variables tended to be less stark than for banks. This
indicates that perhaps while credit unions are still strongly influenced by regulation, they are also
more likely to be weakly influenced by a larger range of factors, as opposed to following the
banks’ pattern of fewer factors but greater effects. As analysis continues, we will return to this
point.
One way the outcomes of the Merger models differ from those of Failure is in the
absolute size of the effect of regulation on mergers. While the models’ beta coefficients make it
appear that regulation had a smaller effect on mergers than failures, it is important to keep in
mind that this difference is relative to other variables in the same model. This means that while
regulation still had a much larger effect on mergers than economic or industry factors within the
same models, the gap between regulation and these same factors within the same models is
smaller than it was for failures. However, if we again compare the models’ beta and
unstandardized coefficients for regulation’s effect on mergers, we see more telling details.
Table 5.2.1 shows both beta and unstandardized coefficients for the effects of regulation
on mergers, and here we can identify some interesting differences between these models and
those of regressions on failure. Most notably, though the absolute effect of regulation on
commercial banking failures was relatively small, the coefficients in Table 5.2.1 show that when
controlling for the industry and economic factors present in both sets of models, both types of
regulation had a smaller effect on commercial banking mergers than failures. Yet as predicted in
my discussion of Table 5.1, both types of regulation had a substantially smaller effect on Credit

Table 5.2.1. Summary of Effects of Regulation Types on Number of Institutional
Mergers, Annual, 1972-2015.
Beta Coefficients
# Commercial Bank
# Credit Union
Mergers Per Year
Mergers Per Year
Market-Opening Regulation
-0.788*
-0.464+
Social Protective Regulation
-0.552*
-0.425*
Unstandardized coefficients
Market-Opening Regulation
-0.100*
-0.700+
Social Protective Regulation
-0.068*
-0.377*
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Union mergers than failures. As expected, market-opening regulation had a very strong effect on
mergers. Unexpected based on the Table 5.1 discussion, but predicted by my hypotheses, Marketopening legislation reduced the number of mergers, to the point that for every two sections added
to market-opening laws, three fewer credit unions were forced into mergers. If mergers were
simply replacing failures due to market-opening regulation, one might expect instead a positive
regression coefficient. Yet while the number of mergers does seem to have supplanted the
number of failures, the strong negative effect of market-opening regulation implies that if not for
the regulation, that the number of mergers would be higher.
Thus, between the sets of models in Tables A and B, we can arrive at a set of more
developed, but still tentative conclusions. First, both market-opening and protective regulations
reduced the number of failures and mergers in both the credit union and commercial banking
industries. Second, both types of regulation had a stronger role in reducing banking failures and
mergers than for credit unions. Third, controlling for other economic and industry factors,
market-opening regulation had a greater aggregate role in reducing credit union failures and
mergers than protective regulations. These findings will no doubt have to be adjusted for the
findings of upcoming models, but they provide a foundation upon which to form broader, more
final conclusions.
For now, we can consider a different type of dependent variable, but one still commonly
associated with institutional stability – change in net income. Net income is often used to assess
whether and by what margin an institution can meet its financial obligations and still make a
profit. Change in net income reflects the same, but also shows whether an institution is
maintaining a consistent pattern of growth over a given period, as capitalist values demand not
only consistent profit, but consistent growth in the amount of profit. Though credit unions have a
lower incentive for profit given their not-for-profit status, variables like this are still used to
measure institutional stability. The same can be said for loan-savings or loan-share ratios, the
latter of which are tested in Table 5.4.
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Model 3: Industry & Economy-Level Factors Influencing Industry-Level Change in Net
Income
Table 5.3 shows the effect of our previously constructed models upon the cumulative
change in net income across the Commercial Banking and Credit Union industries. As before,
models 1 & 4 serve as baseline models representing the common means by which institutional
stability is assessed. In that spirit, Model 1 shows that market share has the greatest, positive
effect on commercial banks’ change in net income, a finding consistent with much of the previous
literature (beta = 0.417). This effect is followed only by that of right party power (beta= 0.310).
This makes sense, as the American Republican Party has leaned heavily toward growth models
for most of the time span of this study.
Model 2, introducing market-opening regulations, shows a mixed result compared to
many of the previous models. While it does have the expected negative effect, Market-opening
regulation shows a beta coefficient of only .382, showing that it comes third to that of Charter
terminations (-0.395), and right party power, which correlated with an increased change in net
income by a factor of 0.427 standard deviations. Model 3 shows a slightly more muted outcome,
wherein protective regulations come in second place in their effect size with a near-significant
coefficient of 0.274, nearly half that of Financial industry market share (beta = .592**).
The credit union models (4-6) show a similarly soft pattern, though in this case, nearly no
industry variables yield significant results. Model 4 shows no significant effects from Industry
variables for credit unions. The strongest influences come from right party power, which for
credit unions reduced change in net income for credit unions. This effect has a stronger, negative
effect than even economic crises (-0.256) and from recessions (beta = -0.384) as they occur.
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Table 5.3. Effects of Industry, Economic, & Regulatory Change on Commercial Bank & Credit Union % Change in Net Income,
1975/1979-2015
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
VARIABLES
CB CNI
CB CNI
CB CNI
CU CNI
CU CNI
CU CNI
Δ # Market- Opening
-0.382*
-0.143
Regulations t-2, t-0
(98.73)
(212.7)
Δ # Social protective
0.274+
0.488**
Regulations t-1, t-2
(50.17)
(189.5)
Δ Financial Industry
0.417*
0.275+
0.592**
0.146
0.140
0.0600
Market Share t-2
(1.751e+06)
(1.562e+06)
(1.905e+06)
(9.756e+08)
(9.786e+08)
(8.516e+08)
Δ # Charter Terminations
-0.222
-0.395*
-0.247+
0.174
0.160
0.181
(1.258)
(1.287)
(1.213)
(1.263)
(1.275)
(1.110)
t-1
Δ Average Institutional
-0.0299
0.0481
-0.0121
-0.291
-0.322
-0.248
Size (Assets per Inst.) t-1
(2.08e-08)
(1.89e-08)
(2.01e-08)
(7.87e-06)
(7.99e-06)
(6.60e-06)
Binary: Recessions
0.214
0.185
0.297+
-0.384*
-0.389*
-0.622***
(69.32)
(62.27)
(69.26)
(68.32)
(68.44)
(65.66)
t-2
Binary: Economic Crises
0.218
0.251*
0.244+
-0.256*
-0.229+
-0.258*
(56.65)
(50.49)
(54.95)
(47.33)
(48.84)
(39.14)
t-2
Chicago Fed Fin. Risk
0.287
0.380+
0.182
0.446+
0.470*
0.568**
Index (High=High Risk)t-1
(47.90)
(42.45)
(47.52)
(42.36)
(42.76)
(36.38)
Right Party Power
0.310*
0.427**
0.261+
-0.415*
-0.442**
-0.303*
(29.42)
(27.81)
(28.82)
(29.12)
(29.68)
(24.90)
t-3
Effective Federal Funds
-0.0895
-0.266
-0176
-0.160
-0.205
-0.277
Rate t-1
(13.03)
(11.88)
(12.68)
(11.95)
(12.17)
(10.11)
Binary: CU Merger
-0.339+
-0.275
-0.237
Movement t-1
(76.17)
(82.39)
(63.86)
Constant
(108.4)
(97.80)
(104.7)
(91.86)
(93.04)
(70.98)
Observations
40
40
40
39
39
39
R-squared
0.343
0.455
0.394
0.294
0.291
0.490
Durbin-Watson
2.11
2.23
2.12
2.22
2.21
2.35
Beta Coefficients reported – standard coefficients available in the appendix. Standard errors in parentheses. Lags reported with
variable names. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

Model 5 yield some surprising outcomes, as market-opening regulation has no significant
effect on credit union change in net income. Instead, this model also continues to be ruled by
macroeconomic forces. Once again, recessions are shown to decrease change in net income (beta
= -0.389), while financial risk increases it by a margin of 0.470 standard deviations. Interestingly,
right party power again appears to have a depressive effect on growth.
In Model 6, we see virtually the same patterns. Social protective regulations did have a
fairly significant effect in supporting growth in net income, by a beta of .488. This comes second
to the significant effects of recessions (-0.622) and financial market risk (0.568). As in the
previous model, macroeconomic factors continue to heavily influence the model, indicating that
while protective regulation in most models has shown to be an important variable in showing
industry stability, this outcome implies that when it comes to a variable that can change as
quickly as net income, the similarly fast-changing conditions of markets may yield a more
substantial effect.
Reflecting upon the models present in Table 5.3, we can answer the question of whether
and to what extent these models support Hypothesis 1.1. Regarding the question of whether, the
answer is no. Not only did both types of regression not have the strongest effect on either
industry’s change in net income, but in one case, had nearly the smallest of all significant effects
(Table 5.3, Model 5). However, it is interesting to note that while market-opening regulations
helped to reduce institutional mergers and failures, when it comes to CNI, a measure of stability,
market-opening regulation correlates with negative change in net income for both banks and
credit unions. That is, more market-opening regulation appears to reduce failures, but also
dramatic growth in income. The next set of models will go farther toward exploring this
relationship, but it is worth tentatively holding onto for now.
It is also worth noting that protective regulations continue their trend to both reduce
failure and increase stability (or at least this measure of it). Yet if regulation has not had the
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Table 5.3.1. Summary of Effects of Regulation Types on Change in Net Income
(CNI), Annual, 1972-2015.
Beta Coefficients
Commercial Bank CNI
Credit Union CNI
Market-Opening Regulation
-0.382*
-0.143
Social Protective Regulation
+0.274+
+0.488**
Unstandardized coefficients
Market-Opening Regulation
-235.20*
-185.15
Social Protective Regulation
+98.94+
+600.87**

Table 5.4. Effects of Industry, Economic, & Regulatory Change on Credit Union
Loan-Share Ratios, 1976/1977-2015
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
CU LN-SH
CU LN-SH CU LN-SH
Δ # Market- Opening Regulations
0.0720
(4.335)
t-4
Δ # Social protective Regulations
0.110
(2.962)
t-0
Δ Financial Industry Market Share -0.0285
-0.0567
-0.00420
(2.466e+07)
(2.60e+07)
(2.360e+07)
t-2
Δ # Charter Terminations
-0.00259
0.0132
0.0359
(0.0176)
(0.0184)
(0.0174)
t-1
Δ Average Institutional Size
0.474**
0.485**
0.451
(Assets per Institution) t-2
(3.09e-07
(3.10e-07)
(3.12e-07)
Binary: Recessions t-2
0.0100
0.0322
-0.0177
(1.749)
(1.803)
(1.641)
Binary: Economic Crises
-0.0488
-0.0309
-0.00631
(2.025)
(2.058)
(1.958)
t-2
Chicago Fed Financial Risk Index
-0.661***
-0.671***
-0.556
(High = Higher Risk) t-2
(1.214)
(1.220)
(1.144)
Right Party Power t-2
0.256*
0.263*
0.302
(0.967)
(0.971)
(0.924)
Effective Federal Funds Rate t-0
0.586**
0.599**
0.562
(0.334)
(0.336)
(0.320)
0.567**
0.520*
0.465
Binary: CU Merger Movement t-1
(3.709)
(3.821)
(3.818)
Constant
(3.001)
(3.080)
(3.037)
Observations
38
38
38
R-squared
0.542
0.661
0.560
Durbin Watson
1.59
1.64
1.55
Beta Coefficients reported – standard coefficients available in the appendix.
Standard errors in parentheses. Lags reported with variable names.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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largest effect on short-term stability, what does? In the models presented in Table 5.3.1, it appears
to be those variables which can change quickly and have short-term effects (dramatic or not).
These have most often been variables such as recessions, financial market risk, and recessions.
Model 4: Industry & Economy-Level Factors Influencing Average Loan-Share Ratios
The final model set applies the same independent variables to credit unions’ Loan-Share
ratios (Table 5.4). Unfortunately, I was not able to obtain sufficient data to allow for a
comparison to commercial banks, but the credit union models alone show interesting results. Of
initial interest in Model 1 is that the only significant industry variable is that of average
institutional size (0.474**). This effect is outweighed substantially by that of the financial
industry risk index (-0.661) and the federal funds rate (0.586).
In both Models 2 and 3, the introduction of the regulatory variables has little direct effect.
In their respective models, the regulatory variables do not reach significant at the .05 level. For
model 2, the strongest effects are the same as in model 1. Model 3 yielded no significant
outcomes.
Conclusion: Models of Regulatory Change & Factors Competing for Influence
Having generated and examined the broad-level tests of the effects of regulation on
Commercial Bank and Credit Union industry failures and stability, controlling for and in
comparison to broader industry, economic, and political forces, there remains the task of
summarizing the results of these 21 regression models. First, let us begin with the most
technically relevant question: did these models confirm or falsify my first hypothesis? In Table
5.5, we see that with those dependent variables measuring forms of institutional failure, there is
mixed support of this hypothesis. In most cases, regulatory variables did not outweigh all industry
variables. However, worth noting is that while regulatory factors were nearly always significant
and moderately powerful, only occasionally did more than one industry variable reach
significance. Given that these variables were tested for collinearity before and during model
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Table 5.5 Comparison of models’ support of Hypothesis 1.1, by regulatory variable and
industry.
Market-Opening
Social Protective
Conceptual
Regulation
Regulation
Dependent Variable
Category
CB
CU
CB
CU
# Institutional Failures
Y
Y
N
N
Failure
# Institutional Mergers
Y
N
Y
N
Change in Net Income
N
N
N
N
Stability
Loan-Share Ratio
N
N
construction, this would indicate that regulation remains a substantial element of financial
institution and industry stability.
The take-home message here appears to be that regulation works. However, an important
point to keep in mind is that the nature of linear regression requires that results be interpreted as,
for each [unit] increase in x, y increases by [coefficient unit]. We see that an increase in
regulation leads to a decrease in failures, and mergers, and had mixed effects on change in net
income per industry. But regulation does not infinitely increase, despite the claims of some
politicians. What actually happened?
This is where theory can help us to make sense of the results. What happened is that after
the 1980s, change in regulation slowed, but despite banks and credit unions coming to share a
market, regulatory change did not equally apply to both institution types. Perfectly fitting the
theoretical model of incumbents (banks) versus challengers (credit unions), banks were able to
leverage their market status and political power to push for continued deregulation that, if not
always consistent, allowed them to maintain their market position. More importantly, they were
able to keep the new fish in their pond at least somewhat constricted. While credit unions did still
gain substantial freedom compared to the postwar years, they still more often faced increases in
regulation than banks did.
However, it is worth noting a distinctly decreasing trend in the level of regulation credit
unions are facing, indicating two things. First, Credit Unions are beginning to win some
legislative battles, despite their challenger position and relatively very small slice of the broad
consumer finance market. Second, if credit unions are winning legislative battles, those battles are
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allowing them to expand in ways that may make them more vulnerable ways similar to banks,
such as to economic shocks and working within smaller safety margins.
Big Picture: Emancipatory Institutions Fight to Be…Less
What does this mean? Credit Unions are playing an increasing role in the world of
consumer finance, and growing via assets, membership, and market share. Though the average
member may not fully understand what separates their credit union from a bank, they have still
chosen to rely on these institutions’ financial services, stability, and some notion of representation
via the common bond requirement. The influence of these institutions is growing, and the factors
that make them both alike and different from banks will become more significant in their effects
on the public as they become more massive. Despite having started as financial institutions
dedicated to serving the underserved, over the last half-century credit unions have fought to
lighten the restrictions that in some ways provide the stability that they are known and lauded for.
As they have become moderately successful in doing so, they have come to compete for a more
general portion of the consumer finance market, raising questions of whether they are coming to
value the norms of big business more than the older notion of thrift. With the current head of the
NCUA making no secret of his desire to allow credit unions to adopt more profit-based models,
the idea of a convergence in the behavioral patterns of credit unions and banks is a concept worth
testing. This is exactly what the Chapter Six attempts to do.
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Chapter Six: Are Banks and Credit Unions Becoming More Alike? An Analysis of Convergence
One of the fundamental premises of this project are that Credit Unions have long been
regulated more heavily than banks. Analysis and discussion so far has demonstrated that is more
accurate to say that Credit Unions were bound more by protective regulation, with less market
access that would have been gained from Market Opening regulation. Yet over time, with the
change in political ideologies guiding regulatory policy, we have also seen a shift in which Credit
Unions and banks are becoming increasingly similar. Given the way shifts in political-economic
ideology drive policy choices, this justifies the second research question guiding this project: Will
the changes in economic ideology and market structure cause credit unions and banks to develop
increasingly similar levels of stability? Given the established convergence of credit union and
commercial bank stability and income patterns, it remains to be seen what role regulatory change
has had in this process, as regulation is itself influenced by ideological changes.
An important point to keep in mind regarding each model with convergence as a
dependent variable is that a higher value (more alike) does not necessarily mean that both
institutions are failing/merging at a higher rate. It simply means that credit unions are doing
something (failing, merging, or experiencing change in income, depending on the model) at a rate
close (whatever that may be) to banks. That is, perfect convergence would be a value of 100%. A
value very far above or below 100% would be a divergence. This means that (for example)
Convergence in Failure Rates can only increase so far before the credit union failure rate exceeds
that of banks and begins to move away from the level experienced by banks.
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Convergence in Failure Rate of Credit Unions with That of Banks

Table 6.1. Effects of Industry, Economic, & Regulatory Change on
Convergence in Commercial Bank & Credit Union Liquidations, 1983-2015
(1)
VARIABLES
Convergence Rate of
Failures Per Industry
# Market- Opening
-0.765*
Regulations: CU t-3
(0.0682)
0.852+
# Social protective Regulations: CU t-6
(0.0474)
Binary: CU Merger Movement t-3
-0.335
(15.33)
Average Institutional Size
-0.0915
(Assets per Institution): CB t-1
(2.68e-09)
Average Institutional Size
0.148
(Assets per Institution): CU t-0
(1.86e-06)
Financial Industry
0.964
Market Share: CB t-0
(175.7)
# Charter Terminations: CB t-0
0.272
(0.00842)
-0.335+
Financial Industry Market Share: CU t-0
(3,340)
# Charter Terminations: CU t-2
0.202
(0.0189)
Binary: Recessions t-2
0.214
(4.988)
Binary: Economic Crises t-2
-0.306*
(5.557)
Chicago Fed Financial Risk Index (High = Higher
0.250
Risk) t-0
(2.983)
Right Party Power t-2
-0.207
(2.984)
Effective Federal Funds Rate t-1
-0.439
(0.832)
Constant
(47.90)
Observations
38
R-squared
0.842
Durbin Watson
2.13
Beta Coefficients reported – standard coefficients available in the appendix.
Standard errors in parentheses. Lags reported with variable names.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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The first convergence15 model to consider is that of Liquidations, a form of failure. The
question driving this model is, “Which (if any) of the factors in our models are making credit
unions’ number of failures closer to that of banks?” In Table 6.1, there are not many strong
relationships. Only four variables had any significant effects: both regulatory variables, Credit
Union market share, and the control for economic crises. Interestingly, an increase in the latter
two variables tended to make credit union and commercial bank failure rates less alike. This can
explain the significance of the economic crisis variable – it indicates that banks and credit unions
fail at very different rates during times of economic hardship. Credit Union market share also has
this diverging effect. A final observation regarding this model is that we see an interesting result
in that market-opening regulation has a divergent effect on the failures of these two industries,
while protective regulations bring them more closely into alignment.
Returning to the results concerning economic crises and market share, there are some
interesting observations to note. Looking at some measures of model fit via Figures 6.1 and 6.2
can clarify this finding a bit. Figure 6.1 shows the absolute count of CU and Bank failures during
economic crises (light shading) and recessions (dark shading). This figure shows that though
Credit Union failures were at their highest value prior to about 1975 (relative to those of Banks
and in absolute terms), the model’s prediction does not start until about 1974, meaning that some
of the largest variance is not captured in the model. This is largely because of the Market Share
variables, for which data was not sufficiently available before 1973. Additionally, Economic
crises have tended to develop during periods of lowest convergence.

15

A reminder: a value over 100% would mean that the credit union failure or merger rate was higher than that of banks.
So, high convergence for these variables would mean a value close to 100%. Divergence would be a value very far
above or below 100%. So, a convergence ratio close to zero, as we see in many cases below would mean that
regardless of their actual individual failure or merger rates, credit unions rates were far below those of banks.
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Figure 6.1. CU and CB Convergence in Failures with Economic Crises
and Recessions shaded, 1960-2015.

Figure 6.2. CU and CB Convergence in Failures with CU Market Share.
1960-2015.
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This numerical outcome makes sense when you also consider the patterns shown in
Figure 6.2. In this we see that during economic crises, the gap between the number of failures
experienced by banks and credit unions is often at its widest. In the latter half of the 1970s, credit
union failures were still coming down due to the changing trend toward mergers, while the
Savings & Loan crisis had not yet come to hit banks. Yet as the savings & loan crisis does
approach from the mid-1980s to the end of the decade, credit unions have developed the patterns
that allowed them to handle the crisis in better shape than banks, thus resulting again in a larger
gap during a period of crisis. And in the final largest block of the crisis variable, which includes
the subprime mortgage and eurozone crises, commercial banks again fared much worse than
credit unions.16 Thus, we can see why the model would identify economic crises as reducing
convergence. Finally, as a point of interest, Figure 6.3 shows a nearly inverse correlation between
the convergence variable and credit union market share, as it appears that credit union market
share has been able to grow during periods of high bank failure. This is likely a result of two
simultaneous factors: the failure of banks making previously inaccessible markets available, and
the “flight to safety” experienced by credit unions during the 1980s and 1990s crises due to their
traditionally more conservative practices.

Though it is worth noting that there were credit union failures at this time, the majority being due to fraud, ‘oneperson shops’, or failures of large Corporate Credit Unions, which are not reflected in this data and are fewer in
absolute number.
16
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Table 6.2. Effects of Industry, Economic, & Regulatory Change on Convergence
in Commercial Bank & Credit Union Mergers, 1981-2015
(1)
VARIABLES
Convergence Rate of
Mergers Per Industry
2.033***
# Market- Opening Regulations: CUt-1
(0.355)
-0.278
# Social protective Regulations: CU t-2
(0.275)
Binary: CU Merger Movementt-1
0.883**
(34.25)
Average Institutional Size
-1.553**
(Assets per Institution): CU t-2
(0.000612)
-0.383
Financial Industry Market Share: CBt-4
(657.5)
-0.948***
# Charter Terminations: CB t-1
(0.0382)
0.698**
Financial Industry Market Share: CUt-2
(14,206)
-1.150**
# Charter Terminations: CUt-0
(0.114)
Binary: Recessions t-2
-0.0417
(17.33)
-0.352*
Binary: Economic Crises t-2
(20.35)
Chicago Fed Financial Risk Index
-0.774**
(High = Higher Risk) t-1
(12.43)
Right Party Power t-2
0.124
(10.11)
Effective Federal Funds Rate t-1
1.188**
(4.664)
Constant
(159.9)
Observations
34
R-squared
0.892
Durbin Watson
2.36
Beta Coefficients reported – standard coefficients available in the appendix.
Standard errors in parentheses. Lags reported with variable names. *** p<0.001,
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
Convergence in Merger Rate of Credit Unions with That of Banks
Table 6.2 has results more consistent with previous models. In this case, we see that the
independent variables in these models have a far more significant effect on convergence in
merger rates than failures.17 Market-opening regulations are shown to have a dramatic role in

17

A reminder: a value over 100% would mean that the credit union failure or merger rate was higher than that of banks.
So, high convergence for these variables would mean a value close to 100%. Divergence would be a value very far
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making Merger rates more like those of banks with a highly significant beta coefficient of 2
(standard deviations), even when controlling for the 1970s Credit Union merger movement.
Protective regulations ended up having no significant role, but as credit unions broadly grew in
asset size, they were less likely to align with the merger patterns of banks, by a margin of 1.5
standard deviations. Likewise, the federal funds rate also had a strong, significant effect on the
gap between bank and credit union merger rates. It is unclear why this might be the case, but one
possibility is that as the federal funds rate increases, troubled banks are less likely to be able to
afford to borrow money to weather unexpected shortfalls. Such an occasion would increase the
odds that troubled institution would be forced to accept a merge with a healthy institution.
Convergence in Change in Net Income of Credit Unions with That of Banks
Table 6.3 seeks to assess these models’ effects on the gap between credit unions’ and
commercial banks’ change in net income. Though the magnitude is smaller than in previous
models, market-opening regulations for both credit unions and commercial banks are closing the
gap in the industries’ average change in net income. This means that as markets are opened and
business facilitated further and further, these institutions’ income patterns are becoming more and
more consistent. Protective regulations have a similar effect, though somewhat weak. This
convergence is also positively affected by right party power, not a surprising result given their
generally pro-market stances. The strongest effect in this model came from the measure of
financial risk, whose negative orientation makes sense, given that change in net income could be
quite sensitive to quick changes in markets, especially as they result of a heightened risk
environment. This can also explain significance of factors such as credit union market share,
recessions, and economic crises, all of which bring credit unions and banks closer together in this
measure.

above or below 100%. So, a convergence ratio close to zero, as we see in many cases below would mean that
regardless of their actual individual failure or merger rates, credit unions rates were far below those of banks.
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Table 6.3. Effects of Industry, Economic, & Regulatory Change on Convergence
in Commercial Bank & Credit Union Change in Net Income, 1977-2015
(1)
VARIABLES
Convergence Rate of
CNI Per Industry
0.612***
Δ # Market- Opening Regulations: CU t-0
(13.89)
0.232*
Δ # Market- Opening Regulations: CB t-0
(5.914)
0.187+
Δ # Social protective Regulations: CB t-2
(2.734)
-0.180
Δ # Social protective Regulations: CU t-2
(12.80)
Binary: CU Merger Movement t-0
0.468*
(6.372)
Δ Average Institutional Size
-0.261
(Assets per Institution): CB t-0
(2.25e-09)
Δ Average Institutional Size
0.316
(Assets per Institution): CU t-1
(1.07e-06)
0.106
Δ Financial Industry Market Share: CB t-0
(125,359)
-0.233+
Δ # Charter Terminations: CBt-0
(0.0781)
Δ Financial Industry Market Share: CU t-0
0.164+
(4.787e+07)
0.0190
Δ # Charter Terminations: CU t-1
(0.0682)
Binary: Recessions t-2
0.189*
(3.165)
Binary: Economic Crises t-2
0.408**
(4.578)
Chicago Fed Financial Risk Index (High = Higher
-0.861***
Risk) t-0
(2.670)
Right Party Power t-1
0.429*
(2.935)
Effective Federal Funds Rate t-1
0.214
(1.107)
Constant
(6.219)
Observations
38
R-squared
0.865
Durbin Watson
2.49
Beta Coefficients reported – standard coefficients available in the appendix.
Standard errors in parentheses. Lags reported with variable names. *** p<0.001,
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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Initial Results: Has Regulation Led to Convergence?
Let us take a moment to assess the meaning of the Convergence model results. I have
posited that regulatory change, particularly that targeting credit unions, has had a key role in
bringing the behavior of these two institution types closer together. Tables 6.1-3 showed that
compared to other model variables, Regulatory change absolutely has that effect, though in an
unexpected way. Table 6.4 summarizes the results of the preceding Convergence models and
shows the extent to which regulation has led change in convergence.

Unstandardized
coefficients

Beta
Coefficients

Table 6.4. Comparison of Effects of CU and CB Regulatory Variables on Convergence
Dependent Variables.
Institutional Failures
Mergers
Change in Net
Income
CU Market Opening

-0.765*

2.033***

0.612***

CU Social Protective

0.852+

-0.278***

-0.180***

CB Market Opening

-

-

0.232***

CB Social Protective

-

-

0.187+**

CU Market Opening

-0.147*

1.376***

66.32***

CU Social Protective

0.097+

-0.107***

-18.91***

CB Market Opening

-

-

12.41***

CB Social Protective

-

-

5.27+**

The rows for CU Market-opening regulation has led to exactly the type of change
expected – while it slightly correlates with an increased gap between credit union and banking
failures, it correlates with a substantially increased convergence in mergers, a means of managing
failures that preserves a greater portion of assets and financial industry-level market share.
Increased CU Market-opening laws can also bring Change in Net Income for Credit Unions
closer to that of banks, a pattern that is notably concurrent with a fall in commercial bank market
share (Figure 6.3).
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Figure 6.3. Credit Union & Commercial Bank % Change in Net Income, with
Commercial Bank Market Share shaded, 1975-2015

Interrupted Models: Has the Policy Domain Shift Changed the Sources of Financial
Instability?
An important element to this study is to also consider to what extent these patterns are
attributable to a shift in the ideologies driving politics and economics, as Fligstein’s theory
asserts. To do so, I have also run interrupted forms of the models present in Chapter 5, limiting
the years under observation to those since 1983, the point at which the ideological shift toward
neoliberal economics begins to yield observable changes.
First Interrupted Model: Causal Factors of Failures in Intra-Neoliberal Period
As with the models in Chapter 5, this set of models evaluates the effects of political &
economic factors on annual institutional failures since 1983. Model 1 (Table 6.5) is again the
baseline model, and you can see that there is little difference in what is significant, except for the
federal funds rate and charter terminations, both of which did lost their significance. However,
Market Share had a substantially more powerful effect on commercial bank failures, with a beta
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coefficient of 1.126 and very high significance. The next most powerful effect in the model
comes from level of risk in the financial industry, with a very significant coefficient of only .313.
The interrupted Model 2 follows a similar pattern to its aggregated equivalent in Chapter
5, but with a few notable differences. Market-opening regulations in this model are nearsignificant (with a beta of -0.409), but their effect is now second to that of Financial industry
market share, which positively correlated with failures by 0.798 SDs. This finding indicates that
from 1983 onward, as commercial banks started to dominate the credit industry, they began to
have larger numbers of failures. This is almost certainly affected by the Savings & Loan crisis,
but it also controls for the deregulation of the time. Levels of financial risk in the economy had a
similar effect as previously, with a highly significant, positive effect of 0.313 standard deviations.
Model 3, however, did end up with some different outcomes. Much like the model
containing the full range of years, protective regulations did continue to significantly reduce
failures. This time its effect was about 150% the strength of the full model, with a beta of -0.712
standard deviations, which renders its effect greater than that of market-opening regulations.
Instead, this model shows more influence by industry-level variables, all of which significantly
increased the annual count of failures. Notable is the effect of market share, which positively
correlated with bank failures by 0.993*** standards deviations. The only economy-wide variable
to have a significant effect was the level of risk present in the economy, which continued its
positive correlation with failures.
Turning our attention to the Credit Union models (4, 5, and 6), there are several
observable differences. Model 4 follows a pattern of significance very similar to its Chapter 5
counterpart (Table 5.1), and of its significant relationships, all have a positive correlation with
institutional failures. Model 4 shows that increased market share has a greater effect on
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Table 6.5. Effects of Industry, Economic, & Regulatory Change on Commercial Bank & Credit Union Failures, 1982/1983-2015
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
VARIABLES
CB Failures CB Failures CB Failures CU Failures CU Failures CU Failures
# Market- Opening Regulations
-0.409+
-0.497
(0.0393)
(0.118)
t-0, t-0
# Social protective Regulations
-0.712*
-0.939**
(0.0366)
(0.0558)
t-3, t-3
Average Institutional Size (Assets 0.106
0.179
0.625*
0.0298
0.350
0.0337
per Institution) t-2, t-0
(1.31e-05)
(1.30e-05)
(2.24e-05)
(0.000157)
(0.000184)
(0.000156)
Financial Industry Market Share
1.126***
0.798**
0.993***
0.476*
0.322
0.278
(221.3)
(333.8)
(203.2)
(5,860)
(6,149)
(5,926)
t-2, t-0
# Charter Terminations
0.194+
0.156
0.194+
0.537**
0.514**
0.557*
(0.0223)
(0.0218)
(0.0203)
(0.0299)
(0.0290)
(0.0246)
t-1, t-0
Binary: Recessions t-2, t-1
0.0537
0.0465
-0.00975
0.154+
0.174*
0.146
(8.240)
(7.963)
(8.819)
(4.959)
(4.843)
(4.036)
Binary: Economic Crises
0.118
0.0954
0.0774
-0.0958
-0.108
-0.110
(11.01)
(10.75)
(10.38)
(6.940)
(6.701)
(5.819)
t-3, t-3
Chicago Fed Financial Risk Index 0.313***
0.312***
0.270***
0.288*
0.274*
0.261**
(High = Higher Risk) t-1, t-2
(8.313)
(7.989)
(8.240)
(4.315)
(4.178)
(3.301)
Right Party Power t-3, t-3
0.185**
0.188**
0.0550
0.0535
0.0344
0.0127
(5.587)
(5.366)
(7.264)
(3.355)
(3.258)
(2.822)
Effective Federal Funds Rate
-0.106
-0.159
-0.211+
0.328
0.339
0.0924
(2.707)
(2.677)
(2.645)
(1.755)
(1.691)
(1.617)
t-1, t-0
Binary: CU Merger Movement
0+
0+
0*
(20.87)
(20.22)
(14.95)
t-0
Constant
(51.29)
(103.8)
(53.36)
(52.41)
(62.20)
(41.34)
Observations
33
33
33
31
31
31
R-squared
0.792
0.812
0.833
0.39
0.435
0.487
Durbin-Watson
1.61
1.43
1.60
1.52
1.87
2.02
Beta Coefficients reported – standard coefficients available in the appendix. Standard errors in parentheses. Lags reported with
variable names. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

Failures by nearly a half standard deviation. As could be expected, higher levels of financial
market risk and charter cancellations also correlate with higher numbers of failures, the former by
over half a standard deviation. The introduction of market-opening regulations to the model (5)
changes little in the distribution of effects from Model 4. Market-opening regulation itself had no
significant effect on failures. This in comparison to average institutional size, which increased
failure by a slightly smaller .514 standard deviations, and the level of risk in the financial
industry, which increased failures by 0.274 standard deviations.
Model 6continued to follow the pattern of significance outlined by models 4 and 5, with
one key difference. Protective regulations had a fairly significant, reductive effect on institutional
failures by a substantial -0.939 standard deviation margin. Unlike market-opening regulations,
protective regulations also yielded the strongest effect in the model, followed by the count of
charter terminations (0.557) and levels of financial industry risk (0.261).
Altogether, our first set of interrupted models shows that from the mid-1980s onward,
market share and levels of risk in the financial economy began to correlate significantly with
instability. Models 1-3, focusing on influencers of banks’ failures, showed consistently that as
commercial banks dominate a larger portion of financial industry, they face larger numbers and
rates of failures though the true meaning of this finding is more difficult to ascertain because of
substantial industry concentration allowed by market-opening regulatory changes. In fact, a
consistent pattern across each of these models is that change in economic factors is leading to
substantial change in levels of failure, and in these cases, growth appears correlated with struggle.
To put it more simply, with market power, opening and deregulation, industry subgroups become
less stable. A point of great importance for future research would be to look at the path
dependence of these models, as market-opening regulation itself has strongly affected both
industry saturation and failure. While testing on these models showed that this point of
collinearity did not substantially alter the outcome of these models, a meaningful path analysis of
these relationships was unfortunately beyond the capacity of this study.
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Second Interrupted Model: Causal Factors of Mergers in Intra-Neoliberal Period
Table 6.6 applies our model to the incidence of credit union and commercial bank
mergers but again restricts the period from the early 1980s onward. In Model 1, Financial
industry market share has an outsized effect on commercial bank mergers, with a highly
significant beta coefficient of 0.965 standard deviations. The remaining significant effects all
have betas below the 0.3 standard deviation level; Charter cancellations have a positive, nearsignificant effect on the count of mergers with a beta coefficient of 0.220, similar to the strength
and significance level of right party power (0.163*). Second to the effect of financial industry
market share comes the Financial Risk Index, with a highly significant beta of 0.292. None of the
variables in this model were shown to reduce bank mergers
The introduction of the Market-opening regulation variable substantially moderates the
strength of Market Share, though it remains one of the strongest effects in the model (and retains
its positive correlation). In Model 2, the three strongest effects all have beta coefficients between
0.3 and 0.6, shared by the financial risk index (0.307), average institutional size (0.445), and
Market share (0.611). However, of all significant effect in the model, none reduced bank mergers;
market-opening regulations had a negative effect on the count of commercial bank mergers, but
its p-value was just short of significance. It is interesting to note, however, that this model shows
stronger effects coming from banking industry factors than economic. The third model, which
introduces the effect of protective regulations, yielded no significant effects on bank mergers,
including by protective regulation.
As with previous tables, Models 4-6 apply the same questions and variables to the credit
union industry. Serving as our baseline, Model 4 shows that while nearly all factors industry and
economic considered significantly affect the annual count of CU mergers (except for average
institution size, Economic Crises, and the federal funds rate), when not controlling for regulation
the greatest effects have come from indicators of macroeconomic instability. This is quite
different from what we saw when this model included the entire time span of study, rather than
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from the 1980s and onward. This model’s two strongest effects come from charter terminations
and the financial risk index, both of which positively correlate with Credit Union mergers. The
next-strongest effect comes from Recessions, which surprisingly negatively correlated with the
number of mergers by 0.365 standard deviations.
Adding social protective regulation does not meaningfully change the pattern of
significance and effect strength. In Model 5, Social protective regulation reduces the count of
Mergers by a fairly significant 0.801 standard deviations. Recessions continue have a reductive
effect, though of just over one-third the effect-strength of market-opening regulation. As in the
previous model, nearly every variable has a positive effect (except for regulation and recessions),
but none of the other variables in the model had effect sizes greater than 0.5 standard deviations.
Model 6 follows virtually the same pattern as models 4 and 5. Protective regulations has a
significantly negative effect on the count of credit union mergers, serves as the strongest effect in
the model, with a beta coefficient of -0.671. As previously, both institution size and charter
cancellations had significant effects on the count of mergers, with beta coefficients of -0.317 and
0.472, respectively. Both recessions and the federal funds rate significantly reduced the count of
mergers, the latter being the second-strongest effect in the model with a beta of -0.482. Both
levels of financial risk in the economy and right party power failed to yield significant effects.
From this segment of analysis, it is clear that again, during and after the 1980s, the state of the
consumer finance industry was such that stability variables, themselves likely influenced by
regulatory change, affected commercial bank and credit union stability far more then general
economic and industry factors. Growth in industry variables was only mildly correlated with
increased counts of mergers, an outcome to keep in mind as we move into the final, broader
project analysis.
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Table 6.6. Effects of Industry, Economic, & Regulatory Change Commercial on Bank & Credit Union Mergers, 1982/1984-2015
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
VARIABLES
CB Mergers
CB Mergers
CB Mergers
CU Mergers
CU Mergers
CU Mergers
# Market- Opening
-0.417+
-0.801**
Regulations t-0, t-1
(0.0355)
(0.535)
# Social protective
-0.432
-0.671***
Regulations t-3, t-4
(0.0246)
(0.160)
Financial Industry Market
0.965***
0.611*
0.823
0.318+
-0.0125
-0.102
Share t-1, t-2
(258.8)
(356.6)
(238.3)
(25,567)
(25,032)
(20,534)
# Charter Terminations
0.220+
0.213+
0.232
0.646***
0.459*
0.472*
(0.0239)
(0.0227)
(0.0220)
(0.160)
(0.162)
(0.166)
t-0, t-0
Average Institutional Size
0.314+
0.445**
0.662
-0.199
0.245
-0.317*
(Assets per Inst.) t-4, t-2
(1.70e-05)
(1.74e-05)
(2.23e-05)
(0.000819)
(0.000768)
(0.000504)
Binary: Recessions
0.160**
0.152**
0.156
-0.365***
-0.339***
-0.170*
(8.301)
(7.959)
(7.667)
(30.45)
(26.06)
(24.69)
t-2, t-2
Binary: Economic Crises
0.142+
0.121
0.159
-0.0130
0.0850
0.0608
(11.66)
(11.22)
(10.75)
(32.56)
(26.41)
(19.91)
t-3, t-2
Chicago Fed Financial Risk
0.292***
0.307***
0.257
0.425**
0.350**
0.102
Index (High = Higher Risk)
(9.053)
(8.641)
(8.819)
(27.56)
(23.16)
(22.68)
t-1, t-2

Right Party Power

0.198+
0.153+
0.0716
(18.51)
(15.17
(14.01)
Effective Federal Funds
-0.0874
-0.136
-0.482**
Rate t-0, t-2
(8.863)
(7.079)
(6.121)
Binary: CU Merger
-0.0369
-0.00420
0.0397
Movement n/a, t-2
(63.31)
(54.46)
(53.26)
Constant
(54.85)
(95.01)
(50.89)
(232.9)
(277.5)
(223.1)
Observations
32
32
32
31
31
31
R-squared
0.765
0.796
0.810
0.773
0.892
0.947
Durbin Watson
1.60
1.47
1.73
1.89
1.90
1.89
Beta Coefficients reported – standard coefficients available in the appendix. Standard errors in parentheses. Lags reported with
variable names. Charter terminations omitted from Model 5 due to collinearity issues. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
t-3, t-3

0.163*
(6.001)
0.219
(2.904)

0.177**
(5.759)
0.209
(2.759)

0.139
(5.589)
0.205
(2.669)

Third Interrupted Model: Causal Factors of Change in Net Income in Intra-Neoliberal
Period
Table 6.7 shows the effects of my models on change in net income for both Credit
Unions and Banks since 1983. Model 1’s results are virtually identical to those in the original,
extended Model 1 in Table 5.3. There are no changes in the direction of any significant
correlations, showing that the baseline effects of industry, political, and economic variables on
change in net income for commercial banks remains accurate when adjusting the time range of
the study, a minor victory for the accuracy of model fit. In this case, the only substantive change
is that Financial industry market share has lost its significance to commercial bank charter
terminations, which appear to significantly reduce change in net income by 0.445 SDs. The same
can be said to an even greater extent for Model 2, which is substantively identical to its
counterpart in Table 5. 3. In this case, the only substantive difference is again in charter
terminations, which negatively correlate with change in net income for banks, with a highly
significant beta of -0.497.
Model 3, however, does have a few changes worthy of comment. Protective regulation
maintains its significant effect on change in net income, but this time, negative. However, this
time the only industry variable to significantly affect Banks’ change in net income was charter
cancellations, which reduce change in net income by a beta of 0.320. Levels of risk present in
financial industries continue to increase change in net income by a margin of about 0.38 standard
deviations but fall just short of significance.
While little change can be seen between Models 1-3 of Tables 5.3 and 6.7, the same
cannot be said for Models 4-6, our credit union models. In this case, we see a set of circumstances
where Credit Unions appear much more affected by broader economic patterns after deregulation
began in 1983, rather than industry or political variables. In Model 4, Credit Union industry
variables have no significant effect in reducing change in net income. The model’s one strong,
significant effect comes from risk levels in financial markets, in which market risk suppresses
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Table 6.7. Effects of Industry, Economic, & Regulatory Change on Commercial Bank & Credit Union CNI, 1982/1984-2015
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
VARIABLES
CB CNI
CB CNI
CB CNI
CU CNI
CU CNI
CU CNI
Δ # Market- Opening
-0.373**
-0.406*
Regulations t-1, t-2
(139.8)
(321.3)
Δ # Social protective
-0.307*
-0.563*
Regulations n/a, n/a, t-0, n/a, n/a, t-2
(49.98)
(311.9)
Δ Financial Industry Market
0.113
0.0259
0.109
0.198
0.0739
0.361*
Share t-3, t-3
(2.308e+06) (1.869e+06) (2.054e+06) (9.913e+08) (1.136e+09) (9.351e+08)
Δ # Charter Terminations
-0.445*
-0.497***
-0.320*
0.245
0.111
0.343*
(1.978)
(1.621)
(1.831)
(1.285)
(1.194)
(1.135)
t-1, t-0
Δ Average Institutional Size
0.294
0.339*
0.191
-0.0435
-0.0336
-0.0201
(Assets per Inst.) t-2, t-0
(2.84e-08)
(2.30e-08)
(2.58e-08)
(8.18e-06)
(8.04e-06)
(7.03e-06)
Binary: Recessions t-2, t-1
0.129
0.0577
-0.0356
0.295+
0.198
0.523**
(107.6)
(85.62)
(102.6)
(66.41)
(71.73)
(71.08)
Binary: Economic Crises
0.239
0.276*
0.247+
-0.119
0.0178
-0.0598
(66.03)
(47.49)
(55.63)
(60.51)
(62.76)
(52.75)
t-1, t-0
Chicago Fed Financial Risk
0.220
0.269+
0.326+
-0.538**
-0.558**
-0.741***
Index (High = Higher Risk)
(63.98)
(48.25)
(56.81)
(60.58)
(61.32)
(61.33)
t-2, t-0,

Right Party Power t-3, t-1

0.268+
(41.06)
-0.0350
(15.17)

0.426***
(32.47)
-0.220
(11.83)

0.342**
(35.84)
-0.0842
(13.14)

-0.148
-0.107
-0.196
(35.56)
(35.33)
(30.25)
Effective Federal Funds Rate
0.134
0.0967
0.422
(14.71)
(14.45)
(14.05)
t-1, t-1,
Binary: CU Merger Movement
0.159
0.273+
-0.0375
(92.45)
(106.1)
(93.08)
n/a, t-2
Constant
(109.9)
(96.07)
(96.58)
(107.1)
(106.1)
(97.92)
Observations
33
33
33
31
31
31
R-squared
0.347
0.594
0.479
0.385
0.422
0.548
Durbin-Watson
1.97
2.21
2.02
2.00
2.02
2.29
Beta Coefficients reported – standard coefficients available in the appendix. Standard errors in parentheses. Lags reported with
variable names. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

change by a beta of -0.538. Far weaker but worthy of note is that recessions have a nearsignificant effect on increased change in CNI, by 0.295 SDs. This pattern is nearly exactly
duplicated for Model 5. Though this model introduces the effect of market-opening regulation,
and this variable does suppress change in net income, it comes in second to the effect of financial
risk in the economy (-0.406* for regulation, compared to -0.558** for risk).
Model 6 is far less like Models 4 and 5. Model 6 is ruled by the effects of regulation,
industry power, and financial market risk. The most substantial change between this set of
interrupted models and the original models present in Chapter 5 is that Credit Union change in net
income was much more strongly influenced by macroeconomic and regulatory factors than by
developments within its own industry or direct legislative party makeup. This implies that as
Credit Unions have experienced substantial growth and industry concentration during this period,
they have become more vulnerable to short term macroeconomic changes. This would support my
arguments about how as neoliberal ideology becomes more rooted in policy, that a regularly
occurring pattern will be massive growth, massive profit, and increased vulnerability to shocks.
Final Interrupted Model: Causal Influences on Average Loan-Share Ratios in IntraNeoliberal Period
Finally, Table 6.8 shows changes in the Loan-Share ratio model when it is restricted to
years after 1982. Doing so does demonstrate a few changes, but the core finding is that regulatory
effects take a back seat to industry growth and broad economic risk and economic risk. The
baseline, Model 1, shows that average institution size has the most substantial effect in reducing
the loan-share ratios of credit unions by a margin of -0.57 standard deviations, an outcome which
remains virtually unchanged with the inclusion or either regulatory variable. Otherwise, Model 1
shows that levels of risk present in financial industries correlate with an increased loan-share
ratio, an effect that also holds in both significance and magnitude across all 3 models. Finally,
Financial industry market share also has a consistent effect across all three models, as it tends to
reduce the loan-share ratio by 0.330-0.390 standard deviations. In effect, this means that as credit
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Table 6.8. Effects of Industry, Economic, & Regulatory Change on Credit Union Loan-Share
Ratios, 1984-2015
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
CB Mergers
CU LN-SH
CU LN-SH
Δ # Market- Opening Regulations
0.147*
(5.130)
t-0
Δ # Social Protective Regulations
-0.116+
(2.800)
t-4
Δ Financial Industry Market Share
-0.336**
-0.364**
-0.390**
(2.655e+07)
(2.462e+07)
(2.595e+07)
t-0
Δ # Charter Terminations t-2
-0.0401
-0.0656
-0.0519
(0.0173)
(0.0163)
(0.0160)
Δ Average Institutional Size
0.566*
0.592**
0.581*
(Assets per Institution) t-2
(3.30e-07)
(2.95e-07)
(3.31e-07)
Binary: Recessions t-2
-0.191+
-0.162+
-0.158+
(1.340)
(1.256)
(1.260)
Binary: Economic Crises t-3
-0.315+
-0.348*
-0.225
(2.107)
(1.956)
(2.001)
Chicago Fed Financial Risk Index
0.355**
0.379**
0.337**
(High = Higher Risk) t-0
(1.626)
(1.501)
(1.530)
Right Party Power t-2
0.156
0.178
0.164
(1.103)
(1.020)
(1.029)
Effective Federal Funds Rate
0.390
0.439+
0.486*
(0.438)
(0.403)
(0.422)
t-1
Binary: CU Merger Movement
-0.00802
-0.0357
0.0253
(4.459)
(4.120)
(4.091)
t-2
Constant
(3.423)
(3.103)
(3.510)
Observations
31
31
31
R-squared
0.462
0.554
0.516
Durbin Watson
1.91
2.05
1.78
Beta Coefficients reported – standard coefficients available in the appendix. Standard errors in
parentheses. Lags reported with variable names. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
unions grow and market influence, there is less room between the balance of loans and savings
for credit unions, giving them less ability to handle shocks or crises. Introducing market-opening
regulation to the model (Model 2) does make a few changes. Market-opening regulations do
increase the loan-share ratio as predicted, but only by a margin of about 0.15 standard deviations.
However, another change seen in this model is that when market-opening regulation is
considered, Economic crises come to have a more significant effect in reducing loan-share ratios.
Model 3’s outcomes better resemble Model 1. Like Model 2, protective regulation has the
smallest comparative effect on credit unions’ average loan-share ratio, and only nears
significance. average institutional size, as discussed previously, still has the strongest effect in the
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model, reducing loan-share ratios by a margin of about -0.58standard deviations. Both average
institutional size and financial market risk have nearly the same effects in Model 3 as they did in
Model 1. In this case, the only remaining difference is that positive changes to the federal funds
rate correlate with an increased loan-share ratio, by a significant factor of 0.49 SDs.
Conclusion: Have Banks and Credit Unions Converged in their Levels of Stability?
Twenty-one model summaries later, what do these interrupted models tell us that the
models dedicated to changes in regulation did not? If we focus on those models’ priorities and do
a direct comparison, one interesting thing. Table 6.9 does just that. There we can see that across
each set of models, removing the first decade of results appears to serve only to blunt the effects
of regulatory change for commercial banks, but we do see that regulation played a far greater
role for Credit Unions’ outcomes than in the aggregated models. There is virtually no change in
the direction of effects except in the last of each model set models: that of the Credit Unions’
industry’s average loan-share ratio.

1983-2015
Models

~1973-2015
Models

Table 6.9. Comparison of Effects of CU and CB Regulatory Variables on Convergence
Dependent Variables. Beta Coefficients.
Institutional
Mergers
Change in
Loan-Share
Failures
Net Income
Ratio
CB Market Opening
-0.981**1
-0.788*1
-0.382*3*
CB Social Protective

-0.581*2

-0.552*2*

+0.274+3

-

CU Market Opening

-0.894**1

-0.464+4*

-0.143**

+0.0720

CU Social Protective

-0.477

-0.425*3

+0.488**2

+0.110*

CB Market Opening

-0.409+2*

-0.417+3**

-0.373**3

-

CB Social Protective

-0.712*2**

-0.432*

-0.307*3**

-

CU Market Opening

-0.497**

-0.801**1

-0.406*2**

+0.147*5

CU Social Protective

-0.939**1*

-0.671***1*

-0.563*2**

-0.116+5*

*Superscript indicates ranking of the variable’s beta coefficient relative to other significant
model variables, where 1 indicates the strongest effect, 2 the second strongest, etc.
However, this type of focus obscures what I think is the more meaningful story that can
be found in this data. The first set of interrupted models clearly shows that from the mid-1980s
onward, market share and size began to correlate significantly with instability. If these models’
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predictions were to be accurate, then as industries dominate a larger portion of the consumer
finance market, they would inevitably face larger numbers and rates of failures. This was a
consistent pattern across each of the banking models: change in industry-based factors is leading
to substantial change in levels of failure, and growth appears correlated with struggle. Credit
unions have not yet shown this pattern definitively, however, instead showing increased
vulnerability to macroeconomic forces. This could be due to their still relatively small average
size, but if that were the case, we would have expected a more similar result from the models in
Chapter 5. Instead, I suspect that it is a combination of factors – diminutiveness, yes, but also
growth. I think that the credit union is currently situated in a sort of middle-area where many are
still small enough to wrestle with some economies of scale, but a substantial portion of the
industry is large enough to be affected by a different class of economic variables.
Given this growth, the question about the level and nature of convergence remains. Here I
have brought back Table 6.4 (Table 6.10 here), because while it shows interesting results, by
itself it does not capture the full story of credit union and commercial bank convergence and
divergence. These models show that Social regulation significantly correlates with convergence
in failures, but that the association is fairly weak. The same can be said of change in net income.
This make sense when we once again consider the prediction of this model, which assumes a

Unstandardized
coefficients

Beta
Coefficients

Table 6.10. Comparison of Effects of CU and CB Regulatory Variables on Convergence
Dependent Variables.
Institutional Failures
Mergers
Change in Net
Income
CU Market Opening

-0.765*

2.033***

0.612***

CU Social Protective

0.852+

-0.278***

-0.180***

CB Market Opening

-

-

0.232***

CB Social Protective

-

-

0.187+**

CU Market Opening

-0.147*

1.376***

66.32***

CU Social Protective

0.097+

-0.107***

-18.91***

CB Market Opening

-

-

12.41***

CB Social Protective

-

-

5.27+**
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Figure 6.4. Credit Union Mergers as a Percentage of Bank Mergers, with Counts
of Credit Union and Bank Mergers, 1982-2015.

linear increase, with a reality in which policy change seldom follows linear patterns. So, if an
increase in x (regulation) leads to a corresponding amount of change in y (Credit Union failure,
merger, or CNI as a % of Banks’), what does this look like when in reality, regulation fluctuates?
In the case of our strongest relationship, we get a result like that seen in Figure 6.4. What
we see is that the proportion of actual change in regulation is quite small, thus showing that while
regulation may have a significant effect on convergence, if there is little change, then ultimately,
the effect on convergence scarcely matters. In this case, there remained substantial difference in
the merger rates of credit unions and banks. This may relate more to a measurement validity issue
with the convergence variables, something worth pursuing in future research. Ultimately, this
chapter has found that while the occurrence of convergence is an open question, there are
indicators that regulatory change can influence such an event, and that without a doubt, regulatory
change since the 1980s has changed the way that credit unions’ failure and stability are influence
by market and industry forces.

146

Broad Significance and Meaning
Considering these findings, what can we conclude in the broader context of this project?
At the end of chapter five I commented that despite a history of placing a high value on serving
underserved populations, credit unions also appear to be fighting the policies that transformed
that value into a reality. Credit unions still have more of a role in community service than other
financial organizations; every year’s NCUA includes sections on serving low-income populations
and other community initiatives. However, the data covered in this chapter indicated that while
they are not necessarily becoming more bank-like, credit unions are beginning to experience a
few of the risks associated with increased size and decreased restrictions.
If we were to continue with the metaphor of credit unions and banks suddenly thrown
into the same pond in which they must now compete for the same resources, a few things can
become clearer. While they are definitely keeping an eye on the market incumbent (to use
Fligstein’s terms), credit unions have not yet fully conformed to the incumbent’s style of
operations. While there is evidence of their interest in doing so, there is not yet evidence showing
that they have done so or what the impact of those choices will be on the future of credit unions
as alternatives to banks.
What does this say about credit unions? So far, despite the decrease in that regulation, the
general pattern and system of regulation that historically and recently set credit unions apart from
banks and similar institutions does render them more stable than their competition. They
demonstrate that financial regulation does work, that it can allow for economic and institutional
growth, and still protect the people who count on that institution for their financial wellbeing.
Likewise, the quick rise in size and market share of credit unions since their appearance in the
United States has shown that serving low-income and marginalized groups without exploitative
practices can still be profitable. These are important points that refute many widespread ideas
about how markets and institutions must function under capitalist systems, and they provide
important evidence that introducing democratic controls and influences into market systems can
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still allow for growth and forestall collapse. It also shows that regulation can be done in ways that
allow innovations to be created and used, in terms of internal functioning or commodities to sell,
as credit unions too have come to offer more services over time (though their investment options
are still very limited).
The limited findings of the convergence models are not necessarily problematic or
meaningless either. Though they did not find evidence of convergence currently occurring, there
is much to be said for the idea that if current trends continue, convergence can happen. In this
case, “current trends” include the practice of widespread deregulation. While real events show
regulation rising and falling, there has been a general, well-documented downward trend in
protective regulation and somewhat in market-opening regulation. If this trend were to continue,
then within the next century we likely would see little distinguishable difference between credit
unions and banks. However, it is important to keep in mind that because support for regulation
waxes and wanes and in the United States is often a partisan issue, there are many factors that can
influence the direction of regulatory policy. In short, the idea that if current trends continue is
theoretically useful, but we must remember that the conditions required to satisfy that statement
are unlikely, especially over a span of a hundred years. Yet there is plenty that can be done with
these findings. They are empirically useful for future work and theory, they demonstrate that
there is a potentially very valuable field of research that has been under-utilized by those seeking
to understand how market functions and ideologies affect the people and societies in which they
occur.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions & Next Steps for Research
At the beginning of this dissertation, I posited the question, “Is there a meaningful
difference between the stability of the Credit Union and Consumer Banking industries before the
1980s, and how have both industries’ stability been affected by subsequent political-economic
changes?” I expected to find a case study of what began as effective financial regulation in the
credit union industry, weakened over time by the rise of an economic ideology which advocates
for the removal of that regulation. By exploring this topic, I hoped that I would contribute to
research that has focused on solving problems in the banking industry by studying potential
solutions.
Initially, I explained the basic functioning of the consumer finance industry and the credit
union industry itself, from its inception to present. Through this exploration of industry history, I
noted that there was a strong inverse correlation between credit union size and failures. However,
I suspected that the relationship was spurious and instead theorized that the correlation could be
explained by regulatory change. This claim was strengthened by the observation that while credit
unions had benefitted from certain key forms of deregulation, they were still deregulated to a
lesser extent than banks and had still decreased their failure rates. After the early 1980s, credit
unions suffered far lower rates of outright failure than banks during subsequent economic
downturns.
The analysis revealed two things: regulation works, but while convergence under current
conditions can eventually happen, it has not yet. Regulatory change had a greater effect on
convergence than most other model variables, even if they were aggregated into categories of
industry-level or economy-level variables. This effect was especially strong in reducing failures
overall, and significantly affected stability (CNI and Loan-Share ratios), especially for Banks.
The most telling finding was that when mapping these results onto the historical record, you
could see that banks were able to leverage their market status and political power to push for
continued deregulation. If not always consistently, this deregulation primarily benefitted them
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and allowed them to maintain their market position. Conversely, they were able to reduce the
level of deregulation permitted to credit unions; credit unions did still gain substantial freedom
compared to the postwar years, but still more often faced increases in regulation than banks did.
This may have ended up benefitting credit unions the most, as a balanced approach to
deregulation allowed them stable growth.
Further study revealed a downward trend in the level of regulation credit unions are
facing. This indicated that Credit Unions are beginning to win some legislative battles, despite
their challenger position and relatively very small slice of the broad consumer finance market,
hinting that if credit unions are winning legislative battles, those battles could be heading in the
direction of bank-like levels of regulation. Yet while that eventuality could be coming, it has not
arrived. The decrease in new regulatory legislation, though noteworthy, is not the same as active
deregulation. Theoretically, credit unions may have solidified their challenger status sufficiently
to reduce the burden of new rules, they have not yet become powerful in the consumer finance
industry to actively relieve the expectation of regulation. That is, they have not yet become
incumbent firms capable of setting the rules to which the broader industry must conform.
The convergence models showed that increases in regulation (especially market-opening
regulation) can lead credit unions to meet and even proportionally surpass commercial banks in
the consumer finance industry. However, the inconsistency of actual regulatory change requires
me to conclude that while convergence is possible under certain conditions, those conditions have
not been met. This makes theoretical and historical sense, as we can plainly observe that while
there is increased similarity between these institutions, they are still by no means the same.
A key argument Fligstein made in the development of the Political-Cultural theory of
markets is that growth is not just a matter of freeing up prices and markets. It is necessary to
create rules of stable interaction. This is driven by the dominant policy domain and a collective
understanding of what seems to have worked in the past. In the United States context, it seemed
that the diminished growth of the 1970s was best addressed by policies that favored deregulation.
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Though the savings and loan crisis Indicated that hypothetically some sort of balance is required,
ever since then, “…in the United States, every economic crisis calls forth the response to
deregulate and to reduce government in worker influence.(Fligstein 2002)” When this was done
as the lead-in and response to the Savings & Loan crisis in the 1980s and early 1990s,
deregulation opened up previously unavailable or unappealing markets for both Credit Unions
and Commercial Banks. This caused their two industries to collide – suddenly they were both
vying for overlapping consumer groups. Though commercial banks were unquestionably larger
than credit unions, credit unions were incumbents in their own areas. Thus, they were able to
manage to compete with banks on CUs’ home turf, while credit unions were able to market to a
broader consumer population.
Theoretical Significance and Substantive Meaning
The findings of this project support the theoretical claim that government intervention is
necessary to produce more stable market outcomes. However, the current policy domain mediates
that intervention through the interests of markets incumbents. In this case, regulatory intervention
appeared in the wake of economic crisis, but each time the accompanying policy change was
planned and implemented frequent feedback from banks. An interesting detail is that as credit
unions grew and became more prominent, they began to also become involved in this process.
This matches well onto the theoretical assertion that the policy domain that was established in the
1980s was one that expected the state to have a smaller role in making the rules and limit itself
more to enforcement. But what this substantively mean?
Fligstein’s Socio-cultural theory was markets was meant to provide a framework by
which to understand that like anything else related to humans, markets too are social systems that
are governed by rules of social interaction. And as with anything else social, culture and ideology
provide and constrain opportunities and perspectives, and their outcomes remain social. There has
been a large volume of theory discussing the importance of government intervention into markets,
yet in the United States it is common perception that such intervention can only ever do more
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harm than good. Using the framework of Fligstein’s theory to consider how market
transformations have changed the landscape of the consumer finance industry over the last 50
years, this study has found compelling evidence that not only does regulation ensure more stable
and equitable outcomes, but that the removal or lack thereof causes distinctly worse outcomes.
Such natural experiments are rare, yet this has been clearly shown by the preceding analysis.
An additional point to bear in mind is that historically, credit unions framed themselves
(admittedly generously) as an emancipatory social movement meant to provide financial
opportunity and literacy to those who were underserved or ignored by existing financial
institutions and markets. For a field as concerned with inequalities as Sociology is, the lack of
attention to the development of a system with such lofty goals (however well they may or may
not have been met) is surprising. This study reveals that credit unions are institutions worthy of
study, not just within the theoretical or empirical subfields of institutional research or
organizations, but also for how they may serve as case studies for economic cultural and
ideological change, community organizations with conflicting goals, and as shifting bridges
between capitalist or federal and communal interests. How long did it take for these “financial
institutions for the man of small means” take to serve the needs of nonwhite populations? Or
female populations? Are they more or less likely to assign LBGT households the same financial
privileges assigned to heteronormative families? Did they also participate in racist discriminatory
policies before and in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis? What was the role of credit
unions in redlining policies?
Implications & Future Research
From this study, it seems apparent that we can learn much more about change in
regulation and its effects from the study of credit unions. Sociologists have studied credit unions
for their interest as organizationally unique institutions (Haveman on State-chartered credit
unions in the 1990s), or for the community engagement performed by CUs outside the United
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States. Yet credit unions have not been assessed for their regulatory significance in the US by
sociologists, meaning that this dissertation had to break some new ground. Doing so has placed
me in a position to make several recommendations for future study.
First, the loosening of requirements of the credit union industry and subsequent effects on
stability needs to be assessed with greater attention to credit union sizes. While my measure of
average assets per institution provides a decent though heavily aggregated measure of industrylevel size. However, credit union stability and failure has varied heavily with credit union size. In
the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis, for example, the greatest financial losses came from
corporate credit unions, a much larger class of institutions that had much broader permissions for
investments. Conversely, the greatest number of NCUA-forced liquidations came from the
smallest institutions, which were found to have not-insignificant issues with fraud, many of which
could be described as “one-person shops”. While NCUA statistics do not divide liquidations or
mergers by institution size, they do often report basic numbers such as assets, shares, and loans
by institution size category, which can still be useful in a study of regulatory effects. Likewise,
detailed information on corporate credit unions is hard to find, and there has been even less
research on them, but the NCU-SIF does provide some aggregate data which can be used to
situate them as players in a broader credit union industry. Given their massive losses and failures
in the subprime mortgage crisis and Great Recession, including the failure and closure of US
Central Credit Union (which functionally equivalent to the failure of a central bank), these are
institutions that must be examined.
One accomplishment of this dissertation is that it was able to study the substantive
differences between market-opening and social regulation, and important direction for future
sociological research into regulation in a broad sense (and particularly for the financial
industries), more work needs to be done on differentiating and clarifying these concepts. In this
and select other studies, market-opening and social regulation have essentially been treated as
function equivalents to the concepts of deregulation and regulation. However, my results indicate
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that market-opening regulation is not only not inversely proportional to social regulation, but that
a decrease in market-opening regulation could possibly have similar outcomes to deregulation as
broadly conceived by the literature. That is, market opening regulation is still regulation, and
should not be treated as deregulation. This differentiation can have substantial implications for
how regulation is treated in sociological research. I would strongly recommend future researchers
work to clarify these concepts and to refine potential measures of them. I suspect that the
regulatory literature will be much better for it.
The question of what policy recommendation could come from this is a difficult one, not
because solutions aren’t apparent, but because policy recommendations must by nature have
some level of feasibility, and within the constraints of American political culture, the solutions
implied by this project are not. One important finding from this project is the confirmation that
allowing institutions room for growth is good for them. While the idea that such a finding is novel
is laughable, it does serve as some small indicator of validity, that this study has not found that
credit unions should stay as small as possible. For the natural-person credit union, growth has
largely been good.
However, it appears that the reason that growth has been good for credit unions is that it
did not come with a long-term pattern of massive deregulation. While there was a measure of
deregulation in the 1980s, there was more market-opening regulation. This made it easier for
credit unions to flourish in the newly merged consumer finance markets, while still being
prevented from participating in the toxic assets that have repeatedly hurt commercial banks and
savings & loans. Corporate credit unions suffered substantially in the subprime mortgage crisis
because they did have access to investments in toxic assets, so this is an area worth continued
examination. A simple policy recommendation would be to once against separate consumer
banking services from investment services, requiring firms to do one or the other. However, given
the way that large institutions have come to rely on income from consumer banking, and the ‘too
big to fail’ outcome of financialization, it is not clear how such a project could be accomplished,
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of what institutions would look like after such a change. That alone would be a topic worthy of
study.
One lamentable element missing from this study that I would most encourage researchers
to pursue in the future is that of culture. While this study asserts that a cultural change has
occurred, and assess its outcomes, it was unable to directly measure that cultural change at the
industry and firm levels. On some level, this may be required to truly assess the level and extent
of convergence occurring, on an ideological level if not practical. There is some evidence that this
is happening, as the current group of NCUA officials are seeking policy changes that would
narrow the behavioral gap between credit unions and commercial banks.
Finally, given the solidly global nature of financial markets, it is fair to ask why this
project did not engage with the research on globalization. There are a few reasons. First, for most
of their history, and arguably for much of the time that globalization has existed as an observable
reality, its connection to American credit unions has been minimal. That is not to say that they
have been untouched by the phenomenon – I am not convinced that that argument could be made
convincingly about most topics. However, when we think of global finance, the assets most
thought of are stocks, derivatives, and a broad array of large of complex investments known as
securities. As communally owned institutions, credit unions have not been closely involved with
or even allowed to make some of these types type of investments until relatively recently. When
they first appeared as commodities, credit unions were not able to work with mutual funds. Today
they are permitted to invest in a range of securities, but generally must do so through corporate
credit unions, much like how people usually must go through an investment firm to purchase
stakes in such investments. Further, the average person-level credit union is still restricted in its
investment options. Thus, there are fewer connections to global financial markets. This lack of
connection is also maintained by their still relatively conservative financial practices, which
served them well during the more recent crises.
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A major factor insulating American credit unions from globalization is their common
bond requirement – because all members must have something in common, they are usually
regionally bounded, either by being defined as a regional credit union, or because the association
of their members is innately geographically limited. For example, even though people who do not
live in Kentucky might be members of the UK Federal Credit Union because of their alumni
status, there is not a sufficiently large eligible population outside Kentucky to justify substantial
expansion for the UKFCU. An additional reason that this project did not engage with
globalization is a matter of scope and comparability. Credit Unions in the US are different from
credit unions in Germany, credit unions in Italy, and credit unions in France. This is in terms of
structure, value system, membership, and regulation. While a comparison is certainly interesting
and worth pursuing, doing so was far outside the practical scope of this project.
This project was inspired by the 2008 US financial crisis, which led me to ask why some
types of financial institutions fared better than others, and how that might lead us to more stable
financial markets. It was driven by a concern about the prevalence of anti-egalitarian arguments
about how institutions had to function to survive. To better understand the issue, I studied
existing literature to find that there are substantive criticisms of the innate instability of markets,
and that empirical evidence supports the efficacy of regulation to mitigate market risks. Having
confirmed that regulation is a key element in market stability, I sought a theoretical approach that
allowed me to take a politically, economically, and historically holistic view of the personal
finance industry. I applied this perspective to an analysis of the consumer finance market,
focusing on banks and credit unions, from the 1970s to the present.
I found that the development of a capitalist-centered policy domain allowed market-based
ideologies to flourish and shape the outcomes of credit unions in such a way that they could
become less stable over time, but that time has not yet come. However, I also confirmed two
conflicting developments, both consistent with the political-cultural theory of markets. First,
regulation is required to maintain industry stability, a finding consistent with the large volume of
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theoretical work on the topic. Second, also consistent with both the political-cultural theory and
other sociological works, the United States is not moving in that direction, at least not for the
consumer finance industry. This indicates that the US will continue to see cycles of bear and bull
markets, punctuated by cyclical recessions for as long if it maintains its current economicideological orientation.
This research is important beyond the existence of a clear gap in the literature. Scholars
across disciplines have observed with concern the apparently increasing incidence of stock
market crashes, panics, and crises since the postwar years (1950-1970), including the increasing
occurrence of stock market volatility in response to social and political events (Minsky 2008,
Minsky 1984, Minsky 1992). It is my hope that this project may help sociologists to better
identify ways to control these patterns of economic instability, while still permitting tenable
industry growth.
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Glossary of Terms
Capital - Wealth in the form of money or other assets owned by a person or organization, which
may be available for investing.
Capital Asset – (For businesses) An asset with a useful life longer than a year that is used to
generate revenue, that is not intended for sale in the regular course of the business's operation. An
example would be a computer used to track inventory in a business.
Conception of Control – A cultural framework which defines who is an incumbent and who is a
challenger and why (i.e., defines the social structure); prescribes how competition will work; and
provides actors with cognitive frames to interpret the actions of other organizations.
Derivative - An asset, such as a future or option, the value of which depends on the price of
another, “underlying” asset (MacKenzie and Millo 2003).
Equity – (1) On a balance sheet, equity represents funds contributed by the owners (stockholders)
plus retained earnings or minus the accumulated losses. (2) Net worth of a person or company
computed by subtracting total liabilities from the total assets. In case of cooperatives, equity
represents members' investment plus retained earnings or minus losses (BusinessDictionary.com).
Exogenous Shock - An unexpected or unpredictable event that that occurs from outside a
particular market, industry, or economy, which affects that market, industry, or economy either
positively or negatively.
Field – A social space in which Collective actors try to produce a system of domination via a
local culture that defines social relations between actors.
Firm - A firm is a for-profit entity that sells goods and/or services for profit and includes all
business structures and trades. In economics, a firm might be differentiated from a business in
that a firm would primarily provide services, whereas business may be oriented more towards
commodities and goods.
Floating Debt – Short-term debt that is continually refinanced, renewed, or rolled over to meet
ongoing operational requirements (BusinessDictionary.com).
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Free Market - an economic system in which prices are determined by unregulated competition
and exchanges between privately owned businesses and/or consumers.
Future - A standardized exchange-traded contract in which one party undertakes to buy, and the
other to sell, a set quantity of an asset at a set price on a given future date (MacKenzie and Millo
2003).
Ideology (Economic) - A framework of norms, values, and cultural notions that are used to
understand the [economic] world in which we live.
Lagging indicators - Economic and financial-market indicators which tend to change only after
an economy has already changed or has begun to follow a pattern or trend. They trail behind
(usually by six months) the overall economic cycle instead of moving with it (as coincident
indicators do) or moving ahead of it (as leading indicators do). Major lagging indicators include
the unemployment rate, outstanding consumer loans, outstanding business loans, business
spending, business profits, book value of business inventories, unit labor costs, and consumer
price index (CPI) (BusinessDictionary.com).
Leading indicators - materialize before a recession is officially declared. Perhaps the most
common leading indicator is contraction in the stock market. Declines in broad stock indices,
such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index, often
appear several months before a recession takes shape (Investopedia 2017).
Not-for-Profit - Not-for-profit organizations are types of organizations that do not earn profits
for its owners. All the money earned by or donated to a not-for-profit organization is used in
pursuing the organization's objectives and keeping it running.
Options - Contracts that give their holders the right, but do not oblige them, to buy – or, in an
alternative form of the contract, to sell – an asset at a set price on, or up to, a given future date
(Benuza, Hardie and MacKenzie 2006; MacKenzie and Millo 2003).
Recession – two consecutive quarters of GDP decline, supplemented by two types of indicators:
leading indicators and lagging indicators (Investopedia 2017).
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Regulatory Regime - A system in which agencies are created to enforce general rules and
markets but do not decide who can own what or make wet investment.
Regulatory Void - Spaces in which government regulation is perceived to be deficient. Freemarket proponents claim that self-regulation will appear to fill the space, while pro-regulation
arguments say that a failure to impose regulation in these spaces will result in a market failure.
Short selling - Selling an asset one does not own, e.g., by borrowing it, selling it, and later
repurchasing and returning it (MacKenzie and Millo 2003).
Solvency - Solvency is the ability of a company to meet its long-term debts and financial
obligations. Solvency is essential to staying in business as it demonstrates a company’s ability to
continue operations into the foreseeable future. Not to be confused with liquidity, which related to
the ability to assemble funds needed in the short term.
Stock-Index Future - A contract that yields a pay-off that follows the prices of the stocks
making up the index.
Volatility - The extent of the fluctuations of a price, conventionally measured by the annualized
standard deviation of continuously compounded returns on the asset (MacKenzie and Millo
2003).
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